

**The Europe of Nations and Its Future.
Nationalism, Euroscepticism, Natiocratism**

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Nationalism, Euroscepticism, Natiocratism

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Preface

The topic of the booklet in front of you is the issue of nationalism as well as Euroscepticism in the European Union and in particular a new phenomenon, which is emerging before our eyes, i.e. nationalism at a European level.

European nationalism? This conceptual cluster is only at a first glance internally contradictory. The era when nationalists from one country shot at nationalists from a neighbouring one is a thing of the past. In a globalized world and integrated Europe nationalism perceived in such a way is long gone. It is a historic relic, which could be exhibited in an ideological museum. Its last remaining followers could be dubbed indeed as *dinosaurs*. Contemporary European nationalists, or as they describe themselves – patriots – do not stare into the past and do not cherish memories of prior conflicts. Euro-nationalists are not nostalgic, but they are focusing on the future.

The ascertainment stated above is the result of our trip to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, which we took in December of 2015 and our conversations that we had with the members of the European Parliament associated with the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF) consisting of so-called Eurosceptics.

The purpose of this work is to examine the origins, the essence and the perspectives of Euro-nationalism.

This booklet consists of two parts. The first one has a theoretical character. Chapter I (the author of which is Adam Wielomski) discusses European nationalism taking into consideration the history of nationalism in Europe since its emergence during the French Revolution, up until contemporary times. The history of European nationalist thought is presented here. Its task was not to recreate all of the details, but to provide a general classification of various types of nationalism, defining the phenomenon and to present the historical trajectory of its development. We prove that there never was a single archetypical nationalism, something that in the spirit of Max Weber we could call *an ideal type*. Nationalism at first meant the right of nations to self-determination in its internal affairs (a republican and democratic postulate) as well as external ones (the postulate of the nation-state), but then it transformed, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, into an either anti-democratic, authoritarian and Christian political current (Romance countries) or a racist and expansionist one (Germany). Currently nationalists are returning to their roots, becoming once again democratic defenders of the nation-state. While the nationalists of the nineteenth century stepped out against the monarchs of Divine Grace under such slogans as *the right of nations to self-determination*, their contemporary counterparts step out against the European bureaucrats, who are detached from the reality of the nations constituting the European Union.

The exit point for Chapter II (the author of which is Magdalena Ziętek-Wielomska) is the statement that many contemporary nationalists do not function under the banners of the nationalist doctrine, even if their worldview can be put in exactly that tradition. The main reason for this is of course the

fact that nationalism has been ridiculed and compromised in the mainstream media by directly linking it with the image of the notorious doctrine of National Socialism. Patriots – because that is how they call themselves – do not want to waste energy on combating this phenomenon. Nationalism – let us say in its classical or traditional form – was also rather ambivalent if it comes to the issues of international cooperation, from which one cannot escape in the globalized world. Finally, classic nationalism did not have a consistent, scientific justification. It referred to the concept of a nation, which has never been clearly defined. A question is posed in the text concerning the possibility of creating a modern nationalist doctrine that could solve problems, which classic nationalism did not see or did not try to tackle. The doctrine of natiocratism seems to be an interesting attempt at disengaging from that impasse. It was created by Józef Kossecki – a Polish scientist and activist of the nationalist movement. In this chapter the basic foundations of natiocratism are presented, as well as the question is posed whether there is a possibility of utilizing that doctrine for the sake of nationalists’ and Eurosceptics’ political struggle.

The second part of our booklet consists of transcripts from our conversations with Eurosceptics, which we conducted in the European Parliament. We registered these conversations in the form of interviews, which we have elaborated in order to make them available for our readers. The most important interview surely is the one with Marine Le Pen – the member of the MENE, the co-president of the Europe of Nations and Freedom group as well as the leader of the French National Front, i.e. the political party which achieved 30% of the popular vote in the 2015 local

government elections and has become the premier political faction in France as far as popularity is considered. Marine Le Pen herself grew to be the main candidate in the upcoming presidential elections. We also conducted interviews with four other prominent representatives of the MENF from France, Austria, Great Britain and Poland.

A different image of European contemporary nationalism emerges from the available literature and the materials that we collected, than is presented in the mass-media promoted stereotypes. It is also far from the thought of the *great classics*: Charles Maurras, Maurice Barrès, Enrico Corradini and Roman Dmowski. The completely new feature of this current can be seen in the pan-European nature of this doctrine. Contemporary nationalists created an authentic *Nationalist International* against European federalism represented by the European Commission as well as the *over-lordship* of German chancellor Angela Merkel. The Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom is an alliance of political parties offering an alternative European project, based on free nations, the purpose of which is to counter the vision of a unipolar world under the absolute domination of the United States of America with the vision of a multipolar world based on the balance of power between the USA, Europe, Russia, China and perhaps smaller players (the classic *concert of powers* known from modern European history).

To conclude we would like to add three remarks. Firstly, we would like to thank Michał Marusik, a Member of the European Parliament from Poland, who is also the chairman of the Congress of the New Right party and member of the MENF, for organizing

our trip to Strasbourg and enabling us to conduct the interviews included in this work. Secondly, we would like to thank our friend Michał Krupa for meticulously translating this book into English as well as Marcin Garbowski, who helped to polish the translation, making it accessible for the international reader. Thirdly, we would like to inform you that the content presented here has been published initially in Polish in the “Pro Fide, Rege et Lege” journal (no. 75/76 from 2015/16).

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PART I

CHAPTER 1

Three waves of European nationalism

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1. What is nationalism?

There is no (if ever there has been) single, metahistorical and metageographical nationalism, or a type of archetypical nationalism, according to the standard of the Weberian ideal type. Throughout Europe's history, and particularly in the history of

European political thought, we can observe various nationalisms, which combined create with enormous difficulty a uniform trend that is referred to – so willingly and frequently – as nationalism.

The term encompasses the French nationalists, who were Jacobin extremists from the period of the Great French Revolution, such as Maximilian Robespierre and Georges Danton, romantic liberals like Jules Michelet and Edgar Quinet alike. In a later period, the Bonapartist Maurice Barrès and the counterrevolutionary monarchist Charles Maurras, were considered the fathers of nationalism. In Italy, the anti-clerical democrat Giuseppe Mazzini and the liberal Camillo Cavour, were considered fathers of this trend, only to be followed by a re-taking of the standard by anti-democrats and imperialists such as Enrico Corradini and Alfredo Rocco. The latter through word and deed supported Benito Mussolini, who abolished the Italian liberal state created by Mazzini and Cavour, noticing in it the most degenerate form of government directed against the nation and the nationalist idea.

Similar examples of internal contradictions within nationalism can be multiplied without end. Nationalists cannot agree on anything even in one country, except for the general slogan: it is necessary to love one's homeland and nation. Nonetheless, they differ diametrically in their view of how to apply this *love*. For some, absolute monarchy, as it existed before the year 1789 (Ch. Maurras), is the quintessential *national* regime. For others – the constitutional monarchy is more suitable (E. Corradini, A. Rocco). For some the real *national* regime is a dictatorship (M. Barrès, F. Franco), still others identify it with a liberal republic (G. Mazzini, A. Mickiewicz, J. Michelet, R. Dmowski). There are also those, for whom the national regime is identified with an omnipotent and totalitarian state under the rule of one

leader (M. Robespierre, B. Mussolini, A. Hitler). All of them support economic nationalism, but they are not in agreement as to whether the national economy is of the free-market or the socialist-statist type. For some, the national religion is Roman Catholicism (F. Franco, A. Oliveira Salazar, B. Mussolini), others are religiously “tone-deaf” (term attributed to M. Weber¹), still others search for their own national monolatric religion, based on pagan models (P. de Lagarde, A. Rosenberg). Nationalists, who love their nation, don’t even agree on the question of what exactly the nation is and who constitutes it: whether it is Ernst Renan’s “daily voting”², (i.e. membership in a nation is of a volitive character), or belonging to it is determined by history and many hundreds of years of state tradition (B. Mussolini, R. Dmowski). Or maybe perhaps belonging signifies determinism and depends on genes and blood (A. Rosenberg)?

The term nationalism tells us nothing, except that whoever describes his views as nationalist, expresses subjective positive feelings for the homeland and one’s fellow countrymen. However, it does not inform us about which political regime the nationalist prefers, what economic model he deems desirable, whether he is a democrat or not, is he tied to the Christian tradition or one that is alien to it. What’s more, this declaration does not even identify who the nationalist considers his countrymen³.

¹ M. Signore, *Max Weber (1864–1920). Etica religiosa e razionalità moderna*, [in:] G. Penzo, R. Gibellini (ed.), *Dio nella filosofia del Novecento*, Brescia 1993, p. 91.

² E. Renan, *Co to jest naród?* [1882], [in:] idem, *Dzieła*, vol. I, Warszawa 1904, p. 33.

³ For further reading see e.g. B. Grott, *Nacjonalizm czy nacjonalizmy?*, [in:] idem (ed.), *Nacjonalizm czy nacjonalizmy?* Kraków 2006, pp. 7–16; A. Wielomski, *Nacjonalizm francuski 1886–1940. Geneza, przemiany i istota filozofii politycznej*, Warszawa 2007, pp. 15–26.

There is no single correct definition of nationalism. In professional literature there are several contradictory definitions of the term. The most important among them are:

**Definition 1: the demand for the right
of nations to self-determination (external)**

The most popular definition states that nationalism demands *the right of nations to self-determination* (external), that is the pursuit of a nation, which never possessed a separate state or which lost it, to create (or rebuild) its own statehood⁴. A crucial issue is connected with the territorial boundaries of these claims. Where are these *national* lands? These can be understood in this place as:

- The territorial space marked by ethnic boundaries, and thus created by adjacent areas: where more than 50% of the population are members of a nation and express this by way of a plebiscite.
- The ethnic solution is the simplest, as it comes down to counting the results of a vote: yet it is often denied in favor of a national territory, not due to the percentage of the national population, but because of its cultural and civilizational value. Such claims are often extended to the lands where members of the minority does not dominate numerically within the population (e.g. in case of the German claims to the Wielkopolska region and the Polish borderlands in the

⁴ Nationalism understood in such a way is discussed among others in E. Gellner, *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 1991, pp. 9–10; C. Calhoun, *Nationalism and Ethnicity*, „Annual Review of Sociology” 1993, no. 19, p. 212; Ch. Tilly, *National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us*, „Daedalus” 1993, no. 122, p. 29; A. Buchanan, *Secesja i nacjonalizm*, [in:] R.E. Goodin, Ph. Pettit, *Przewodnik po współczesnej filozofii politycznej*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 744 and ff.

interwar period). In many cases such claims can be based solely on history, where members of the nation aspiring to ownership constitute a minority of the population, but these are the areas that are the historic cradle of the nation (e.g. Kosovo for the Serbs, the Holy Land for the Jews, at the time that the Zionist movement was born).

**Definition 2: the demand for the right
of nations to self-determination (internal)**

Nationalism can be understood somewhat differently, if we accept as its current definition the “right of nations to self-determination (internally)”. Just as a nation in case of definition no. 1 has the right to decide on its borders, it also has a right to decide who, how, on what basis and for how long can govern it. A self-governing nation is one which does not recognize the rule of any monarch ruling on the basis of *Deo Gratia* or as a result of inheritance of the throne – meaning the deriving of power from historical or religious legitimacy. A nation possessing the right to internal self-determination decides about its choice of a political and social system, its relations with the Church (churches), decides which party it appoints to power and does not recognize any other authority, which it did not establish and which does not operate under the conditions dictated by the nation. This leads to the demand for the establishment of the rule of the people via representative institutions (democracy). The primary sovereignty of the nation never expires, the nation never loses it, it cannot legitimately and permanently rid itself of it and an eventual disposal is never legitimate. This by definition makes hereditary monarchies illegal, as well as authoritarian governments and all these types of regimes in which office terms are not maintained as a principle. Whoever inherits power and reigns for life is considered

a usurper of the primary and inalienable rights of the nation⁵. The external and internal “right of a nation to self-determination” can be combined into one coherent whole in the form of a state with a democratic regime, preferably one that has an ethnographic character. The consequence of this idea is that all the states in the world should be ethnographic by nature and should be democratic. This is the idea of Woodrow Wilson and neo-Wilsonian advocates of *the right of nations to self-determination* – an ideal that is universally recognized today as democratic.

And yet definitions of nationalism, which are not concerned with such abstract notions, as the objective rights of nations, the inherent rights of nations, etc., lean in a completely different direction. Here we are concerned with definitions that do not focus on the search for the ideal national borders or regimes, but make references to real national interests and which perceive foreign as well as domestic policy in terms of a clash of conflicting interests, sometimes resulting in concealed or even open violence. Therefore, we can add the following definitions to the previous ones:

**Definition 3: the primacy of the national
interest over particular interests**

The essence of nationalism rests on the recognition of the absolute primacy of the national interest over the interest of social classes, political parties and individuals, that is, the subordination of all the aims of smaller entities which comprise the nation to this interest.

All of the above mentioned smaller entities must subordinate their political, economic and cultural-religious interests to the

⁵ H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States. An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, London 1977, p. 6.

highest good, which is the good of the nation as a whole⁶. In relation to definitions number 1 and 2 this represents a radical shift of focus from the idealist-institutional moment to the functional one, resulting in the treatment of the nation as a kind of temporal absolute, to which everything must be subordinated. According to this definition, writes Paolo Alatri, “the nation is understood as an absolute entity, not as an organic and dialectical mixture of various moral, social, political and economic forces co-existing among people in a given country”⁷. This raises the nation to the rank of absolute value and assigns it a similar place in the hierarchy of values to the status of the modern nation-state in the era preceding the French Revolution, along with its aims referred to as *raison d'état*. This also encompassed the minor interests of social classes, individual provinces, cities, lands and the great feudal lords. This definition is nothing else but an old and well-known *raison d'état* transferred to the era of mass society, where the monarchical state ceases to be the subject of politics, because it is replaced by a state expressing the will of the people.

**Definition 4: the superiority
of one's nation over others (chauvinism)**

Definition no. 3 can be considered neo-classical, because it refers to the idea of the modern state in the age of classicism (XVI–XVII century), where sovereignty was transferred from the hands of Louis XIV (or monarchs like him who claimed *l'Etat c'est moi*) to the new representative of the interests of the state, i.e. the nation. The understanding of nationalism, where it is claimed that one's nation is superior to other nations and has the

⁶ P. Alter, *Nationalism*, London 1989, p. 9.

⁷ P. Alatri, *Le Origini del fascismo*, Roma 1962, p. 5.

right to impose its ideas on them is quite different in nature. Such a chauvinistic assertion, usually based on the belief in one's own cultural or economic superiority, gives its advocates legitimacy to conquer neighbors by military means or their subordination through economic and political methods. It also validates discrimination against national minorities, deemed for some reason to be of lower status in relation to the ruling nation. In such cases nationalism comes close or is directly connected with national chauvinism or racism, recognizing certain peoples as being of higher status and others of lower status based on genetic reasoning (German doctrine of *Blut und Boden*)⁸.

As we can observe, the first two definitions of nationalism, that is the "right of the nation to self-determination" in external and internal matters, have an emancipatory character. They are oriented towards the emancipation of the people from bondage or subordination to a foreign ruler or government of a foreign nation. In this way the community while perceiving itself in terms of political unity could exercise self-rule within boundaries perceived to be natural and utilizing the rule of the majority. This theory consciously refers to the concept of the sovereign people coined by the radical democrat Jean-Jacques Rousseau as well as to the characteristic (this time liberal) theories of the French Enlightenment on the possession of natural rights by individuals (Fr. *Droits*). Nationalism, understood in such a manner, based on Rousseau's idea of popular/national sovereignty receives an inalienable and innate status as a law of nature.

⁸ H. Munro Chadwick, *The Nationalities of Europe. The Growth of National Ideologies*, Cambridge 1945, pp. 122 and ff.; Cz. Bartnik, *Teologia narodu*, Częstochowa 1999, p. 15; I. Berlin, *Europejska jedność i zmienne kole jej losu*, [in:] idem, *Pokrzywione drzewo człowieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 154–155.

Meanwhile, definitions no. 3 and no. 4 go in a totally different direction, completely at odds with Enlightenment ideals, because they are not emancipatory in nature. Definition no. 3 (the subordination of particular interests to the national interest) constitutes a classic formula of a sovereign and absolutist nation-state, adjusted to the newly formed mass society, where monarchy has been abolished along with its non-democratic legitimacy of power. It is often said that the French Revolution “invented the nation against the king, legitimacy from the bottom against legitimacy from the top”⁹. This view is repeated by numerous intellectual historians, contrasting nationalism and popular sovereignty with the classical, pre-revolutionary state and its absolute monarchy¹⁰. However, such an understanding of nationalism as presented by definition no. 3, makes it possible to neatly combine these ideas, so that the nation-state is no longer a vehicle of emancipation, but rather an instrument of the reign as in traditional relations, henceforth nationalism becomes counter-revolutionary. The most spectacular form of this doctrine was Charles Maurras’ vision of absolute monarchy, “traditional, hereditary, anti-parliamentary and de-centralized”¹¹, of which the truly unsurpassed archetype was the monarchy of Louis XIV.

On the other hand, definition no. 3 sees nationalism as validation of the political domination of one nation over others, which does not concern itself with finding (even theoretically) the common

⁹ J. Plumyène, *Les nations romantiques. Histoire du nationalisme. Le XIXe siècle*, Paris 1979, pp. 52.

¹⁰ E.g. H. Kohn, *Die Idee des Nationalismus. Ursprung und Geschichte bis zur Französischen Revolution*, Frankfurt am Main 1962, pp. 9–10; J.-L. Chabot, *Le nationalisme*, Paris 1986, p. 9; E.J. Hobsmaum, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programs, myth, reality*, Cambridge 1990, p. 23.

¹¹ Ch. Maurras, *Enquête sur la monarchie*, Paris 1924, pp. 169, 302.

good, either within the national community or in the sphere of international relations. Therefore, definition no. 4 was organically rooted in the political violence connected to ethnic or racial reasons.

From this brief review of the basic definitions of nationalism ultimately not a single fixed model and definition of nationalism emerges. It is not possible to demarcate the famous Weberian ideal type of nationalism, which fascinates so many historians of ideas and other social scientists. One single type of nationalism does not exist. Rather, there are various types of nationalisms.

2. Two historic waves of nationalism

The various understandings of the term nationalism presented above and the conflicting views on which political system, economic policy and religious issues should be considered national or anti-national, as well as various, often contradictory definitions of belonging to a nation, seem to only be a shapeless mix of different ideas, from which it is impossible to draw a common ideological core. These contradictions become clear, when we attempt to read and study nationalism in a metahistorical way. Indeed, it is impossible to formulate any Weberian-type nationalism as such, which would account for all the historically and geographically separate types of nationalism. While in the case of liberalism, conservatism, Marxism, fascism or anarchism it is relatively easy – despite the internal differences within these great ideologies and political doctrines – to find, for example, five or ten liberal ideas, which can be accepted by all liberals or a similar set of ideas accepted by all Marxists or conservatives, in the case of nationalism this is not possible. This is because, as we mentioned at the beginning of this article, nationalism has never been and as of today is not an independent political ideology. It is only an affection for

one's country and one's nation, which takes on a concrete form by drawing heavily from solutions offered by other ideologies or doctrines. And so, we have national conservatives (Action Française, conservative revolution in Germany, the Francoists in Spain), national liberals (the Italian *Risorgimento*, French romantic republicanism of the XIXth century), national socialists (fascists) and even national communists (German *Nationalbolschewismus*). Nationalism, most likely, cannot be synthesized only with anarchism and libertarianism, as these two ideologies reject everything that is above the individual, and thus the very concept of the nation.

Navigating the maps of nationalism is made easier by the fact, that mixing of nationalism with other doctrines and ideologies is not so entirely coincidental. In particular epochs, each wave of nationalism enters into close alliances with certain ideologies as well as doctrines and directs itself against other ideologies/doctrines. This is due to the fact that nationalists view some of them as consistent with the interests of the nation and others as opposed to them. These are not permanent alliances, because the interests of the nation can either objectively change or the authors of the various nationalist doctrines may come to define it differently than previous generations of nationalists. These bonds, however, do not change from day to day. Based on these relationships, we can distinguish the following waves of nationalism.

3. The first wave: democratic nationalism (1789–1870)

This trend develops in Europe between the French Revolution (1789) the fall of the Spring of Nations (1848–1849) and the unification of Italy (1866–1870). The classic representatives of this type of nationalism were:

- 1/ French revolutionaries of the revolutionary period, especially the Jacobins, who proclaimed the sovereignty of the nation against the sovereignty of the king.
- 2/ Democratic patriots of the Restoration era, the July Monarchy and the Spring of Nations, who proclaimed the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a people's republic (France, Spain) or the unification of a divided country into a democratic republic (Poland, Italy, Germany).
- 3/ The Italian *Risorgimento* movement (until 1870), which retained for the longest period of time the democratic message of the original nationalism.

We can consider the nationalism of this period as one utilizing definitions no. 1 and no. 2, which are already known to us. Its essence is *the demand for the right of nations to self-determination* in relation to their borders and form of government. This type of nationalism is sometimes referred to as “Risorgimento nationalism” or “Jacobin nationalism”¹². When one looks at the classical left-right axis, this movement is to be found on the left side.

The formula of *the demand for the right of nations to self-determination* has as its source in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory and the concept of the sovereignty of the people, who possess a non-outdated and inalienable right to decide about their own fate¹³. That is why, according to the Genevan philosopher, “any legitimate government is republican”¹⁴.

¹² P. Alter, *Nationalism*, op.cit., pp. 28–31; M. Clément, *Enquête sur le nationalisme*, Paris 1957, p. 25 and ff.; A. Wielomski, *Nacjonalizm jakobiński*, [in:] S. Stępień (ed.), *Ideologie, doktryny i ruchy narodowe. Wybrane problemy*, Lublin 2006, pp. 29–46.

¹³ J.J. Rousseau, *Umowa społeczna*, Poznań 1920 [1762], I, p. 5; II, pp. 1–2.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, II, p. 6.

This Rousseauistic democratic ideal is essentially a transposition of unrestricted monarchical sovereignty – characteristic of the era of French absolutism from the legists in the spirit of Jean Bodin to Louis XVI – to the equally sovereign people, who have a right to decide on their borders, political system and on who is to wield power as their representative. Now it was only necessary to identify the word “people” with “nation”, which in the French language (“people”) is not especially difficult¹⁵.

We shall discuss democratic nationalism using two characteristic examples: French and Italian.

3.1. French Jacobin and post-Jacobin nationalism

The original nationalist ideal, which was based on Rousseau’s thought, was of a civic character. The French revolutionaries considered all adult men, who were citizens of the state and possessed political rights, to be *the sovereign nation*. Belonging to a nation is not a matter of feelings, language, common ancestors. The national community is identical with the political community, i.e. people who participate in sovereignty and possess political rights. That is why the moderate revolutionaries, who favored electoral census, identified the nation only with the middle class, whose representatives possessed voting rights in the early period of the revolution. Emmanuel Sieyès argues that only taxpayers constitute the nation¹⁶.

Such reasoning is opposed by Maximillien Robespierre, who proclaimed that the nation consists of all French citizens and all

¹⁵ J. Lakanal, *Rapport sur J.J. Rousseau*, [n.p., n.d.] pp. 2–5; H. Kohn, *Nationalism. Its Meaning and History*, New York 1955, p. 20; O.H. Gablentz, *Nationalismus*, [in:] *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften*, vol. VII. Göttingen 1961, p. 540.

¹⁶ E. Sieyès, *Qu’est-ce que le Thiers-Etat?*, [n.p.] 1789, pp. 45, 86.

of them should be given the right to vote¹⁷. The combination of nationality and citizenship led the revolutionaries to consider members of ethnic and linguistic minorities living within France (the Bretons, German-speaking Alsations and Lorrainers) as Frenchmen, while denying this identity to the francophone Walloons and Swiss¹⁸. The notion that membership in the nation is combined with the subjective sense of belonging to the *spirit of the nation* or *the national character* is an idea that appeared in a somewhat later period. It grew out of the romantic period – after the revolution¹⁹.

The first generation of this type of nationalists identified the nation with the lower social classes, which were about to come to power – “The Third Estate is the complete Nation”, while the privileged estates are “foreign” (*étrangers*) wrote Sieyès²⁰ – and the nation-building processes with emancipation from the traditional elite, i.e. the monarchy and aristocracy. As one revolutionary *catechism* proclaimed, the nation is “a community of citizens, who on account of their emotions and mutual needs, form a force for the preservation and happiness of the patrimony”²¹. In the political thought of the French Enlightenment, even before the revolution, the notion of the fatherland was associated with *free* or republican institutions. Monarchies (*despotisms*) were seen as constituting a negation of freedom and subjects should not harbor

¹⁷ M. Robespierre, *Textes choisies*, vol. I, Paris 1974, pp. 67, 75.

¹⁸ H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, op.cit. p. 6.

¹⁹ A. Walicki, *Mesjanistyczne koncepcje narodu i późniejsze losy tej tradycji*, [in:] J. Goćkowski, A. Walicki (ed.), *Idee i koncepcje narodu w polskiej myśli politycznej czasów porozbiorowych*, Warszawa 1977, pp. 84–107.

²⁰ E. Sieyès, *Qu'est-ce que le Thiers-Etat?*, op.cit., pp. 2, 8.

²¹ C.F. de Chasseboeuf Volney, *La loi naturelle, ou le cathéchisme du citoyen français*, Sallior 1793, p. 103.

any positive feelings in relation to them, including loyalty²². To quote Saint-Just, “the people and its enemies no longer have anything in common, except the sword”²³.

The French Revolution broke out under the cosmopolitan slogan *fraternity* of all people – of all estates, provinces and nations. However, given the widespread opposition to its universalist ideas, the process of excluding various groups from the original universal nation of people began. Those who were initially removed were those who, while being French citizens, opposed the new regime. That is how the aristocrats (political opponents of the Revolution) were excluded and after that the *fanatics* (opponents of the ecclesial schism of 1790)²⁴. When the revolutionary armies encountered armed opposition in Belgium and Germany – not only from the monarchs, but also from the local populace – the famous manifesto *The Homeland in Danger* was published (*Le Patrie en danger*, 1792)²⁵. At this moment the revolution lost its original universalist character, transforming into an authentically French revolution against the traditional nations of Europe²⁶. The concepts of *foreign* and *abroad* began to be associated with the notion of

²² See for e.g. encyclopedic definitions authored by L. de Jaucourt, *Patrie, Patriote* and *Patriotisme*, [in:] J. Le Rond d’Alembert (ed.), *Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, vol. XII, Neufchastel 1765, pp. 178, 181. See also H.-F. D’Aguesseau, *XIX-e Mercuriale. L’amour de la Patrie. Prononcée à la Saint Martin 1715*, [in:] idem, *Oeuvres*, vol. I, Paris 1759, pp. 207–212; J.J. Rousseau, *Wyznania*, vol. I, Warszawa 1978 [1781], p. 37; Monteskiusz, *O duchu praw*, Kęty 1997 [1748], p. 7.

²³ L.-A.-L. Saint-Just, *Wybór pism*, Warszawa 1954, p. 69.

²⁴ C. Jones, *The Great Nation. France from Louis XV to Napoleon*, London 2003, p. 552.

²⁵ *La Patrie en danger* [1792], at fr.wikisource.org.

²⁶ C.J.H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, New York 1948, pp. 35–53; J. Baszkiewicz, *Nowy człowiek, nowy naród, nowy świat*, Warszawa 1993, pp. 343–354, 362–375.

*counterrevolution*²⁷. When the counterrevolutionary armies begin the counteroffensive, whereupon the defense of the Republic truly combines with the defense of France and the revolutionaries themselves declare that they are defending the *natural borders* and the *honor* of their country. In other words they used the conceptual apparatus characteristic of the old dictionary of the monarchical state. The often evoked notion of the *right of the nation* is nothing but a new version of the old *raison d'Etat* of Cardinal Armand de Richelieu and Louis XIV. A schoolbook from this period teaches that freedom means that the nation is not subject to anyone: not to a king in the country (internal sovereignty), nor to any political force outside of the boundaries of the state (external sovereignty). The ideology of freedom, therefore, combines both with the right to self-determination inside the country (republicanism), as well as the right of the French nation to an external self-determination about its national borders²⁸.

Democratic nationalism during the French Revolution suffered from a defect, i.e. its *de facto* un-democratic character. The revolutionaries were aware that they did not have widespread social support, because many Frenchmen were opposed to the revolution and the Catholic peasant majority maintained a deep reservation due to the anti-religious policies of the state and the toleration of many anti-Christian excesses and acts of vandalism. Faced with this situation, the minority of revolutionaries made an ideological effort to justify their dictatorial regime on the basis of not so much direct social consent, but on the objective good of the nation, who will (in the future) thank them for accomplishing the emancipatory revolution. Thus the source of the revolutionary dictatorship was

²⁷ M.-M. Martin, *Histoire de l'unité française*, Paris 1957, p. 312.

²⁸ *Alphabet républicain*, Paris an II (1793/1794), p. 21.

the (objective) “right of the nation”²⁹ and it derived its validation from the fact that the Jacobin convent originated from the will of the same nation by way of voting. In his famous statement that the “people, who chose us, have ratified everything”³⁰ Robespierre expressed his conviction that the representatives of the nation are free to do absolutely anything that is required by the good of the nation, including the introduction of dictatorship and the physical massacring of all those suspected of aversion to or conspiring against the revolution. “The revolutionary government is the despotism of freedom against tyranny”, stated the first dictator in French history³¹, for whom dictatorship – necessarily exercised on the nation’s behalf – became “the beloved system” (*mon système chéri*)³².

Jacobin nationalism was a result of the application of the collectivist-democratic ideology of Rousseauism. This nationalism had an egalitarian and collectivist character, where everyone had to be alike, where wealth, cultural and intellectual differences were to disappear. Thus was born the utopia of totalitarian nationalism, where all people were to be alike and form a collective that would negate any form of individualism. By removing inequalities and dissimilarities the intention was to create a new and homogenously understood French nation. As the American scholar Jacob Talmon writes, behind this project lay an obsessive “idea of social harmony based on the egalitarian concept of human rights”³³, where there would be neither poor nor rich, intelligent nor stupid, because all members of the national body would be alike.

²⁹ J.-P. Marat, *L'erreur des Parisiens*, Paris n.d. [1791], p. 4.

³⁰ M. Robespierre, *Textes choisies*, op.cit., vol. II, Paris 1974, p. 54.

³¹ Ibidem, vol. III, p. 119.

³² M. Robespierre, *Renvoyez-moi ma goue ou la lettre à la Convention Nationale*, n.p., n.d. [Paris 1794], p. 5.

³³ J.L. Talmon, *Le origini della democrazia totalitaria*, Bologna 2000, p. 220.

That is not to say that the essence of democratic nationalism was necessarily dictatorship exercised on behalf of the nation. Democratic nationalists of the nineteenth century, especially those formed in the spirit of romanticism, possessed a strong Promethean and messianic element. That is why the idea of imposing something on the nation for its objective good was not totally foreign to them. After the Jacobin episode, however, they were not that inclined to establishing a dictatorship in the name of an alleged objective good of the nation. In the nineteenth century establishing of such forms of government became characteristic of the socialist left, especially for the Blankists and Marxists, who were full of admiration for the murderous forms of dictatorship exercised on behalf of the masses, an example of which was the Paris Commune (1870)³⁴. The last of the veterans of democratic nationalism – here we are referring to Giuseppe Mazzini – who strongly opposed this form of political power, seeing in it only a type of terrorist governance, signified executions, looting, as well as militant atheism and barbaric anti-clericalism³⁵.

The main current of democratic nationalism, which applauded the revolutionary and emancipatory ideas, was strongly attached to the democratic idea, as well as to liberal political and legal institutions. In nineteenth century France this trend was developed by numerous politicians and writers: Jules Michelet, Alphonse Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Edgar Quinet, Léon Gambetta. Its last epigone was Georges Clemenceau. This type of nationalism was linked with liberalism, but its representatives did not derive

³⁴ J. Schleifstein, *Marxismus und Staat. Zur Entwicklung der Staatsauffassung bei den marxistischen Klassikern*, Frankfurt am Main 1982, pp. 51–53.

³⁵ N. Bakunin, *La théologie politique de Mazzini et l'Internationale*, Neuchâtel 1871, pp. 14–17.

liberal principles from the universal ideas of the law of nature or human rights, but solely from historical causes, ones that were shaped therefore by the national community. They opposed the tyranny of Robespierre, Napoleon III, and censorship³⁶. All forms of authoritarian power which were not exercised by the nation, but only on its behalf, were ultimately discredited by the dictatorship of Napoleon III. The nation expresses its will only through a parliament elected in a general election³⁷.

The democratic nationalists in the nineteenth century articulated the need for the completion of the revolution, but not with the help of arms, but via political and social reforms implemented with the support of a parliamentary majority. These reforms were to be of a social nature and their aim was the unification of individuals and classes into one, harmoniously functioning national community. For this reason they wanted to introduce in France elements of social labor law or the right to establish trade unions. This nationalism protrudes against ideologies of a class nature, because it wants to unite all Frenchmen “under the standard of the Republic”³⁸.

A characteristic feature of democratic nationalism was its profound aversion to the Catholic religion, which resulted from the strong impregnation of anti-clerical ideas into the continental Enlightenment. From the pre-revolutionary Gallican tradition the

³⁶ J. Michelet, *Histoire de révolution*, vol. VII, Paris 1888, pp. 1–33; L. Gambetta, *Discours et plaidoyers choisis*, Paris 1909, pp. 17–18; G. Clemenceau, *Au soir de la pensée*, vol. II, Paris 1927, pp. 374, 378–379, 416, 428, 433; V. Hugo, *Politique*, Paris 2002, pp. 174–177.

³⁷ A. Lamartine, *La Présidence, discours prononcé à l'Assemblée nationale*, Paris 1848, p. 5; idem, *Une seule Chambre, discours prononcée à l'Assemblée Nationale*, Paris 1848, pp. 6 and ff.; L. Gambetta, *Discours et plaidoyers*, op.cit., pp. 27–29, 33, 113–115, 119, 142–143, 203.

³⁸ L. Gambetta, *Discours et plaidoyers*, op.cit., p. 255.

revolutionaries took away the notion that the Church is subject to the State (up until 1789 to the king and then to the sovereign nation). That is why the representatives of the people have a right to regulate all religious matters, beginning with ecclesial changes and ending with dogmatic matters³⁹. A Catholic, who adheres to the pope rather than the French parliament, is, according to the leader of the liberal monarchists Honoré G.R. Mirabeau, “a criminal”⁴⁰. The leader of the Girondins, Jacques Brissot, proclaims that if Catholicism is to be tolerated in the revolutionary world, it must undergo liberalization, and since the pope does not agree to it freely, then the Church needs to be subordinated to the State (i.e. the nation) and with the help of political decisions liquidate papal authority as well as the existing clerical hierarchy, simplify dogma, invalidate canonical codes and return to the simple “religion of reason”⁴¹. Here the sovereign political people become an equally sovereign people of God. The Jacobins went so far as to create a new deistic religion of a nationalist and democratic nature (the cult of the Supreme Being)⁴².

Despite all of their anti-clericalism the nationalist revolutionaries did not intend to sever relations between the State and the Catholic Church. On the contrary – just like the old Gallicanist tradition, they proclaimed the subordination of the Church to the State. In 1790 they passed the civil constitution of the clergy, which constituted a *de facto* schism, because it suppressed the sovereignty

³⁹ E.g. H.G.V.R. Mirabeau, *Oeuvres*, vol. III, Paris 1834, p. 28.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

⁴¹ J.P. Brissot, *Rome jugée, et l'autorité législative du pape anéantie*, Paris 1791, p. VI.

⁴² F.-A. Aulard, *Le Culte de la Raison et le culte de l'Être suprême (1793–1794)*, Paris 1892; A. Mathiez, *Les Origines des Cultes Révolutionnaires*, Paris 1904; M. Ozouf, *Religion revolutionaries*, [in:] F. Furet, M. Ozouf, *Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution Française. Institutions et créations*, Paris 1992, pp. 311–328.

of Rome over the Church in France. Without a papal mandate it divided existing dioceses and introduced the election of bishops and priests by all French citizens who possessed political rights, without regard for a declared creed⁴³. As a result of this initiative a national, schismatic, constitutional church was created, supported by the State and boycotted by the majority of the faithful, which was liquidated 11 years later by Napoleon's concordat (1801)⁴⁴. The idea of the separation of Church and State appears only in the second half of the 19th century. It was totally alien to the revolutionary nationalists, because it implied the independence of religion from a sovereign and omnipotent nation.

Generally speaking, nationalist democrats believed that State should be ordered towards the modernization of social consciousness. The State has as its objective the raising of future generations in a secular, anti-clerical and anti-traditional spirit. For Gambetta secularism and anti-clericalism were the main motives of French nationalism, which is symbolized in his famous slogan "Clericalism? This is the enemy" (*Le clericalisme? Voilà l'ennemi*)⁴⁵. Schools were to serve as the main instrument for massive atheization and also upbringing in the spirit of secular nationalism. Therein lies the essence of the *secular and republican school*.

Despite liberal and social ideas, democratic nationalism was fiercely nationalistic, a fact symbolized by the issue of Alsace and Lorraine lost by France after the battle of Sedan (1870). Léon Gambetta led the defense of France after the fall of the Second

⁴³ *Constitution civile du clergé* [1790], accessed at ac-reims.fr.

⁴⁴ G. Pelletier, *Rome et la Révolution Française. La théologie et la politique du Saint-Siège devant la révolution française (1789–1799)*, Rome 2004, pp. 302–320; A. Wielomski, *Kościół w cieniu gilotyny. Katolicyzm francuski wobec Rewolucji (1789–1815)*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 203–316.

⁴⁵ L. Gambetta, *Discours et plaidoyers*, op.cit., pp. 237, 374.

Empire and the proclamation of the Republic. It is then that he proclaimed the idea of defending to the last soldier, the arming of the people and fighting to the death – a plan that was interrupted by a real *stab in the back* from the Paris Communards, who initiated a social revolution in the rear, forcing the Republic to surrender to the forces of Otto von Bismarck. In 1917–1918 Clemenceau directed the war against Germany and claimed that “the army is the highest manifestation of nationalism in action”⁴⁶. These nationalists were militarists, but also republicans. For this reason they demanded deep personal reforms in the army so that it would no longer be dominated by the aristocrats and monarchists, even if this happened at the expense of its combat strength⁴⁷.

3.2. The political theology of the Italian *Risorgimento*


Italian Jacobinism did not possess any nationalistic traits. On the contrary, the local Jacobins were the executioners of the commands given by the French, who were occupying the country (*triennio giacobino*, 1796–99). This gave them a cosmopolitan and even treacherous (from the patriotic point of view), as well as a politically revolutionary dimension⁴⁸. It is only later that patriotism appears in the thought of the Italian revolutionaries, in the era of romanticism and is associated with the person of Giuseppe Mazzini. He was not only a patriot fighting for the unification of Italy. He was also a revolutionary striving for the destruction of the pre-revolutionary world in all its dimensions.

⁴⁶ G. Clemenceau, *Grandeurs et misères d'une victoire*, Paris 1997 [1930], p. 26.


⁴⁷ L. Gambetta, *Discours et plaidoyers*, op.cit., pp. 369–370.

⁴⁸ A.M. Rao, *L'expérience révolutionnaire italienne*, „Annales Historique de la Révolution française” 1996, no. 313, pp. 387–407.

In Mazzini counters every principle of the traditional world, which derives its legitimacy from the will of God or tradition with a revolutionary idea. He proclaimed (not without reason) that everything traditional, has its justification in the custom or will of a Divine or monarchical authority. The old world was created from the top, according to the following theological and political principle:



Mazzini's national-revolutionary project is of the opposite character, in which everything originates from the bottom, from the sovereign nation:



Giuseppe Mazzini constructs a complex project for the reconstruction of the world, where everything is reversed. The rationale for the revolution is that the Catholic Church preaches a false teaching that man is born tainted by sin, while a man “is by

nature good” and that is why “our responsibilities are always positive. There is no more *one cannot*, but only *one may*”⁴⁹. This is the dogma of the democratic revolution: prohibitions no longer exist, only rights. Everything, which up until now was banned/evil, becomes permitted/good. The inversion of the hierarchy pertains to various spheres. The acquisition of control over the Catholic Church by a sovereign nation is a condition *sine qua non* of the democratic revolution. The enemy of popular rule is the Catholic Tradition, which allegedly falsified the teaching of Christ in the hierarchical and authoritarian spirit. Progress requires a revision of the traditional teaching of the Church, because a new era approaches, where nothing will be proclaimed from *the top* and Catholicism cannot escape this transformation. The Church must become democratic and implement the will of the people. The revolution is not atheistic, but it demands that the Church become a part of it and that Christ becomes a symbol of the revolution⁵⁰. The people are the “image of God on Earth”⁵¹ and the will of the same people – expressed in democratic elections – is the same as the will of God (the popular expression in the romantic period political *vox populi, vox Dei*). Whoever contrasts the will of the people with that of any religious authority (e.g. the Pope) is a prideful idolater, who declares that the people/God is wrong. God is the father of democrats and revolutionaries; He supports the principle of universal suffrage and manifests Himself on earth through the will of the voters. Jesus Christ is the sovereign

⁴⁹ G. Mazzini, *Doveri dell'uomo*, Londra 1860, accessed at liberliber.it, chap. I.

⁵⁰ For further reading on the heretical religious doctrine of G. Mazzini see B.M.A. King, *The Life of Mazzini*, London 1912, pp. 222–248; E.Y. Hales, *Mazzini and the Secret Societies, The Making of a Myth*, New York 1956, pp. 199–211; G. Salvemini, *Mazzini*, Stanford 1957, 35–43, pp. 62–67.

⁵¹ G. Mazzini, *Doveri dell'uomo*, op.cit. chap. II.

people, because “Humanity is the living Word (*Verbo*) of God”⁵². The world has no need for a Pope, who would preach the Word. The people become the Logos and through the revolution they will create paradise on earth, which will be built by the God-Man, i.e. a nationalist revolutionary. God is no longer transcendent; He has become pantheistic reason, overflowing the masses, whose electoral voice and revolutionary act are an expression of His will. Whether one prays to God or votes, it’s all the same thing. The democratic Church has new creed: “We believe in mankind, the sole interpreter of the laws of God on earth”⁵³.

The Kingdom of God, according to Mazzini, *is of this world*, it will arise here and now, as soon as Europe passes through the last phase of revolution and destroys the old order: “Earth is no longer a place for expiation and sin; the aim of our work is improvement, development towards a higher existence”⁵⁴. God created Earth and Heaven, thus His kingdom must therefore be of this world! Thanks to democratization and industrialization, Earth will soon reach the same level as Heaven. After the final revolution, the Heavens will come to Earth and the opposition between Earth (symbol of imperfection and suffering) and Heaven (symbol of perfection) will disappear. Thanks to democracy, Earth will no longer be a cursed place, but a “place of sanctification”. God supports the revolution, the beheading of kings, anti-clerical reforms, the pillaging of churches, because the deity is always on the side of the sovereign people against the elites and authorities, therefore “all great revolutions erupt under the slogans *God willed it so! God willed it so!*” and the “work of emancipation and

⁵² Ibidem, chap. III.

⁵³ Ibidem, chap. III.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, chap. II

progress” is “a Divine plan”, because “Christ is the leader of the republic” (*Cristo capo della Repubblica*)⁵⁵.

We emphasize this theological-political problem in order to demonstrate, that early nationalism on the Italian Peninsula was not of an anti-religious character. It was originally characterized by a belief in the nationalization and transformation of religion. There was much expectation with regard to the initially liberal pontificate of Pius IX. Extremely anti-Christian trends appear only after Mazzini. It is then that Italian nationalists could not bear the fact that the First Vatican Council (1869–70) deliberated without the consent of the Italian state and supported the most anti-papal currents, demanding, among other things, the penalization of ultramontane views propagated by the clergy⁵⁶.

Giuseppe Mazzini’s persuasion on the possibility of the sovereign people taking over the Catholic Church was based on the then popular theory of progress. So he taught that religious truth is not eternal and universal, but is variable along with changes in the popular will. Dogmas and morality also are subject to the theory of progress. Today’s dogma will be tomorrow’s falsehood; what is immoral today will be the norm tomorrow. God manifests His will through the people and shapes it through republican education, its aim being the destruction of all moral principles of the old world and to create new ones, adequate for the revolutionary reality⁵⁷.

Such political theology was characteristic of not only the Italian *Risorgimento*. In nineteenth century France, the political romanticist,

⁵⁵ Ibidem, chap. II.

⁵⁶ T. Granderath, *Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils von seiner ersten Ankündigung bis zu seiner Vertagung*, vol. III, Freiburg 1906, p. 665; K. Schatz, *Vaticanum I. 1869–1870*, vol. I, *Vor der Eröffnung*, Paderborn 1992, pp. 284–286.

⁵⁷ G. Mazzini, *Doveri dell'uomo*, op.cit, chap. VII.

Jules Michelet, upheld the tradition of top-down democratization of Catholicism through the will of the sovereign and omnipotent nation⁵⁸. In Poland, similar reveries of a democratization of the Church and the creation of a new democratic religion, through the power of the sovereign people, were concocted by Adam Mickiewicz, who by imitating the language of the Old Testament, formed a religious-emancipatory narrative of the European peoples. He claimed that the Polish nation is a collective messiah (“Christ of the nations”⁵⁹), who had the task of liberating itself and all the remaining nations of the world:

And the Polish nation was crucified, and brought into its tomb. And the kings shouted: ‘We have killed freedom – we have buried it’ (...) the Polish nation is not dead! Its body, indeed, is in the tomb, but its soul has ascended from the surface of the earth; that is, from public life to the abyss, or domestic life – to the homes and hearths of those who endure distress and oppression in their country, and far from their country, in order to be the witness there of their suffering, and of their misery. And on the third day, the soul shall return to its body; and the nation shall rise from the dead; and shall free all the nations of Europe from slavery. (...) And from the great European political structure not one stone will be left on top of another⁶⁰.

The essence of this theological-political construct was the radical secularization of Christian symbols, whose transcendent,

⁵⁸ J. Michelet, *Histoire de révolution*, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 1–93.

⁵⁹ A. Sikora, *Mysliciele polskiego romantyzmu*, Chotomów 1992, pp. 70–73.

⁶⁰ A. Mickiewicz, *Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego*, Wrocław 2004 [1832], pp. 35, 128.

original meaning was now given a new political character. Christ, from being the Son of God, was transformed into a revolutionary political symbol of the struggle of nations for self-determination, borders and political form.

It is no surprise that this theological-political vision also includes the heretical notion of Christ the democrat, whose essence would be social emancipation⁶¹. These theories were also developed by Rev. Piotr Ściegienny⁶². The Polish Legion, created by Mickiewicz in Italy (1848) utilizes Marian and Christological symbolism again and again, but it is not faith that this project is concerned with, for “freedom today is that, which faith used to be”⁶³. Thus, religious symbols have been harnessed for a revolutionary aim of a nationalistic character. Christ is to serve the fatherland. This blasphemous abuse of religious symbolism by the revolutionary patriots did not escape the attention of the Church: Gregory XVI condemned the Polish November Uprising (Powstanie Listopadowe) in the encyclical *Cum primum* (1832), rightly accusing the revolutionaries, that it came about “under the guise of religion”⁶⁴. Pius IX, in turn, refuses to bless the standards of the Polish Legion, because of its leader Mickiewicz, who abused religious symbols for revolutionary aims⁶⁵.

In the doctrine of *Risorgimento*, the principle of the sovereign nation was placed in opposition to traditional society, based on the principles of hierarchy – with the aristocracy and monarch on the top. Against the rights of kings we have universal human rights. It

⁶¹ Ibidem, pp. 5–36.

⁶² A. Sikora, *Mysłiciele polskiego*, op.cit., pp. 109–128.

⁶³ *Legion Mickiewicza* (ed. H. Batowski), Wrocław 2004, p. 15.

⁶⁴ Pope Gregory XVI, *Cum primum* [1832], accessed at nonpossumus.pl, § 1.

⁶⁵ *Legion Mickiewicza*, op.cit., pp. 64–65.

is not about changing social elites, because every form of an elite assumes that there is something above the will of the sovereign people. Since everything is derived from the people, nothing can surpass it. The postulated equality signifies socialism, where the people will redistribute the property of wealthy individuals. Private property will cease to be sacred, becoming the property of the people, which, however, does not mean communism, i.e. another form of tyranny. Mazzini makes an exception for land and property owned by the nobility which has to be nationalized in order to create socialist cooperatives⁶⁶.

The family also has to undergo mandatory democratization, where the patriarchal model should be replaced with one that is more partner-like in nature. To achieve this goal a correction must be made in the text of the Bible, which falsely claims, that “God created man and from man – a woman”. It should be replaced with a new text: “God created Mankind in the form of women and men”⁶⁷. Schools have the task of creating this new vision of the family after the emancipation and inculcating the younger generations with it. This model was to be ensured by a state-run and obligatory school, educating the younger generation in the spirit of the struggle against pre-revolutionary values and ideas.

3.3. The European dimension of democratic nationalism

The French nationalists of the Romantic period were convinced that the French were the most cultured nation in all of Europe and that Paris should be the world’s capital⁶⁸. Despite this

⁶⁶ G. Mazzini, *Doveri dell'uomo*, op.cit., chap. XI, pp. 2–4; *Conchiusione*, p. 1.

⁶⁷ Ibidem, chap. VI.

⁶⁸ E.g. J. Michelet, *Histoire de révolution*, op.cit., vol. V, pp. 198–99; idem, *Intoduction à l'histoire universelle* [1847], [in:] idem, *Oeuvres*

megalomania they were at the same time advocates of creating a pan-European federation of free nations, which would have had republican and democratic regimes. They also supported the right of political unity for divided nations under the republican standards of Poland, Italy and Germany⁶⁹.

This element is clearly observed in Mazzini, because it is linked with his theological-political project. The unification of Italy was to be just one of the steps in the unification of all Mankind (*Umanità*). People initially unite in a family, then in the local community, then in a nation-state, and the crowning of this process is the idea of Mankind, which is “God’s thought”. In a characteristic way he argues that Christ died for all of Mankind on the cross and today the revolution unites Mankind into a European federation, thus fulfilling the will of God. The revolutionary nationalist proclaims: “Free and not free, be all brothers” and “love Mankind”, because “nations need to be fraternized” into one “mankind”⁷⁰.

Democratic nationalists considered themselves national patriots, but their native countries were not the aim in and of themselves. They were only a necessary step towards the creation of a European state. This, in turn, was supposed to lead towards the creation of the state of Mankind, where violence, diplomacy and national interest would all be eliminated. In Polish revolutionary nationalism of the Romantic Period one can discern the sources of the European Union project.

Complètes, vol. XXXV, Paris 1897, pp. 401, 425, 446–51, 463–64; idem, *Le peuple*, Paris 1961 [1846], pp. 327, 362; V. Hugo, *Politique*, op.cit., pp. 144, 148, 275, 331.

⁶⁹ V. Hugo, *Politique*, op.cit., pp. 123–28, 428–32, 442–46, 557–58, 596–604; J. Michelet, *La Pologne martyr*, Paris 1863, pp. 3–136; E. Quinet, *Allemagne et Italie*, Paris 1846; idem, *Les révolutions d’Italie*, vol. I-II, Paris 1904 [1848–1851].

⁷⁰ G. Mazzini, *Doveri dell’uomo*, op.cit., chap. IV.

4. The second wave: non-democratic nationalism (1870–1945)

This current arises in the wake of the establishment of a republic in certain states (France) and of broad democratization in Europe, which took place in the second half of the 19th century. Its beginnings can be traced to two great *Affairs* in France, which shook not only the political scene, but also the view of nationalists in relation to the democratic political system. We are referring to the Affair surrounding Gen. Boulanger (1886–89) and the Dreyfus Affair (1894–99). The end of this nationalism is symbolized by the year 1945, when the non-democratic Right is physically eliminated from the political scene. In the left-right axis this form of nationalism can be found on the right, and sometimes even on the extreme right. In the subject literature it is referred to as *integral nationalism*, so as to emphasize the role of Charles Maurras⁷¹. This nationalism corresponds to definition no. 3 (Latin countries) or no. 4 (Germany).

4.1. Catholic-Latin nationalism

Democratic nationalism disappears in the second half of the 19th century. In such countries as France or Italy this disappearance resulted from the fact that the essential postulates of democratic nationalism were realized. French nationalists wanted to abolish the monarchy in all of its forms, i.e. Legitimist, Orleanist and plebiscitarian, and they achieved this, finally proclaiming the republic in 1870, based on universal suffrage. Italian nationalists in the mold of Mazzini and Garibaldi managed to unify Italy, although in the form of a constitutional monarchy and not of a republic. However,

⁷¹ P. Alter, *Nationalism*, op.cit., pp. 37–40.

even this regime was based on universal suffrage and monarchic power was *de facto* originated from the will of the people. Since Pius IX had anathemized Victor Emanuel due to his occupation of Rome, the monarchy could not derive its legitimacy from God. It did not want to anyway, because the liberal monarchists governing within it were closer in thought to Freemasonry than to the Catholic Church. Eastern European nationalists, who were under the powerful influence of the revolutionary Romantic tradition and republican standards emanating from France, had to wait longer for the formation of nation-states and for universal suffrage. The simultaneous fall of czarist Russia, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the defeat of Wilhelminian Germany made the independence of several Eastern European nations possible. They became constituted as democratic republics (Poland, Czechoslovakia). This signified a realization of the ideals of the revolutionary nationalism of the 19th century and the appearance of new states based on the model of the Third French Republic. This was truly a fulfillment of the dream of early nationalism.

Unfortunately, the implementation of these postulates brought about a great disappointment among the nationalists. The newly founded democratic nation-state was such in its external form (republic, democracy, universal suffrage). The new generation of nationalists quickly realized that democratic republics are forms of government on behalf of the people, but not in the real interest of the nation. In all of them, the liberal element of individual rights took precedence over the persuasion that the interest of the nation must take precedence (definition of nationalism no. 3). The increasing importance of various lobbies with vested, often transnational, business interests, i.e. big capital, anti-clerical Freemasonry, ethnic minorities well-organized in the battle for their interests (especially Jews), was viewed with unease. This

aversion towards the influence of various lobbies was expressed in an exemplary manner by Maurras' formula about the true reign of "four confederated estates", i.e. the Jews, Freemasons, the Protestant minority and the *metèques* (naturalized foreigners)⁷².

The parliamentary system turned out to be one great disappointment, because the particular party and class interests took precedence over the general (national) interest. The aforementioned Boulanger and Dreyfus Affairs in France, the period of the utterly corrupt and oligarchic governments of Giolitti in Italy, Polish *sejmocracy* of 1919–26, the republic in Spain (1931–36), all of them made clear that the democratic state was very weak, torn apart by internal conflicts and unable to display political will. A considerable factor was also the fear of Bolshevism, the Soviet revolution and the question of whether a weak, democratic state will come out victorious from the confrontation with a militarized Communist Party, ably managed from Moscow? The parliamentary system functioned fairly well only in Czechoslovakia.

In response to these problems, in countries with a Catholic religious tradition and culturally linked with the Roman tradition and Roman law, the nationalists⁷³ sought to solve the problems of the democratic state by strengthening the institution of the state, re-defining the essence of the term *national government*.

⁷² Ch. Maurras, *Enquête sur la monarchie*, op.cit., pp. 206–207, 257–258, 367; idem, *Mes idées politiques*, Paris 1968 [1937], pp. 203–204, 226.

⁷³ We also count Italian Fascism among the nationalist movements, because the nationalists joined the fascists led by B. Mussolini (1923), giving the movement a program, which Fascism executed (building of an empire, the maintaining of monarchy, a break with Parliamentarism, Church-State reconciliation, social reforms etc.) see P. Alatri, *Le Origini del fascismo*, op.cit., pp. 5–32 (the author refers to Fascism as „nazionalfascismo”, p. 30); J. Sondel-Cedarmas, *Nacjonalizm włoski. Geneza i ewolucja doktryny politycznej (1896–1923)*, Kraków 2013, pp. 407–28.

A government so far was considered to be elected by the nation, but now it was to be the government which rules in the interest of the nation, regardless of how it was constituted and whether it possessed or lacked democratic validation. The idea was to replace party government, which had particular interests as their aim, with a *national government*. This turnaround occurred in Poland only after 1926. Therefore, the classic *Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka* (*Thoughts of a modern Pole*, 1904) authored by Roman Dmowski, which defined the Polish doctrine of nationalism, does not yet exhibit authoritarian traits⁷⁴. Let us illustrate this by quoting nationalists from various countries.

In France Charles Maurras writes:

Part of the French were divided according to the tastes and ideas represented in the Assembly. However, there is something which is not represented there: France. Neither in the Assembly nor in the Senate, nor on the Champs-Elysses nor the Government – only parties are represented there – there is no representation of France. The France, as it was yesterday, and that, which will be tomorrow – the one which stands above any elections (...). In these conditions you would like to have legislation aimed at development, sustainability, future? As a Being she is absent in the state⁷⁵.

In the writings of this same political thinker we read:

The general interest does not have a constitutional representative, since the entire state is – according to the

⁷⁴ R. Dmowski, *Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka*, Warszawa 1989 [1904].

⁷⁵ Ch. Maurras, *Dictionnaire politique et critique*, vol. III, Paris 1931–35, p. 181.

law and constitution – founded upon particular as well as party interests. Nobody in France is the nation⁷⁶.

In Italy, the right-wing fascist, Francesco Lo Faro, writes in a similar fashion:

The Assembly represents particular interests, not the general interest of the state. The socialists represent only one social class against another and against the state; the agrarians represent only a particular interest group: representatives from Sardinia their own region, etc.

therefore

Parliamentarism can be defined as the collapse of the principle of national representation in favor of individual and group interests, which reign over the state thanks to the principle of the election of representatives⁷⁷.

Carlo Costamagna adds that only the fascist state-being an “internal negation of all parties”⁷⁸ can overcome this condition.

That is also why, utilizing a Hegelian narrative, Giovanni Gentile creates the theory of the state as an “ethical”⁷⁹ institution.

⁷⁶ Ibidem, vol. 2, p. 9.

⁷⁷ F. Lo Faro, *Il nuovo parlamento nello Stato fascista*, Roma 1928, pp. 23, 25.

⁷⁸ C. Costamagna, *Il senso dello Stato*, „Ciritica fascista” 15.01.1927.

⁷⁹ J.T. Desanti, *Gentile et les origines philosophiques du fascisme*, [in:] M.A. Macciocchi (ed.), *Eléments pour une analyse du fascisme*, vol. I, Paris 1976, pp. 115–27; W. Kozub-Ciembroniewicz, *Państwo „etyczne” Giovannię Gentile*, „Studia nad Faszyzmem i Zbrodniami Hitlerowskimi” 1997, vol. XX, pp. 211–22.

In Spain, José Pemartin, a supporter of Gen. Miguel Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (1923–1930) states:

Order is the indispensable requirement for any collective undertakings. Without it nothing can be accomplished, unless by chance. In politics, order is the merging of authority and hierarchy⁸⁰.

The leader of the Spanish Falange – and privately the son of Gen. Primo de Rivera – José Antonio Primo de Rivera supplements the previous statement:

The fatherland is a permanent unity, a common historical fate for which the authoritarian state, vivid and corporatist, will permit laboring, thanks to its established laws for every individual and class⁸¹.

We find similar pro-state statements in the words of the prominent nationalist dictators. Mussolini proclaims that “without the State there is no nation. There are only relations between individual people, susceptible to any disintegrating impulses, which history is full of”.⁸² General Francisco Franco characterizes the effect of his decades long rule in the following way:

The Spain of 1970 is completely different than that which was afflicted with convulsions and antagonisms in 1933.

⁸⁰ J. Pemartin, *Le Général Primo de Rivera et la dictature en Espagne*, Bruxelles 1929, p. 47.

⁸¹ J.A. Primo de Rivera, *Textos biograficos y epistolario. José Antonio íntimo*, Madrid 1968, p. 177.

⁸² As cited in N. Tripodi, *Il fascismo secondo Mussolini*, Roma 1978, p. 88.

We can oppose the collapse and permanent struggle of the parties with a panorama of an ordered society, where class struggle is a standard that has no place in which it could be displayed⁸³.

This development is possible only thanks to the many years of dictatorship, providing Spain with “national unity, religious unity, social unity and political unity”⁸⁴.

For non-democratic nationalists the State is the institutional exponent of the objectively understood national interest, because it alone is capable of standing above party and particularistic conflicts, especially ones relating to class. But for the State to be able to stand above particularistic interests, it cannot be derived as such from party interests. Therefore nationalists of this type reject democracy and general elections, preferring authoritarian rule for the objective good of the nation instead. Hence the idea of monarchical power (Action Française), of an authoritarian and charismatic character (Italian Fascism) or of an authoritarian-technocratic regime (Francoism in Spain and Salazarism in Portugal).

The authoritarian state was perceived as the only entity capable of ending economic and political conflicts arising from free market capitalism of the nineteenth century, which was symbolized by the revolutionary Le Chapelier law (1791). The liberal state forbade employees and employers from organizing unions, withdrawing itself from the function of an economic regulator. This created great chaos in which a handful of the richest individuals gained dominance, i.e. the capitalists and the bankers. This in turn contributed to a revolutionary reaction on the part of the proletariat in the form of class ideology (Marxism). Nationalism

⁸³ F. Franco, *Pensamiento político*, vol. I, Madrid 1975, p. 196.

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, vol. I, p. 39.

is an attempt to appeal to the idea of a national community against the idea of an international class community⁸⁵, as well as against a regime of oligarchic plutocracy. It proposes a broad spectrum of economic reforms so that the proletariat, which took separatist, internationalist and class positions, will once again become *national*. Maurice Barrès referred to this project as a new “patriotic economy” or “national socialism”⁸⁶. Effectively this meant the creation of a national economy, which would – as is described by the theoretician of Italian corporatism Giuseppe Bottai – “bring peace between the classes”⁸⁷.

Corporatism was the embodiment of the peace economy. The system originated in Fascist Italy and it is based on a whole series of laws coming from the period stretching between 1923 and 1936⁸⁸. The first legislation in this respect had a strong propaganda element to it, but the last of the laws constituted a truly Italian reaction to the Great Depression of 1929, establishing an entire system of a *de facto* socialized economy, directed by the State on the basis of large production plans⁸⁹. In constructing social peace, the Fascists in Italy were the first to create a welfare state with a forty hour work week, paid leave, work-free Sundays, compensation, severance pay for dismissed employees, a ban on the employment of minors,

⁸⁵ Np. M. Barrès, *Scenes et doctrines du nationalisme*, vol. II, Paris 1925, pp. 158–175; G. Bottai, *Le Corporazioni*, Milano 1935, pp. 109–110; A. Bertelé, *I tre sistemi economici, liberalismo, socialismo, corporativismo. Loro origini storiche, presupposti ideali, principii generali*, Torino 1940, pp. 67–75.

⁸⁶ M. Barrès, *L'idéal dans les doctrines économiques*, „La Cocarde” 14.11.1894; idem, *Socialisme et nationalisme*, „La Patrie” 27.02.1903.

⁸⁷ G. Bottai, *Le Corporazioni*, op.cit., p. 19.

⁸⁸ P. de Michelis, *La Rôle économique des corporations fascistes en Italie*, Genève 1940, pp. 26–31.

⁸⁹ L. Fontana-Russo, *Politica economica generale e corporativa*, Roma 1940, pp. 58–90; P. de Michelis, *La Rôle économique*, op.cit., pp. 70–84.

protection of women's labor, unemployment insurance, a pension and retirement system, family allowance and health insurance⁹⁰. The Italian corporatist system was emulated in Francoist Spain, where it endured until the late 1950's, when the country underwent an accelerated liberal economic modernization⁹¹.

It is no coincidence that the corporatist question is a re-occurring theme in the speeches of nationalist dictators: Benito Mussolini, Francisco Franco and Antonio Salazar⁹². It pertains not only to the economic policy of the authoritarian state, but also to its political organization. Nationalist parliamentary systems in authoritarian Romance-speaking countries are not derived from general elections, but from corporatist ones. General elections are to be replaced through corporatist designation or in other words – as the Francoists would have it – the introduction of “organic”⁹³ democracy in which parliamentarians are non-political representatives of natural trade communities (corporations) and not political parties. Such systems were introduced in Italy, Spain, Austria and Portugal.

When compared with democratic nationalism, apart from the attack on democracy, the greatest *novum* is the affirmation of Catholicism, which is perceived by the nationalists to be a spiritual antidote to liberal freethinking and materialist Marxism.

⁹⁰ P. de Michelis, *La Rôle économique*, op.cit., pp. 105–168.

⁹¹ J.R. Hombrevilla, *Política económica española (1959–1973)*, Barcelona 1979; M.J. González, *La economía política del franquismo (1940–1970)*, Madrid 1979.

⁹² B. Mussolini, *Spirito della rivoluzione fascista. Antologia degli “Scritti e Discorsi”*, Milano 1940, pp. 259–331; F. Franco, *Pensamiento político*, op.cit, vol. I, pp. 495–522; A. Oliveira Salazar, *Antologia, 1909–1960*, Coimbra 1966, pp. 189–204.

⁹³ E.g. J. Beneyto Perez, J.M. Costa Serrano, *El partido. Estructura e historia del derecho público totalitario, con especial referencia al Régimen Español*, Zaragoza 1939, p. 140.

Privately, the attitude of nationalists towards religion varied: some were agnostics (Ch. Maurras, M. Barrès, R. Dmowski), others atheists (B. Mussolini), still others orthodox Catholics (F. Franco, A. Salazar). Everyone, however, believed that nationalism needs Catholicism as the basis for its worldview and that it constitutes traditional national identity. Maurras wrote:

Whether we believe or not; we are all born Catholic.
Our spiritual and moral habits were formed between the
balusters, the Holy Table and the Catholic altar⁹⁴.

For this reason Catholicism should be treated as an “element of the public peace, intellectual and moral order as well as national tradition”⁹⁵. Similarly, Roman Dmowski wrote:

Catholicism is not an appendage to Polishness, coloring it in some way – it is a part of its essence (...). The attempt to separate Catholicism from Polishness, to separate the nation from religion and the Church, is a destruction of the very essence of the nation⁹⁶.

The Spanish nationalist Ramiro de Maetzu claimed:

The historic valor of Spain is based on the defense of the universal spirit against the sects. This was the basis of Christianity’s struggle against Islam and Israel. We fought

⁹⁴ Ch. Maurras, *Dictionnaire politique*, op.cit., vol. I, p. 237.

⁹⁵ Idem, *La politique religieuse* [1912], [in:] idem, *La Démocratie religieuse*, Paris 1978, p. 371.

⁹⁶ R. Dmowski, *Kościół, naród i państwo* [1927], [in:] idem, *Wybór pism*, vol. IV, Nowy Jork 1988, p. 99.

also to maintain the unity of Christianity against the secessionist spirit of the Reformation⁹⁷.

In concluding the Lateran Treaty (1929) even the atheist and ex-socialist Mussolini admitted that Catholicism is the essence of Italian tradition⁹⁸. The assaults on liberalism and democratism due to their anti-clericalism and secularization of the world became a permanent feature in the vocabulary of non-democratic nationalists.

The last important feature of Romance-speaking/Catholic non-democratic nationalism was the highlighting of national prejudice with regards to national minorities and neighboring nations. For nationalism stems from a sense of humiliation and weakness of the nation, it is a reaction to this blemish⁹⁹. For the French the necessary motivation for the emergence of nationalism was the defeat at the hands of the Prussians and the loss of Alsace and Lorraine (1870); for the Italians it was the defeat at Adua at the hands of the barefoot Ethiopians (1896) and the general feeling that Italy is a second-rate state, which was highlighted by the terms of the Versailles peace, where the Italian aspirations for Dalmatia were ridiculed, hence the characteristic belief of Italian nationalism that Italians are a “proletarian nation”¹⁰⁰. For the Spaniards the impulse stemmed from the lost war with the United States and the loss of the remaining former colonial empire (1898). On Polish territory it was a reaction to years of

⁹⁷ R. de Maeztu, *Defensa de la Hispanidad*, Madrid 1998 [1934], p. 237.

⁹⁸ R. Paribeni, *L'Impero Romano*, vol. III, Roma 1939, pp. 45–47.

⁹⁹ I. Berlin, *Odchylona gałąź, o rozwoju nacjonalizmu*, [in:] idem, *Pokrzywione drzewo*, op.cit., pp. 216–217, 221.

¹⁰⁰ R. Michels, *L'imperialismo italiano*, Milano 1914, pp. 5–7; E. Corradini, *Discorsi politici. (1902–1923)*, Firenze 1923, pp. 103 and ff.; idem, *Jedność i potęga narodów*, Poznań 1937 [1922], p. 6.

partitions and unsuccessful irredentist attempts, when Poles saw themselves as rulers of the Republic stretching from Gdansk and Poznan to Kiev and Smolensk.

The sense of humiliation (subjective and objective) leads to a search for *national enemies*, both inside and outside the country. Ethnic minorities are the internal enemy, especially the Jews, who were accused of being cosmopolitan and of having international ties. This pertains especially to Polish and French nationalism, where Jews were linked with Freemasonry, cosmopolitan capital, Bolshevism or with an enmity towards Catholicism. Italian nationalism initially was not anti-Semitic, but it became so in the late 1930's due to the influence of theories emanating from neighboring Germany¹⁰¹. Only Spanish nationalism lacks any traces of animosity towards Jewry. Hostility is also directed at other ethnic minorities which are suspected of disloyalty to the State (the attitude of Polish nationalists towards Ukrainians in the Eastern Małopolska region, the relation of Polish and French nationalists towards the German minority).

The second object of aversion is the neighboring nation. French and Polish nationalists held radically anti-German positions seeing in Berlin a threat to their own states (rightly, as World War II demonstrated). In relation to Germany Latin nationalism is defensive in nature. French nationalists in general limited themselves to the defense of the territorial and colonial *status quo*, which emerged after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, signifying political and military hegemony of France in Europe

¹⁰¹ M.-A. Metard-Bonucci, *L'antisémitisme fasciste. Un 'transfert culturel' de l'Allemagne vers l'Italie?*, „Rélations Internationales“ 2003, no. 116, pp. 483–494; idem, *Profil racial de l'homme nouveau sous le fascisme italien*, [in:] idem, P. Milza (ed.), *L'homme nouveau dans l'Europe fasciste (1922–1945). Entre dictature et totalitarisme*, Paris 2004, pp. 147–169.

and the preservation of the colonial empire. Other Latin nations, however, are just beginning to fight for the creation of their own empires: the Italians want to resurrect the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean and Mussolini willingly styled himself as the new Caesar of the rising empire¹⁰²; the Portuguese believe in the rebuilding of the glory of their small country by way of settling African colonies (Angola and Mozambique)¹⁰³; the Spaniards of the 1930's dream of *Hispanidad*, i.e. the creation of a great Catholic-Spanish empire composed of the Iberian Peninsula and all of Latin America¹⁰⁴.

Romantic non-democratic nationalists fought against all the political institutions created by their forefathers, i.e. the democratic nationalists. While their predecessors were republicans, democrats and anti-clerical, working towards a European republic composed

¹⁰² R. Paribeni, *L'Impero Romano*, op.cit, vol. III, pp. 49–50 (ibidem a collection of speeches by *Il Duce* on the necessity of rebuilding Rome – pp. 5–18). See also two interesting brochures on the subject: N. Fattovich, *Il senso della Romanità in Mussolini*, Bologna 1939; G. Bottai, *La funzione di Roma nella vita culturale e scientifica della nazione*, Roma 1940. For more on the problem in scholarly literature see for eg. F. Rigotti, L. Ornaghi, *Die Rechtfertigung der faschistischen Diktatur durch die Romanität*, [in:] R. Saage (ed.), *Das Scheitern diktatorischer Legitimationsmuster und die Zukunftsfähigkeit der Demokratie*, Berlin 1995, pp. 141–157.

¹⁰³ M. Braga da Cruz, *O Partido e o Estado na Salazarismo*, Lisboa 1988, pp. 62–73; A.E. Duarte Silva, *Salazar e a política colonial do Estado Novo, o acto colonial (1930–1951)*, [in:] *Salazar e o Salazarismo*, Lisboa 1989, pp. 101–152; Y. Leonard, *Le colon, figure de l'homme nouveau dans le Portugal de Salazar?* [in:] idem, P. Milza (ed.), *L'homme nouveau dans l'Europe fasciste (1922–1945). Entre dictature et totalitarisme*, Paris 2004, pp. 209–226.

¹⁰⁴ J. Vazquez de Mella, *Antología*, Madrid 1953, pp. 66–69; I. Gomá Tomàs, *Apología de la Hispanidad. Discurso pronucniado en el Teatro "Colón", de Buenos Aires, el día 12 de octubre de 1934, en la velada conmemorativa del "Día de la Raza", „Acion Española” 01.11.1934*; R. de Maeztu, *Defensa de la Hispanidad*, op.cit.

of free and democratic nations, the non-democratic nationalists wanted a nationalist-Catholic dictatorship, hostile to their neighbors and to ethnic minorities. They fought fiercely against the *ideas of 1789* (Italian Fascism), but also against political romanticism which was the philosophical basis for revolutionary patriotism, seeing in it a wave of irrational anarchy (French and Spanish movements)¹⁰⁵. Democratic nationalists usually did not live long enough to see the generation of non-democratic nationalists. The few epigones of Jacobin nationalism were terrified by this new wave. The last true Jacobin, Eugène Fournière, wrote in this manner while addressing Barrès and Maurras:

Nationalism (...) is republican, founded upon on the right of nations to self-determination. Nationalism was born in the hearts of the French when the Rights of Man were proclaimed, those rights of man against which you now throw anathemas,

after which he stated that the new nationalists are guided by

a primitive tribal feeling which does not have any contact with neighbors other than war and which does not exchange with them goods and ideas, but only murderous shots¹⁰⁶.

Non-democratic nationalists of the end of the nineteenth century and from the interwar period were aware that their

¹⁰⁵ P. Lasserre, *Le Romantisme français. Essai sur la révolution dans les sentiments et dans les idées au XIXe siècle*, Paris 1911 [1907]; Ch. Maurras, *Romantisme et Révolution*, Paris 1922; E. Vegas Latapie, *Romanticismo y Democracia*, [n.p.]1938.

¹⁰⁶ E. Fournière, *L'artifice nationaliste*, Paris 1903, pp. 9, 31.

forefathers came from the Left and were revolutionaries. Italian Fascists, while fighting against the revolution of 1789 which came from France, constantly referred to the original Italian democratic tradition of *Risorgimento*¹⁰⁷. But they held the position that in rejecting liberal and parliamentary political institutions, they were realizing its democratic message. Giovanni Gentile, the most prominent ideologue of Fascism wrote: “*Mazzini oggi è con noi*” (Mazzini is with us today)¹⁰⁸. There was a great admiration for the Jacobin Committee of Public Safety among members Action Française. According to them it saved the country from an external armed counter-revolution, whose victory would admittedly signify the triumph of the Rights and it would also lead to the despoiling of France and the annexation of the border territories¹⁰⁹. In the Polish nationalist tradition, despite its critical approach to Polish revolutionary Romanticism, there was also an awareness of the significance of this legacy for the way it was formed¹¹⁰. In the end all of the non-democratic nationalists, despite their sympathy towards rightist concepts of government, were aware that genetically nationalism was born during the French Revolution. Although the propositions formulated back then are contrary to

¹⁰⁷ E.g. R. Michels, *Elemente zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Italienischen Sozialpatriotismus*, [in:] idem, *Sozialismus und Faschismus*, München 1925, pp. 1–53.

¹⁰⁸ P.G. Zunino, *L'ideologia del fascismo. Miti, credenze e valori nella stabilizzazione del regime*, Bologna 1985, p. 88. For more on the subject of the relation between Fascism and Risorgimento see for eg. N.A. Sidi-Maamar, *Entre philosophie et politique, Giovanni Gentile. Un philosophe engagé sous le fascisme*, Paris 2001, pp. 17–38; H.A. Cavallera, *L'immagine del Fascismo in Giovanni Gentile*, Lecce 2008, pp. 80–128.

¹⁰⁹ L. Daudet, *L'Entre-deux-guerre*, Paris 1932, p. 213; Ch. Maurras, *Dictionnaire politique*, op.cit., vol. V, pp. 50–51, 162; idem, *Les Conditions de la Victoire*, vol. IV, *La blessure intérieure*, Paris 1918, p. 148.

¹¹⁰ E.g. S. Kozicki, *Dziedzictwo polityczne Trzech Wieszców*, Warszawa 1949, pp. 342 and ff.

the current understanding of the national interest. They intended to combine post-revolutionary nationalism with the political institutions grounded in an authoritarian and hierarchical pre-revolutionary vision. To cite Maurras, they wanted to “bring together the sons of the Jacobins and the Chouans”¹¹¹.

4.2. German civilizational separatism

German nationalism was developing already in the nineteenth century in a different direction than Romantic nationalism for two primary reasons.

Firstly, German nationalism never actually went through a democratic phase, because it was a reaction to the sovereigntist ideas and institutions brought from France and on French bayonets, i.e. the revolutionary ideas. The ideas of the Enlightenment were treated here as French, not universal, ideas. For this reason, German political Romanticism, however based to a large extent on (epistemologically liberal) extreme subjectivism, almost always adopted reactionary positions, becoming an expression of indigenous conservatism¹¹². Opposing the abstract Enlightenment visions, it revalorized historical thinking and the rooting in the local tradition. In contrast with the Romantic nationalists, German nationalists of the beginning of the nineteenth century never saw

¹¹¹ Ch. Maurras, *La contre-révolution spontanée*, Lyon 1943, p. 57.

¹¹² J. Baxa, *Romantik und konservative Politik*, [in:] G.-K. Kaltenbrunner (ed.), *Konservatismus in Europa*, Freiburg 1972, pp. 443–468; G.-K. Kaltenbrunner, *Der schwierige Konservatismus. Definitionen-Theorien-Porträts*, Herford 1975, pp. 169–222; J. Godechot, *La contre-révolution. Doctrine et action*, Paris 1984, pp. 124–130; K. Lenk, *Deutscher Konservatismus*, Frankfurt 1989, pp. 71–86; R. Skarżyński, *Konserwatyzm. Zarys dziejów filozofii politycznej*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 147–160.

themselves as representing a political current, the culmination of which was to be the unification of the whole of Europe or of mankind. On the contrary, they wanted to unite only German-speaking countries against the Napoleonic invasion¹¹³.

Secondly, the specific feature of German political thought in the 19th century was the long absence of the idea of unification of the German-speaking peoples into a single state. For several decades the Lutheran tradition of thought was dominant. It pertained to a territorial and dynastic state, covering only part of the German-speaking community – usually those uniform in confession. When Johann G. Fichte constructs his economically autarkic concept of the “closed commercial state”, it is not a pan-German project, but a Prussian one, as evidenced by the fact that addressee of the book is a Prussian politician¹¹⁴ – it does not pertain to Germany as such, but only to Prussia. When Georg W.F. Hegel forms his historiosophical apologetics of the state, it is not a pan-German state that he refers to, but a Protestant Prussian one¹¹⁵.

German nationalists did not focus on the idea of the state, because the Germans for centuries did not possess uniform statehood and actually did not even have such a tradition. Neither was it brought about by the Lesser Germany solution accomplished by the policy of Otto von Bismarck, which omitted German-speaking Austria in the process of German unification. Hence the focus of German nationalism did not revolve around the idea of the state, but around the specifically understood nation (*Volk*). Members of the Volk were originally the subjects of a given German small state,

¹¹³ J. Droz, *Présentation*, [in:] idem (ed.), *Le Romantisme politique en Allemagne*, Paris 1963, pp. 24–31.

¹¹⁴ J.G. Fichte, *Zamknięte państwo handlowe* [1800], [in:] idem, *Zamknięte państwo handlowe i inne pisma*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 151–155.

¹¹⁵ G.W.F. Hegel, *Wykłady o filozofii dziejów*, Warszawa 2003 [1821], pp. 473–518.

regardless of their nationality. The liberal legislation imported from France took the same position (the civic nation). Quickly, however, thanks to the influence of the philosopher Johann G. Herder and the German Romanticists, the term began to denote a cultural and spiritual community which was difficult to define, and ultimately even a racial one defined in biological terms¹¹⁶.

Due to the fact that they did not possess a unified national state for centuries, German nationalism did not refer to this category. On the contrary, the term *state* was associated with territorial political entities, artificially cut out from the vast German-speaking areas.

At the same time, the Germans were unable to forge their own original state tradition, which was no problem for Italian nationalism of the *Risorgimento* era, despite the latter experiencing a similar lack of a historical nation-state. This intellectual weakness of German nationalism was the cause, why they rejected Roman public law. The philosophy of law, which was dominant in Germany hence the era of Romanticism, rejected Roman private law, perceiving it (perhaps too hastily) as individualistic and liberal, incompatible with the Old German communal spirit¹¹⁷. Roman public law on the other hand favored the modern, centralized absolutist state or in other words – within the German political context until 1870 – the territorial state, therefore it did not have a pan-German character¹¹⁸. Overall Roman

¹¹⁶ H. Liermann, *Das deutsche Volk als Rechtsbegriff im Rechtsstaatsrecht der Gegenwart*, Berlin-Bonn 1927, pp. 5–26.

¹¹⁷ V. Stanislawski, *Natur und Staat. Zur politischen Theorie der deutschen Romantik*, Opladen 1979, p. 117; T. Harada, *Politische Ökonomie des Idealismus und der Romantik. Korporatismus von Fichte, Müller und Hegel*, Berlin 1989, pp. 83, 313–314; idem, *Adam Müllers Staats- und Wirtschaftslehre*, Marburg 2004, pp. 87–88, 96–97.

¹¹⁸ M. Rainer, *Das Römische Recht in Europa. Von Justinian zum BGB*, Wien 2012, pp. 203–237.

law appeared late in the Reich – in the XIIth–XIIIth centuries – along with the Italian jurists of the Stauffer dynasty. As a matter of fact it was disseminated by the French invaders during the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. That is why in the nineteenth century there was a fierce debate on whether they can ever be regarded as an expression of the German historical spirit (K. von Savigny vs. A. Thibaut)¹¹⁹. The greatest opponent of Roman law in German learning of the late nineteenth century was the prominent historian and philosopher of law – Otto von Gierke¹²⁰.

Due to the lack of a common tradition, as well as a pro-state idea (i.e. one which arises from the spirit of Roman public law), the German-speaking peoples perceived unity in terms of a mystical or racial community. Volkism became its expression, the Germans' yearning for an ancient and idealized pre-modern world. Volkism appealed to the idea that in the landscape, i.e. in the environment, national ancestral traditions are preserved, which are absorbed by the individual by way of living in the motherland since ones' birth. For this reason we see the appearance of such concepts as *rooting* and *soil and blood*. Volkism, understood in such a way, had a deeply particular and historical character – religiously it took on a pantheistic dimension. The advocated rural Germanic order is identical with the Germanic Middle Ages and its antithesis is the Jew, depicted as the eternal nomad, a stateless person, a person completely uprooted, in other words a precursor and creator of individualistic liberalism. The clash of the German peasants with the Jewish innkeepers and bankers created the prototype for

¹¹⁹ G. Pugliese, *I Pandettisti fra Tradizione romanistica e moderna Scienza del Dritto*, [in:] *La Formazione storica del Diritto moderno in Europa*, Firenze 1977, pp. 32–40; M. Rainer, *Das Römische Recht*, op.cit., pp. 276–322.

¹²⁰ O. von Gierke, *Der germanische Staatsgedanke*, Berlin 1919; idem, *Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts*, Frankfurt am Main 1948, pp. 10–23.

the myth of a racial war for world domination¹²¹. For a people deprived of a uniform tradition and a philosophy of the state, volkism's merit was its irrational character, a matter of a subjective emotion. A citizen of any German-speaking state or a German-speaking citizen of a foreign country could become a member of a community understood in such terms. The volkist community, formed by the *landscape*, naturally had a particular character and was constructed in opposition to all forms of universalism. Paul de Lagarde attempted to constitute its separateness on the basis of the restoration of a monolatric German religion, i.e. on a spiritual element¹²². Germans, however, began to quickly construct their sense of identity on the myth of race (in the biological sense). This myth, created in France (A. de Gobineau), originally acted as a foundation for the concept of the estate society, proclaiming that people are not equal¹²³. German anthropologists, however, (L. Wilser, K. Penka, and T. Poesche) gave it a scientific form, based on the Darwinian philosophy of nature. These researchers placed the aboriginal motherland of the Arians (Thule) in the North, treating the common origin of the peoples as the basis for the pan-German idea. Friedrich Lange negated Christian universalism, assigning Arians primacy over other races and above all a propensity for a Nietzschean heroic conception of life, deriving from this notion the praise for Prussian militarism. Heinrich Driesmas even perceived the Reformation as a struggle of the German race against Catholicism, which was under the

¹²¹ On volkism see for e.g. G.L. Mosse, *Kryzys ideologii niemieckiej*, Warszawa 1972; S. Breuer, *Nationalismus und Faschismus. Frankreich, Italien und Deutschland im Vergleich*, Darmstadt 2005, pp. 146–161.

¹²² P. de Lagarde, *An die Deutschen. Eine Auswahl aus den „Deutschen Schriften“*, Berlin [n.d.], pp. 195–254.

¹²³ J. Evola, *Il mito del sangue*, Milano 1937, p. 31.

influence of Judaism¹²⁴. The doctrine of Ludwig Woltmann was of huge importance. He analyzed political systems and legislation through the prism of race and promoted a policy of eugenics, the aim of which was to breed a new elite. Germans saw themselves as the highest product of evolution, and perceived mixing of races as the cause for the fall of empires¹²⁵.

German nationalism found fertile ground in the, already heavily secularized, Prussian-Protestant circles, which is why it was always directed against Catholicism. Prussia built its identity in obsessive opposition to the universalism of the Latin-Catholic world¹²⁶. This trend was radicalized by the National Socialists, who developed the myth of the German race. According to Alfred Rosenberg, Christianity as it was created by St. Paul was intellectually “Jewified”, constituting a “Jahwefied system of irrational mysticism” and “magic”. In his opinion, this was to be especially visible in Catholicism, serving the “foreign” Latin Rome, which had developed over the centuries a grand plan of spiritual, intellectual and political conquest of the Germans¹²⁷. The remedy for the Catholic conspiracy was the idea of the “fifth Gospel”, in other words a national, German and racist Christianity of a territorial character, with its own dogma, separate ecclesiology,

¹²⁴ Ibidem, pp. 37–42, 52–53.

¹²⁵ Ibidem, pp. 43–49.

¹²⁶ M.B. Gross, *The War against Catholicism. Liberalism and the Anti-Catholic Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, [n.p.] 2005; G. Kucharczyk, *Kulturkampf. Walka Berlina z katolicyzmem (1846–1918)*, Warszawa 2009; M. Kopczyński, *Między konserwatyzmem i nacjonalizmem. Myśl polityczna Ottona von Bismarcka*, Toruń 2013, pp. 199–280.

¹²⁷ A. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts. Eine Wertung der seelisch-geistigen Gestaltkämpfe unserer Zeit*, München 1938 [1930], passim, especially see chapters I, 1, 1; I, 1, 3–4; I, 1, 6–8; I, 2, 1–3; I, 3, 5–6; II, 1, 3; II, 6.

where the nationalist state would administer the church on behalf of the Volk. In this German Christianity Christ's Revelation would be replaced with national-religious myth¹²⁸. The practical realization of this project in the III Reich was the movement of so-called German Christians, who inserted racism into Christianity, eliminating from it traces of Judaism and universalism¹²⁹.

All in all German non-democratic nationalism was not so much nationalism (appealing to the national community), but rather racism (appealing to the supposed genetic community) of a mystical and irrational character. It was not science, but a myth, hence the name of Rosenberg's program book (*Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*)¹³⁰. Its characteristic trait lay in its anti-statism (in the Roman public law understanding) and in ignoring statutory law in favor of subjective feelings. That is why Carl Schmitt was right, when he summed up the Nazis coming to power (1933) by stating "Hegel is dead"¹³¹. He was seconded in this thought by the leading Nazi philosopher of law Otto Koellreuter, who wrote: "the state in and of itself does not possess any political value. For National Socialism, the Hegelian idea, that the state constitutes an 'ethical reality', is an alien notion"¹³².

¹²⁸ Ibidem, V. For further reading see K. Harvill-Burton, *Le Nazisme comme religion. Quatre théologiens déchiffrent le code religieux nazi (1932–1945)*, Quebec 2006, pp. 20–36.

¹²⁹ See e.g. H.J. Sonne, *Die politische Theologie der Deutschen Christen*, Göttingen 1982; J. Stroup, *Political Theology and Secularization in Germany, 1918–1939. Emanuel Hirsch as a Phenomenon of his Time*, „Harvard Theological Review” 1987, no. 80, pp. 321–368; E. Voegelin, *Hitler und die Deutschen*, München 2006, pp. 160–220.

¹³⁰ A. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, op.cit, III, 3, p. 3.

¹³¹ C. Schmitt, *Staat, Bewegung, Volk. Die Dreigliederung der politischen Einheit*, Berlin 1933, p. 32.

¹³² O. Koellreuter, *Deutsches Verfassungsrecht. Ein Grundriss*, Berlin 1935, p. 10.

SS lawyers (K. Eckhardt, R. Höhn), who objected to the idea of the modern state, preached total legal voluntarism: the Führer, acting on behalf of the Volk, is not guided by written laws. The liberal Weimar constitution was formally in force in the Third Reich and in civil law, the liberal BGB. Nevertheless, the courts rule here in accordance with the current ideological line. Court sentences were often replaced with simple administrative decisions, which sanctioned the lawless state, where norms were replaced with orders, instructions of superiors and arbitrary decisions of judges inspired by the general principles of the National Socialist philosophy of law, the ideology or program of the NSDAP¹³³. The state loses its primacy to the Volk, whose exponents are the Führer and the Nazi party. This relation of the state and the party is the basic difference between Latin Italian Fascism and German Fascism. For Italian Fascists, the thought that anything could stand above the totalitarian state, including the governing monoparty (PNF), is absolutely unimaginable¹³⁴.

The Nazis recognize the Volk (*Volksgemeinschaft*) as the only subject of law, encompassing all the racially pure Germans living in the Reich and beyond its borders. Karl Lorenz writes that

the subject of law (Rechtsgenosse) is only he, who is a part of the Volk (Volksgenosse). And the part of the Volk is

¹³³ C. Lavagna, *La dottrina nazionalsocialista del diritto e dello stato*, Milano 1938, pp. 172–186; V. Winkler, *Der Kampf gegen die Rechtswissenschaft*, Hamburg 2014, pp. 279–282.

¹³⁴ Np. L. Viesti, *Stato e diritto fascista*, Perugia 1929, pp. 15–82; C. Costamagna, *Dottrina del fascismo*, vol. I, *Il principio dello Stato*, Brindisi 1983 [1938], pp. 34–96; A. Rocco, *Scritti e Discorsi politici*, vol. III, *La formazione dello Stato fascista (1925–1934)*, Milano 1938, pp. 943–956. Spanish fascists had a similar outlook – see L. Legaz y Lacambra, *Introducción a la teoría del Estado Nacionalsindicalista*, Barcelona 1940, pp. 129–192.

he who is of German blood. This statement should be recorded as the source of legal capacity of every human being in art. 1 BGB, becoming the basis of our law¹³⁵.

Now we understand why in Nazism it is the Volk, not the state, which is the basic subject of law¹³⁶. Since the non-German citizens of this state (e.g. Jews) are not part of the Volk, but German citizens of foreign countries are. Therefore, the distinction between domestic and foreign policy loses its meaning. No one knows who exactly is a member of the Volk and how many of them are there. Adolf Hitler speaks on its behalf, as its only legitimate political representative¹³⁷. Hans Frank and Carl Schmitt argue that the leader speaks the law, therefore his every public utterance is normative, abolishing the old laws and establishing new ones¹³⁸.

The Hitlerites were not ethnic nationalists. Nazism was never a nationalist, but rather an imperial movement, whose symbol was the idea of the Thousand-Year Reich. They believed that the world must be divided into several *great spaces*, governed by a few nation-lords (Germans, Italians, Japanese, English, Americans, possibly Russians), where each one would sovereignly administer its subordinate area.

¹³⁵ As cited in M. Auer, *Der privatrechtliche Diskurs der Moderne*, Tübingen 2014, p. 21, footnote 41.

¹³⁶ C. Barrabino, *Il ‚popolo‘ nell'ideologia nazional-socialista*, Milano 1940, pp. 169–184; F. Lopez de Oñade, *La certezza del diritto*, Milano 1968 [1942], pp. 102–142.

¹³⁷ E. Huber, *Wesen und Inhalt der politischen Verfassung*, Hamburg 1935, p. 91; O. Koellreutter, *Deutsches Verfassungsrecht*, op.cit., pp. 15, 146–148; C. Barrabino, *Il ‚popolo‘ nell'ideologia*, op.cit., pp. 133–141.

¹³⁸ H. Frank, *Die Neugestaltung des deutschen Rechts*, „Deutsches Recht“ 1935, no. 19/20, p. 470; C. Schmitt, *Der Rechtsstaat*, [in:] H. Frank (ed.), *Nationalsozialistisches Handbuch für Recht und Gesetzgebung*, München 1935, pp. 3–10.

The symbol of this absolute governance over one's *great space* is the Monroe Doctrine, which established the suzerainty of Washington over the whole New World¹³⁹. Every nation, in its expanse, established its own ideology and has the right to conduct any form of social engineering, including the extermination of whole nations or social groups considered hostile or unnecessary. The Germans were to rule Continental Europe. The Nazis imagined the creation of a United States of Europe (*Vereingte Staaten von Europa*)¹⁴⁰. Through peaceful unification (with the help of economic pressure) or military conquest, German manufacturing will reign over the continental economy, the German nation will acquire "living space" for economic expansion and migration, and the unification of Germans from the Reich, Austria and German minorities in the remaining states will finally occur¹⁴¹. In this way, a pan-European "economic zone", in which "the nations will work together for the common development of a common civilizational, economic and cultural space" shall be created¹⁴². This is the German idea of a "new ordering of reality" (*Neuordnung*)¹⁴³.

The Nazi "living space" (*Lebensraum*) moves away from thinking in statist terms. The vision assumes the final "overcoming of sovereign states"¹⁴⁴ and the replacement of traditional European states with pan-continental rule of the Volk. This mystic community, which cannot

¹³⁹ C. Schmitt, *Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte. Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht*, Berlin 1991 [1941], pp. 22–33.

¹⁴⁰ H. Krebs, *Panuropa oder Mitteleuropa?* München 1931, p. 16.

¹⁴¹ Ibidem, pp. 3, 21–23, 29; R. Höhn, *Reich, Grossraum, Grossmacht*, Darmstadt 1942, pp. 85–88.

¹⁴² R. Höhn, *Reich, Grossraum*, op.cit., pp. 110, 112.

¹⁴³ For further reading see M. Ziętek-Wielomska, *Idea Neuordnung jako źródło niemieckich idei zjednoczenia Europy*, [in:] Ł. Świącicki, A. Wielomski (ed.), *Od Christianitas do Unii Europejskiej. Historia idei zjednoczenia Europy*, Warszawa 2015, pp. 267–298.

¹⁴⁴ R. Höhn, *Reich, Grossraum*, op.cit., p. 133.

be described, but which can be instinctively felt, would become the new sovereign subject of law. The states would disappear as political entities and their place be taken by the sole subject, the German Volk, the purpose of which was to build the future community of European Arian peoples. Reinhard Höhn writes that Europe will become “A Living Space for one Volk”, where other nations will find happiness through “[the] harmony of inequality”¹⁴⁵, that is, thanks to the benevolence of German hegemony.

In Germany the Nazis created a totalitarian system, while theoretically being an extremely anti-statist movement, particularly opposed to Roman law and the idea of a modern sovereign state, which arose from it. Nazism was an expression of the anti-statist doctrine of Gierke, negating Roman public law as a source of the idea of the state for a Germanic community law (lacking in public law)¹⁴⁶. The Volk was to replace the state and the private law of the Volk commonwealth was to displace all public law¹⁴⁷. The ancient national community was to be rebuilt (*Gemeinschaft* vs. *Gesellschaft*) through the abolishment of the modern state and public law. The state arose in Nazism coincidentally, when it turned out that the freedom granted to the emancipated liberal individual cannot be turned over to communal society. Such a society failed to rise in an artificial manner, therefore the laws made by the leader and the party on behalf of the Volk must have

¹⁴⁵ Ibidem, pp. 133, 136.

¹⁴⁶ R. Höhn, *Der individualistische Staatsbegriff und die juristische Staatsperson*, Hamburg 1935, p. 16. About the role of O. von Gierke in Nazism in this aspect see R. Höhn, *Otto von Gierkes Staatslehre und unsere Zeit*, Hamburg 1936, pp. 9–14.

¹⁴⁷ R. Meyer-Pritzl, *Die „Kieler Schule“ und das Römische Recht*, [in:] idem, A. Hoyer, H. Hattenhauer, W. Schubert (ed.), *Gedächtnisschrift für Jörn Eckert*, Kiel 2008, pp. 555–584; V. Winkler, *Der Kampf gegen die Rechtswissenschaft*, op.cit., pp. 263–282.

some formal executioner. The stolen liberal freedoms were taken over by the state, which became totalitarian, as if by accident, as a byproduct of the anti-liberal revolution¹⁴⁸.

5. The third wave: European nationalism?

After the Second World War the word nationalism was banished and in the official politically correct dictionaries – the official and approved by the power and media elites governing Western Europe narrative – was placed next to such terms as *fascism* and *National Socialism (Nazism)*. All three were blamed for the outbreak of the Second World War and the unbelievable atrocities perpetrated by the Third Reich. All three were associated with the chimneys of Auschwitz and the extermination of millions of people, conducted for racial reasons. Today these terms have become insults and are not considered politically scientific designations. We understand all too well, for example, that one may not like George W. Bush and criticize his aggressive and imperial foreign policy, but this does not entitle one to call the American president a “fascist” and compare the attack on the World Trade Center to the arson attack on the Reichstag ordered by Hitler¹⁴⁹. This narrative illustrates with what do many contemporary people, even scholars, associate the aforementioned terms.

Nobody will deny that German Nazism was criminal in character and indeed is responsible for the death of millions of people of many races, nations, religions – citizens of dozens of European states. Yes, Nazism was a sinister ideology and its pejorative signification is justified. However, when we characterize

¹⁴⁸ C. Lavagna, *La dottrina nazionalsocialista*, op.cit., pp. 63–70; M. Auer, *Der privatrechtliche Diskurs*, op.cit., pp. 21–22.

¹⁴⁹ L. Portis, *Histoire du fascisme aux Etats-Unis*, Paris 2008, p. 290.

Italian Fascism, there appear doubts as to its criminal character. During the reign of Benito Mussolini no concentration camps were built in Italy, no mass shootings and murder of millions of people took place. Yes, Italian soldiers did perpetrate some war crimes in colonial Ethiopia and in the Balkans, but they did not differ in nature from the hundreds of similar (shameful) accidents that happened and will always happen during the duration of war, and about which the media inform us every day, for example in Afghanistan or Iraq. A war crime differs from an act of genocide in scale, it also lacks the motivation to exterminate any national or social group. Italian Fascists never led a methodic and planned campaign of physical annihilation of their political enemies. Compared with the Third Reich, the number of victims of political repression was negligible. During the 21 year reign of the Fascist political system, around 15 000 people (5000 imprisoned) were subject to repression, but until 1940 only 9 executions were carried out for political reasons (mainly irredentist Slovenian terrorists)¹⁵⁰. Whereas at the end of the civil war in nationalist Spain, where Fascism never existed, more than 23 000 death sentences were carried out. Even after the liberalization of the regime, during the next 20 years (1954–74) more death sentences were carried out there for political reasons than in the analogous 20 year period of Fascist Italy (ratio of 51:9)¹⁵¹. It is no coincidence that in serious literature on the subject, there is an on-going discussion on whether Mussolini's reign was totalitarian or simply authoritarian¹⁵².

¹⁵⁰ Z. Sternhell, *Ni droite ni gauche. L'idéologie fasciste en France*, Bruxelles 2000, p. 54.

¹⁵¹ J. Tusell, *La dictadura de Franco*, Madrid 1996, pp. 226–228.

¹⁵² The authoritarian, not totalitarian, character of Italian Fascism is highlighted by A. Aquarone, *L'organizzazione dello Stato totalitario*, Torino 1965, pp. 290–293. A polemical approach to this is taken by

In the case of the nationalist movements of the interwar period and during the Second World War, the question of their brutality/humanitarianism was a mixed bag. There were nationalists who murdered representatives of other nations (for example the massive murder of Serbs committed by Croatian Ustashe), but there were also nationalists who themselves were murdered by maleficent totalitarian regimes (for example Polish nationalists were murdered both by the Soviets and the Germans), as well as authoritarian regimes (the legionaries of Corneliu Z. Codreanu murdered by Romanian monarchists in 1938). The greatest mass-murderers of the XX century were communists, such as Stalin, who represented a thoroughly internationalist ideology, which considered any type of nationalism to be a *bourgeois ideology*.

In spite of this, after 1945, the greatest odium of responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity was ascribed to national movements, which represented a victory for the propaganda of the social democratic Left (in Western Europe) and the Communist Left (in Eastern Europe), both being enemies of nationalism and patriotism.

To this day in many European countries serious scholars, politicians and journalists dare say, that there are *better* and *worse* crimes. The former can somehow be, if not entirely morally justified, than at least understood and accepted, while in case of the latter this is impossible. Those *worse* crimes are those that were committed in the name of racist and nationalist ideologies (indeed both concepts are unreasonably mixed together and treated as synonyms), the victims of which were people of foreign nationality and different ethnic groups, national minorities, especially the Jews (in this context less is written about the Roma

J.-Y. Dormagen, *Logique du fascisme. L'Etat totalitaire en Italie*, Paris 2008, pp. 7–23.

and the Poles are almost never mentioned). Opinion-forming leftist circles approach Communist atrocities with a greater degree of understanding. They are somehow excused, because although they were committed against entire social classes with equal savagery, but in the name of allegedly lofty ideals – *humanity, progress, emancipation, equality*, etc. This is brilliantly illustrated by the debate on the unequal relation of the official German academia towards Nazi and Bolshevik ideology (*Historikerstreit*)¹⁵³, which was initiated by Ernst Nolte, as well as by a similar debate in France, where it was, even recently, quite seriously discussed whether the crimes committed in the name of class struggle are equally monstrous, like those committed for reasons having to do with a racial struggle¹⁵⁴. We observe a similar phenomenon in Poland, where prosecutors willingly prosecute nationalist and fascistic groups for propagating *hate* and a *totalitarian system*, while demonstrating a leniency towards similar groups which refer to Marxism in its different variations, promoting a hatred similar in intensity, but not on the grounds of nationality.

This development has its roots in the *anti-fascist* post-war cleansing, which occurred in Europe¹⁵⁵, as a result of which the nationalist Right was physically annihilated and pushed from public debate. Paradoxically, this process was deepest in those countries, where Fascism never existed, for example in France (*Epuration*) or in Poland and countries of Eastern Europe. This cleansing occurred especially in those countries, where the Communists came to power directly (Eastern Europe) or as part of a broader

¹⁵³ E.R. Piper (ed.), *„Historikerstreit“. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung*, München 1987.

¹⁵⁴ F. Furet, E. Nolte, *Fascisme et communisme*, Paris 1998, pp. 131–135.

¹⁵⁵ K. Lowe, *Dziki kontynent. Europa po II Wojnie Światowej*, Poznań 2013, pp. 107–242.

anti-fascist coalition (France). In these countries the traditional Right, including the nationalists, under the standards of battling with *fascism* and against *collaborators*, was completely annihilated. Of particular importance to the development of rightist ideas was the victory over the French Right, which was traditionally the cradle of grand ideas across the continent. The life sentence for Charles Maurras, due to alleged “intellectual collaboration” with the Germans, was to be a symbolic closing of the history of French counter-revolutionary political philosophy, through the penalizing of its political doctrine and the person of its founder¹⁵⁶.

Paradoxically this cleansing was least observed in post-war Germany and Italy – the countries that were responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War and in which fascism was a real, not imagined, phenomenon. In these states national and conservative ideas were sentenced to political oblivion, but people who were active in the totalitarian system were not hunted down zealously. In the Federal Republic of Germany rightist and nationalist views have signified and continue to signify elimination from public life¹⁵⁷, but people with a Nazi past who publically rejected their views, claiming to now be *liberal democrats*, were allowed to return to public life, not having to explain their Nazi past¹⁵⁸. In Italy the situation was even simpler, because after a brief interval the post-fascists organized into the Movimento Sociale

¹⁵⁶ Y. Chiron, *La vie de Maurras*, Paris 1991, pp. 449–463; S. Giocanti, *Maurras. Le chaos et l'ordre*, Paris 2006, pp. 458–473.

¹⁵⁷ H.-J. Puhle, *Conservatism in Modern German History*, „Journal of Contemporary History” 1978, no. 4, pp. 712–713; J.Z. Muller, *The other God that failed. Hans Freyer and the Deradicalisation of German Conservatism*, Princeton 1987, pp. 18, 382.

¹⁵⁸ H. Grebing, *Positionen des Konservatismus in der Bundesrepublik*, [in:] H.-G. Schumann, *Konservatismus*, Köln 1974, pp. 290–314; H. Lübke, *Die resignierte konservative Revolution*, „Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft” 1959, no. 115, pp. 131–138.

Italiano (MSI), openly referring to the legacy of *Il Duce*¹⁵⁹. Italy was the sole post-war country with a democratic system, where nationalists remained active in official politics, led for many years by Giorgio Almirante. Yet even there they were politically isolated and their views were fiercely and widely criticized and ridiculed.

Nationalists for decades also maintained power in Spain, governed by Francisco Franco, and in Portugal under Antonio Oliveira Salazar. The fall of both of these authoritarian systems in the late 1970's, after the death of both prominent dictators, signified political oblivion for the nationalist parties, which were relegated to the margins of democratic politics¹⁶⁰. Also the ruling political and media class led a systematic campaign of defamation directed against the nationalist and conservative political tradition, often falsely equating it with fascism. It has been pointed out that already, that although virtually nobody outside of Portugal consider Salazar to be a fascist, this view is quite widespread in the country itself and stems from the dominance of scholars with a leftist orientation, often with an oppositional past¹⁶¹. Their interpretation is dominated by a simplistic understanding of Marxism, according to which the Right and fascism are synonyms¹⁶².

Researchers of nationalism usually end their portrayal of the history of European nationalism in the year 1945, and the existing

¹⁵⁹ F. Duprat, *L'Ascension du M.S.I.*, Paris 1972; G. de Medici, *Le origini del MSI. Dal clandestinismo al primo congresso 1943-1948*, Roma 1986; M. Bankowicz, *Niedemokratyzmy*, Kraków 2011, pp. 161-186.

¹⁶⁰ J.L. Rodríguez Jiménez, *La extrema derecha española en el siglo XX*, Madrid 1997, pp. 438-500.

¹⁶¹ A. Costa Pinto, *The Salazar 'New State' and European Fascism*, San Domenico 1991, pp. 2-5, 49-52.

¹⁶² E.g. F. Piteira dos Santos, *O fascismo em Portugal, conceito e prática*, [in:] *O fascismo em Portugal*, Lisboa 1982, pp. 9-17. Excellent refutation of this thesis was given by M. Braga da Cruz, *O Partido e o Estado*, op.cit., pp. 11-62.

nationalist movements and parties are shortly characterized with contemptuous terms such as *extreme Right-wing* or *neo-fascist* (more extensive works terrify the reader with a similar language of the narrative¹⁶³). Thus they recognize that the history of European nationalism has already ended, and the nationalist doctrine itself has been exhausted. Such reasoning, very often observed, is not scientific in nature, but ideological, because important social and political movements are presented as relics of the past, allegedly linked to the crimes of the Second World War. Therefore, researchers of nationalism shift their focus to political and social movements of the Third World or to anti-colonial movements. The term *nationalism* signifies for them the Kurdish Question in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran or the question of Tibetan separatism in China. We see this especially in English language literature, and 80% of the global dissertations on nationalism after 1945 were written in this language.

The view, that after 1945 nationalism has become a subject of research for people specializing in international relations of the Third World, we consider to be a complete misconception. In the case of many English language researchers, especially from the United States, this is most likely a result of ignorance and a lack of basic knowledge about the political thought and party systems of the Old Continent (after all, the average American researcher only reads in English and probably is not even aware that most of the books and magazine in the world are printed in other languages). Nationalist movements were indeed weakened after 1945 and

¹⁶³ The author of this article has recently been literally shocked by the primitive, discrediting to a scholar language and embarrassing level of ideological “anti-fascism” present in the dissertation on contemporary nationalism authored by P. Moreau, *De Jörg Haider à Heinz-Christian Strache. L'extrême droite autrichienne à l'assaut du pouvoir*, Paris 2012 (section on political doctrine pp. 97–148).

a uniform democratic-liberal conglomerate of politicians as well as the media was arrayed against it. Although this does not mean that they disappeared altogether from Europe. What's more, the economic crisis of the last few years, escalating into a political crisis on a continental scale, induced voters to look at nationalist movements with greater sympathy. We see in Europe at the beginning of the XXI century a true renaissance of nationalism.

Today we are dealing with a third wave of nationalism, which has either not been analyzed by serious researchers or is being described with an unscientific, journalistic language – as the above – mentioned *extreme Right*. According to this narrative, nationalist parties are solely parties of protest, allegedly lacking a positive program. We consider such views simplistic, even erroneous, and motivated by the ideological views of their authors. From 1983, i.e. from the time of the famous elections in Dreux, the French National Front has ceased to be a party existing on the margins of political life¹⁶⁴.

Masses of Islamic immigrants (of which some are religious fanatics and potential terrorists), a top-down enforcement of European integration, the so-called deficit of democracy in European institutions, a sense of oligarchization of political life as well as a general disappointment with the promises associated with the creation of the Western welfare state and, finally, concerns stemming from globalization and the rise of the global free market, have resulted in the birth of nationalist movements as well as reinvigorated nationalist political thought.

Before our eyes the third historical current of nationalism arises today, which we propose to designate as European nationalism, and the reason for this is that the pivot of its concerns is associated with

¹⁶⁴ D. Albertini, D. Doucet, *Histoire du Front national*, Paris 2014, p. 90.

the process of European integration. We believe it is still too early to analyze and describe this phenomenon holistically. It is very novel. Less than twenty years ago, in 1998, a book appeared authored by Bruno Mégret entitled *New Europe (La Nouvelle Europe. Pour la France et l'Europe des nations)*. It was published as a policy paper of the National Front and dedicated to an alternative to the official model of a federal Europe and it represented also a further development of the official position of the party from year 1993 onward¹⁶⁵. The essence of this proposal was the replacement of the European treaties with seven new ones, wherein the Member States could choose in which treaty they wanted to participate in and in which they did not, being able to freely accept and renounce these treaties¹⁶⁶. This book, written less than twenty years ago, stood on the grounds of national thinking, expressing French and only French skepticism about the contemporary shape of Europe. It was characterized by a peculiar Francocentrism, because it did not imply cooperation with similar Eurosceptic movements in other countries. The latter, moreover, outside of France, were still on the margins of political life. Thus Mégret expressed the French spirit of separatism against bureaucratic Europe, where nations step by step were losing their independence to European institutions.

This *separatist* thinking seems to be a thing of the past. Today, the National Front has major partners with similar programs in other countries of the European Union, who are equally firmly fighting against the processes of Europeanization and globalization.

Paradoxically, such a pan-European alliance of nationalist forces is exacted by the EU itself and such Euro-centric institutions as the

¹⁶⁵ *300 mesures pour la renaissance de la France. Front National, programme de gouvernement*, Saint-Brieuc 1993, pp. 355–372.

¹⁶⁶ B. Mégret, *La Nouvelle Europe. Pour la France et l'Europe des nations*, Saint-Cloud 1998, pp. 94–95.

European Parliament in Strasbourg. Since euro-parliamentarian faction cannot be established unless the group of MP's represents a minimum of seven Member States means that the nationalists had to create something along the lines of *Nationalist International*. We are talking here of the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom. In our opinion, the ruling political elite of Europe will soon change the rules guiding the organization of European elections, so that only pan-European parties can compete in them. This would be a logical consequence of the declared belief in the end of sovereign states on our continent¹⁶⁷. Nationalist parties can only survive such a reform only through the establishment of Euro-nationalism and a Euro-nationalist political party. Until now, within nationalist movements, the idea of pan-Europeanism was known only in Fascism (the conference in Montreux in 1934)¹⁶⁸. Now it has become a test for nationalists with far less radical political agendas. The interviews published in this publication with a number of MEPs, representing the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom, allow us to point out some characteristics of the emerging European nationalism:

Firstly, a change in narrative has occurred. Euro-nationalists are not nationalists, but patriots. This means that the nationalists recognized the term which describes them as a lost cause, permanently associated with stereotypes created by the liberal and left-wing political class. Some of the MEPs did it out of political common sense and some because they come from the Eurosceptic conservative, not nationalist, tradition (M. Marusik, J. Atkinson).

¹⁶⁷ E.g. E. Denninger, *Vom Ende nationalstaatlicher Souveränität in Europa*, „Juristen Zeitung“ 2000, no. 22, pp. 1119–1126.

¹⁶⁸ J. Medina, *O congresso fascista em Montreux (1934)*, [in:] *O fascismo em Portugal*, Lisboa 1982, pp. 187–194.

Secondly, it stresses the democratic character of nationalism. In a way, the history of nationalism has come full circle and nationalists have returned to the idea of national sovereignty. Just as disciples of Rousseau, so Euro-nationalists want to restore the sovereignty of their nations, i.e. the right to self-determination about themselves. However, they do not propagate these ideas against the monarchs of Divine Grace; as such do not exist in the EU, but against the European and national power elites, which have become alienated from the control of their constituents. They want nations to materialize their sovereignty, taking it away from the hands of those who govern in their name, but actually only to the benefit of the oligarchs. This element can be particularly strongly observed in the case Georg Mayer, who emphasizes, that his mother party derives from the tradition of the Spring of Nations. But it is also noticeable in the interview with Marine Le Pen, who stresses the sovereignty of the French people in their own country.

Thirdly, the new European nationalism opposes the concept of a unipolar world, where the United States dominate the entire globe, with the acquiescence of their younger and militarily, politically and economically weaker EU. This nationalism opposes both American globalization and Brussels Europeanization – noticing in both phenomena two faces of the same process – and postulates a return to a multipolar world, the traditional concert of powers, which signifying a world without a monopoly on power. In this respect, the distinct predilection of Euro-nationalists for the Russia of Vladimir Putin is worth noting. They perceive him as the one power that is able to challenge the unipolar nature of the world.

In our estimation, currently the long-term goal of the Euro-nationalists is: to create a Europe of free and sovereign nations, free from the Euro-bureaucracy and abstract Euro-ideology, which is able to compete for its rightful place in a multipolar world,

alongside the United States, Russia and China. This is why we do not perceive this alliance to be temporary, but possessing elements of permanence: none of the European nation-states are able to independently contend for an equal place alongside Washington, Moscow and Beijing. Europe consists of countries that are too weak to strive alone for such a position. Therefore Carl Schmitt was correct in projecting his concept of designing a large space at the time of the Third Reich, claiming that the era of “small states” has come to an end. The new nationalism will either be pan-European or it will simply be an expression of a parochial rebellion without a future.

CHAPTER 2

Natiocratism: The new ideological background for the concept of a Europe of Nations?

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1. The inadequacy of classic nationalism

Big finance, corporations and the media have transformed our modern world, which up until now was organized in the form of states, into a kind of large magma with system of decision-making centers, lobbies, interest groups which are difficult to distinguish. The actual decision-makers within it seem to be anonymous with the political class that is financially dependent on them, only administers dummy nations states. The real decisions are made somewhere in the background, remaining hidden from the nominally sovereign nations.

The nationalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a cultural reaction in response to the cosmopolitan trends within economics and politics emerging at the time, both of them had a deeply anti-communal (liberalism) and class (Marxism) character, appealing to linguistic, religious, emotional and identitarian distinctiveness. Modern nationalism, due to the efforts of the media, is subliminally associated with murderous ideologies and it seems to have no reason to exist in its previous form. However it is the only doctrine which could potentially be able to effectively resist the vision of a unified Europe and a world *McDonaldized* by big companies, through mobilizing under its banners wider segments of society. After all, the growing popularity of Eurosceptic parties in Europe indicates the potential which could be utilized by nationalist movements. The successes of the National Front in France, led by Marine Le Pen and the social-post-fascist Right in Italy (*Destra Sociale*) show that the change in discourse and image pays off in the form of rising social support.

Unfortunately contemporary nationalism, which is ridiculed and portrayed nowadays as possessing a murderous potential, is mostly a reaction to the threat posed by immigrants. It does not have a grand political vision, similar to those formulated by Maurice

Barrès, Charles Maurras, Enrico Corradini or Roman Dmowski. The basic question is whether nationalism as a doctrine still has a *raison d'être*? Is it worth the fight to cleanse it of the numerous negative stereotypes, with which it is strongly associated? It seems that this doctrine has no future. There are three arguments which justify this conclusion – one is pragmatic and two are arguments of principle.

The first argument is the assertion of the fact that the cleansing nationalism of all the negative stereotypes would require immense work in the field of political propaganda, which appears virtually impossible to do by the groups who identify with thinking in terms of the national interest.

Secondly, nationalism – let's call it classic or traditional – was fairly indifferent to the issues that play a fundamental role together with the contemporary level of technological and economic development. In particular that classic nationalism did not deal with the problems of international cooperation, which is a must in a globalized world. Technological progress has increased dramatically the mobility of people, capital, goods and services. Halting these processes by way of closing the borders of nation-states using classic means of state protectionism is difficult to defend as a rational and useful solution for citizens.

Thirdly, classic nationalism was a doctrine devoid of a coherent scientific justification. It appealed to the concept of the nation, which has never been clearly defined. In its radical, ethnocentric versions it was marked by the thesis of the superiority of one's own nation over other, neighboring countries, as well as ethnic minorities, wherein the concept of nation was not connected with the concept of citizenship, but with the particularistic identity¹.

¹ H. Munro Chadwick, *The Nationalities of Europe. The Growth of National Ideologies*, Cambridge 1945, pp. 122 ff.; I. Berlin, *Pokrzywione drzewo człowieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 154–155.

Sometimes nationalism was understood as recognition of the superiority of national and state interests over particular interests². Finally, nationalism was defined as the right of every nation to self-determine itself, both with regard to the borders of each one of them (the postulate of a nation-state) and with regard to themselves (the postulate of the sovereignty of the people)³. The lack of a clear definition opened the door to various abuses and distortions that took the most extreme form in Nazi Germany. The lack of a scientific, rational justification for the validity of national demands seems to be the biggest drawback of this ideological formation.

An interesting attempt to get out of this impasse seems to be natiocratism, which sees itself as a scientific doctrine. In this study the basic assumptions of natiocratism shall be presented. Also the question concerning the possibility of utilizing this doctrine in the political struggle by nationalist and Eurosceptic forces will be posed.

2. The scientific basis of natiocratism

2.1. Natiocratism and nationalism

Natiocratism as a draft of a new national political doctrine was presented in 2014 in the book *Naukowe podstawy nacjokratyzmu* (*The Scientific Basis of Natiocratism*) written by Józef Kossecki. It is a doctrine which expands on Polish nationalist thought with the addition of Catholic social doctrine, the Feliks Koneczny's doctrine

² P. Alter, *Nationalism*, London 1989, p. 9.

³ H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States. An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, London 1977, p. 6; E. Gellner, *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 1991, pp. 9–10; C. Calhoun, *Nationalism and Ethnicity*, „Annual Review of Sociology” 1993, no. 19, p. 212; Ch. Tilly, *National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us*, „Daedalus” 1993, no. 122, p. 29.

on civilizations, the Polish school of sociology of Leon Petrażycki and Henryk Piętko, as well as the Polish school of cybernetics created by Marian Mazur, of which Kossecki was a prominent representative.

Józef Kossecki deliberately and consciously rejects the term nationalism in defining his proposal, because this notion has been given a pejorative meaning in the official mass processes of information exchange, synonymous with national chauvinism. Thus in order to avoid the trap of the negative nationalist stereotype, which is very strong in Polish (and not only Polish) society, social cyberneticist has created an innovative concept of natiocratism. It is defined as follows:

Natiocratism is the scientific theory of nationalism understood as the right of each nation to possess its own state and to govern itself within it, without external interference⁴.

The novelty of natiocratism would lie in its liberation from romantic and emotional exaltations. In the mind of Józef Kossecki, natiocratism should be regarded as scientific nationalism, as the old nationalist demand for the nation-state proven in a rational way using social cybernetics⁵. We do not see here neither an appeal to the legal-political theory of a sovereign state, or a reliance on the pre-war authorities, which demonstrated the need to create and maintain such a state by way of identitarian argumentation. Kossecki introduces some entirely new arguments into the debate about the current political situation in Poland and in the European Union, which do not come from the humanities, but from the social and exact sciences.

⁴ J. Kossecki, *Naukowe podstawy nacjokratyzmu*, Warszawa 2014, p. 8.

⁵ Ibidem, p. 8.

2.2. The nation-state proven by the *more geometrico* method

Natiocratism refers to the objective laws of the development of primal social organizations, among which the most important is the national community. Józef Kossecki writes:

As shown by L. Petrażycki and H. Piętka, the development of primal social organization is the result of sociological laws. The first is the law of the increasing size of the primal social organizations from the family to the nation and eventually to transnational relationships⁶.

By primal organization we mean one that incorporates in all of its functions the totality of social life at a given stage of its development. The process of increasing size of the primal social organizations is a result of the process of adaptation of the human psyche to the conditions of social existence.

Kossecki writes further:

The second law states that the process of adaptation of the human psyche is socio-centric, that is to say, that it occurs in the interest of a social group. These two laws describe the processes that act antagonistically in relation to each other and as a consequence lead to their degradation, when the results of the application of the first law are social relationships that are too large⁷.

⁶ Ibidem, p. 26.

⁷ Ibidem, p. 26.

What follows the foregoing is that conflicting determinants lie in the social aspect of human nature. The development of primal social organizations leads to the process of linking of smaller communities into ever larger ones. Kossecki argues, referring to Piętka that as an action of the first of the above mentioned sociological laws, the size of the primal social organization increases.

According to Piętka and Kossecki, social organizations, which at a certain stage of development served as the primal social organization, were:

- 1/ *One blood social organizations*: the family; kin (group of families descended from a common ancestor); tribe (united by a common ancestor, real or legendary).
- 2/ *Different blood organizations*: nationality (social organization united by ethnicity); people (group of tribes or nationalities representing the people of one state, not necessarily identifying with it); society (a people, in which economic division of functions between the various population groups occurred within one country); finally, the state (the primal social organization which includes the legal order in its functions), the nation (primal organization encompassing within its functions the entirety of social life, in particular the ethical order). It follows that the nation-state is the highest known and historically grounded social organization of the *different blood* type.

According to Józef Kossecki, the nation is an association based on ethics and a voluntarily abidance to autonomous national law, which can function even without a state and its apparatus of coercion. It is a historical culmination of known integration processes of smaller communities into larger ones⁸. The ideal

⁸ Ibidem, pp. 27–30.

of every developed nation is, therefore, to have their own state, though there are nations deprived of it, mainly because of military defeat and absorption by another state. Kossecki assumes, along with Petrażycki and Piętka, that the formation of nations is not accidental, not an expression of an artificial ideology, but a natural process of human development. Therefore, the social cyberneticist rejects the assumption, which is popular in sociology of politics, that the nation is an artificial product invented by ideological intellectuals, forming modern nations as an intellectual concept and infecting the masses with it with the use of demagoguery, the press and the education system⁹. On the contrary, just as in Thomistic philosophy (the narrative of which is alien to Kossecki), the nation-state is the result of natural development also in this place. For the cyberneticist this direction of development is a scientific theorem. So why, scientifically or in a natural way, do nations not join in transnational communities – on a continental or global scale? This is due to the aforementioned reverse process, which is the subordination of constantly growing numerically and territorially cosmopolitan commonwealth of interests of the ruling group. This happens at the expense of the common good, which leads to dissatisfaction and, ultimately, to the disintegration of the state, lacking an internal binder.

However, in order to take a closer look, at the argument that nations are not only a transitional stage in the creation of transnational political bodies, but that they are autonomous systems, one needs to introduce some concepts from the field of social cybernetics.

⁹ B. Anderson, *Wspólnoty wyobrażeniowe. Rozważania o źródłach i rozprzestrzenianiu się nacjonalizmu*, Kraków 1997.

2.3. The nation-state as an autonomous system

As already mentioned, natiocratism is based on the achievements of the Polish school of cybernetics, including primarily social cybernetics developed by Józef Kossecki. Socio-cybernetics is the study of the processes of social control, whereby control we mean the exertion of deliberate influence on a particular phenomenon¹⁰. Social control can also be defined as the effect of the controlling object on the controlled object. Cybernetic systems are those in which the processes of control take place. The most important types of cybernetic systems are:

- 1/ Controlled systems that operate in the interest of a controller outside of it. Such systems are not able to process and store information which have a control value. An example of such a system is a colony or a country under occupation, which must work to support itself, because the colonizers and invaders, fulfilling the organizational functions, do not want to pay extra to support it; what's more, the colony must pay for the maintenance of the metropolis which works for its own benefit and not the colony's¹¹.
- 2/ Self-controlling systems, that is, ones where the control system is equipped with an organ which processes and stores information (correlator) in order to use them at any time. Due to the fact that the outside organizer has the program of process control, the self-control system also works for the benefit of the organizer¹². An example of this system is a state with a neo-colonial dependency, which

¹⁰ J. Kossecki, *Cybernetyka społeczna*, Warszawa 1981, p. 5.

¹¹ J. Kossecki, *Naukowe podstawy nacjokratyzmu*, op.cit., p. 166.

¹² Ibidem, p. 167.

possesses its own economical organs, executive organs (e.g. its own government) and scientific bodies. However, due to its links with the former metropolis it operates in fact in the interest of the country which controls it¹³. Dependence of this kind relies heavily on indirect control, consisting of the programming of the elite of the *neo-colony*, both in the cognitive and decision-making spheres¹⁴.

- 3/ Autonomous systems, equipped with an organ that allows them to modify their own functioning, fulfilling the functions of the organizer¹⁵. Thanks to this organ, it becomes independent of an external organizer. The autonomous system is its own organizer and is guided by its own self-interest; what's more, it can control other systems, and thus become their organizer. The autonomous system is a sovereign state, which itself sets its own goals, priorities and methods of implementing tasks.

Based on the three possibilities mentioned above, a nation can actually enjoy its independence only if it functions as an autonomous system. The natiocratic postulate presented by Kossecki, which also is the internal sovereignty of a nation, assumes that the nations (and specifically their elites) have appropriate knowledge, for them to be able to practice their sovereignty, i.e. use the theoretical and legal opportunities which come with possessing a state.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 168.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 169.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

2.4. The power of the system: The anti-union argument

Why shouldn't the European nations try to rise above their own autonomous systems in order to build a common European state as a grand autonomous system, able to compete effectively with the United States, China and Eurasia? To answer this key question another concept from the field of social cybernetics must be introduced. It is the concept of the power of the system. The total power of the autonomous system is the greatest possible power, which can be processed in a given state¹⁶. Part of the total power of the autonomous system must be consumed by the way the system itself functions. From the point of view of energy it is thus idle energy. Although it exists, it does not serve the development of the system, but it serves its maintenance and the maintenance of internal cohesion, for example the costs of the bureaucratic apparatus.

Kossecki proves that the most efficient system is not the one that produces the most power, but the one that produces the most power after deducting the costs of idle energy. If, for example, two autonomous systems generate national income in the amount of \$1 trillion per year, but one of them uses half of this amount for its own livelihood, and the other only 1/10, the latter actually has four times the amount for its development, armaments etc. Józef Kossecki writes:

The necessity of idle power spending means that for the sake of self-control and control of the surrounding environment, the autonomous system cannot consume its total power. It can only use the part which remains after subtracting idle power – called dispositional power¹⁷.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 180.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 182.

The dispositional power of the autonomous system must then be used in order to acquire and process energy from the environment. This is called operating power. The rest of the available dispositional power, which remains with the autonomous system after covering the operating power is called free power, which can be consumed by the system in a way it sees fit, e.g. in order to improve its environment for its own self-interest¹⁸. This is a continuation of Mazur's earlier theory, which stated that the interest of an autonomous system does not lie in the maximization of the total power, but of the total free power. This is due to the fact that the increase in the amount of material in the system causes an increase in total power and at the same time it also increases idle power. The distinction between operating and idle power on the hand and free power on the other is the basic argument directed against the European Union, which directs a huge amount of attention to the maintenance of internal cohesion, losing along the way huge amounts of energy due to the convergence of economies and systems of the Member States, expanding for this sake the giant apparatus of Euro-control of the nation-states. That is why, through the eyes of a social cyberneticist, it is considered to be a force of regressive energy – it hinders the development of peoples, which could take place much faster and more efficiently in nation-states (autonomous systems).

A skeptical response to the question about the possibility and long duration of a European state flows from the doctrine of natiocratism. The artificial blending of many nations and states into one new entity contradicts what the supporters of the EU people claim – it does not maximize the amount of free power. This artificial creation consumes more and more idle energy necessary

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 184.

for its own maintenance. The beneficial state for the peoples of Europe is therefore the existence of many nations and nation-states, which seek to maximize their free power, as autonomous systems are aiming within themselves.

3. Autonomy, progress and powers of regression

3.1. Ideology and the postulate of nation-states as autonomous systems

In the previous section we presented the basic assumptions of natiocratism. At this stage, we should take a closer look at some of its selected claims. Let us start with the basic postulate of natiocratism, i.e. the pursuit of nation-states to be truly autonomous systems.

The nation-state must not be seen only in legal terms. Not every nominally sovereign state is capable of the practical usage of the capabilities stemming from sovereignty. In contrast to archaic nationalisms of the nineteenth century, Kossecki is not impressed with the democratic type of state. He accepts it as a given one, which should be utilized for the good of the nation, since it already has such institutions and functions in such a cultural context. A truly sovereign nation internally is not one that elects for itself a parliament, but one that actually performs the processes of self-control within its own state.

Józef Kossecki argues that the transformation of the state from a formally sovereign into one that actually utilizes its sovereignty in practice is due to the factors which he refers to as “ideology”¹⁹.

¹⁹ This term has a different meaning here than in political science, as it encompasses ideology, doctrine, religion – any idea guiding the

He writes that the basis for the functioning of systems (countries) is their struggle to impose on neighboring systems their own ideology, expressing the interests of the imposing state. Weak states, having elites that are mentally dependent on other countries think in terms of expressing the interests of powerful neighbors:

(...) ideology in the socio-cybernetic understanding sets out the basic objectives of social activities, including all types of combat. (...) The concept of ideology has in these considerations a general meaning and refers to a system of social norms delimiting the basic objectives of social activity as an autonomous system. Whereby an autonomous system – as defined by Marian Mazur – we mean a system that has the ability to control itself and can prevent the loss of this ability. In other words, it is its own organizer and can be controlled according to its own interest (within specified limits)²⁰.

It's based on Kossecki's statement that one can talk of an autonomous social system only when it is able to develop its own ideology, on the basis of which he can lay out its objectively beneficial aims and methods for their implementation. Otherwise we risk failure of these actions or taking over – overtly or covertly – control of these actions by another system that has solved the abovementioned problems and can effectively control social actions – of course, in their own interest²¹.

operation of the system and the way of thinking of its elites. It seems to be similar to the concept of “cultural power” of A. Gramsci.

²⁰ J. Kossecki, *Naukowe podstawy*, op.cit., pp. 13–15.

²¹ Ibidem, p. 24.

The most important for the independence of the state role is played by the development of a state ideology by the country's elites, which correspond to its interests. The choice of a false ideology leads to a reduction or loss of independence by the people. Kossecki includes cosmopolitan liberalism among the popular ideologies, conceptualized by freemasonic Enlightenment circles and Communism which was imposed after 1945. The basis for ideologies, which lead to a limitation of actual independence, is the lack of adequate knowledge about objective processes governing the development of primal social organizations. The lack of such adequate knowledge leads to action inconsistent with the objective social laws, i.e. the interests of the state. Kossecki's natiocratism aspires to the role of an ideology conceived in such a way, which is to ensure the proper development of nations by the adopting the right strategy, from which the correct specific actions arise. The point of Kossecki's various statements is that this condition is not met by the modern Polish state, which has external attributes of sovereignty, but does not execute them because of mental dependence of the Polish elite on foreign centers of power, mainly German and American²². Poland is self-controlling, but is not autonomous. Changing this situation seems to be the main postulate of natiocratism.

3.2. Progress and the forces of regression

At this point we come to an interpretation of the concepts of progress and regression made by Kossecki. Although these terms at first seem associated with the vocabulary of the nineteenth century Carbonari, their meaning is much broader than the original one.

²² See *Wywiad portalu www.konserwatyzm.pl z socjocybernetykiem doc. Józefem Kosseckim*, accessed at konserwatyzm.pl.

Regression occurs when nations cannot develop fully and enjoy their independence. International forces of regression, popularly called the forces of reaction, are all those social forces that have an interest in halting or even reversing the natural processes of social (national) development²³. The forces of regression are forces that do not allow humanity to develop in its natural direction, i.e. the nation-state. Accordingly the progressive forces are forces that contribute to – using the language of Aristotelianism, which the author himself does not use – the effecting of the potency which is inherent in humanity. Just as the nineteenth-century revolutionaries, so too Kossecki considers the forces of regression to be non-national monarchies and sees the forces of progress in the democratic nation-states. However, he also includes international organizations among the forces of regression, such as the European Union, which gradually seems to be taking the form of a super-state, consisting of many nations located on a large space. The forces of progress thus become the Eurosceptic currents. This definitely differentiates Kossecki from the archaic democratic nationalism of the nineteenth century, proclaiming the disintegration of multinational states (Austria, Russia) and the unification of Italy, Poland and Germany, and as its ultimate goal having the establishment of a federal state of free European nations²⁴. According to natiocratism, the nation-state is not a mere stage on the path to the establishment of the homogenous state as understood by Kojève, but the end of the process of integration. Kossecki recognizes that:

using the concepts of Marian Mazur's cybernetic theory of autonomous systems, one can define the forces of social

²³ J. Kossecki, *Naukowe podstawy*, op.cit., p. 35.

²⁴ See e.g. V. Hugo, *Politique*, Paris 2002, p. 275; A. Mickiewicz, *Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego*, Wrocław 2004, pp. 121–122.

progress as such forces that seek to increase the sociological free power – i.e. that, which people can exercise at their discretion and according to their own interest²⁵.

Progress means, therefore, the maximizing of free energy of free nations. According to cybernetics, currently the most important forces of regression are groups seeking to strengthen the alliance between big international capital and centralized political power. The method of operation adopted by them is to reduce the free energy of nations by imposing their legal and bureaucratic solutions on them, the aim of which is to increase the amount of idle energy.

3.3. Natiocratism and Eurocracy

As already mentioned, natiocratism aspires to the role of ideology (as defined by socio-cybernetics), which is to ensure the proper development of nations by adopting appropriate strategies. Natiocratism, which is a political doctrine, must be strictly distinguished from natiocracy, which is the political system built according to the principles of natiocratism. In accordance with the etymological meaning of the term: *natio* (nation) and *kratos* (power), natiocracy means a government under control of a nation. We will not find the concept of natiocracy in the works of Kossecki, but it results from the assumptions adopted by socio-cybernetics.

Similarly, we can create a couple of concepts Eurocratism-Eurocracy. The term Eurocratism will signify an ideology (as defined by socio-cybernetics), which states that the path of European development lies in ever closer integration under

²⁵ J. Kossecki, *Naukowe podstawy*, op.cit., p. 35.

centralized and bureaucratic institutions. In contrast, the term Eurocracy should be understood as the political system of Europe, which will be governed by the decision-makers of the EU.

One might also be tempted to create a pair of terms relating to the idea of world government. These notions could be called globalcratism – globalcracy.

4. The foundations of the EU as a regressive force

As already mentioned, natiocratism places the European Union, in its current form, on the side of the forces of regression. One argument has already been invoked: the EU significantly restricts the free energy of the European nations. The main question is, in what else is the regression, or in traditional terminology – the reactionism of this institution manifested? At this point we depart from the considerations made by Kossecki and draw conclusions from his doctrine.

The preamble of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)²⁶ states that one of the reasons for the establishment of the EU was the need to overcome the division of the European continent and the need to create a firm basis for the construction of a future Europe. We will not find references to the right of nations to self-determination; at most we can find mentions of respect for national identities, history, culture and traditions of the individual nations. Based on the analysis of this and other EU documents one can assume that the institution is based on the ideology (in the socio-cybernetic sense) that assumes the autonomous existence of nation-states to be unfavorable for Europe. This is justified by two reasons. First,

²⁶ *Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union*, OJ EU 2012/ C326, p. 1.

such a system does not guarantee peace on the continent; second, it is detrimental to the economic development of Europeans. It is worth taking a closer look at these arguments. The ideology of the EU, i.e. Eurocratism, assumes that the existence of different autonomous systems is dangerous, as they may have conflicting interests, which can lead to conflict and even wars between them. It follows that the existence of the EU, alongside such powers as the USA, Russia and China is potentially dangerous because it can lead to war on a global scale. In other words, from this allegation regarding the risks resulting from the coexistence of nation-states, the postulate for the creation of world state arises, which would encompass the EU. On the basis of ideological assumptions adopted by the EU, it must be recognized that it considers itself merely as a step towards the creation of a global state.

From the standpoint of natiocratism, the creation of a world state is doomed to failure, because the idle power needed to maintain such a body would have to be impossibly large, which would result in the limiting of free energy of the whole world. In recollection, the increase of the amount of material in the system will indeed increase total output, but at the same time it also increases the idle power²⁷. That is why Mazur also claimed that systems expanding in an unchecked manner (systems of unrestrained expansion) are not capable of achieving the maximum possible free energy. This claim also lay at the root of natiocratism, which indicates that the political systems of unrestrained expansion are easier to break down in times of crisis. The only factor preventing the development of society is competition with other societies, its elimination leads to unrestrained development of crises²⁸. It follows that the ideology of the European Union,

²⁷ J. Kossecki, *Naukowe podstawy*, op.cit., p. 182.

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 187.

i.e. Eurocratism, is based on erroneous assumptions. In order to create lasting foundations for the European order, it cannot be based on creating a system of unrestrained expansion. Creating such a system means the curtailment of free energy in Europe; on the other hand, it exposes the continent to the danger of a complete erosion of political and social order in the event of a crisis. Eurocratism is therefore based on the false assumptions that the maintenance of peace, through the elimination of nation-states, is generally a more favorable solution for Europeans, than functioning in a system which is based on the coexistence of competition between nation-states.

One way to reduce the risk of the outbreak of war between the nation-states is the development of such rules of competition between them that channels potential conflicts in a different way. Natiocratism as proposed by Kossecki does not provide specific proposals as to how to form such rules of competition. But it is definitely worth the effort to try and introduce a system of rules of international cooperation, which would allow the effective channeling of potential conflicts between different autonomous systems.

At this point it must be mentioned that in literature there is often a thesis that appears according to which war favors the concentration of capital and strengthens the alliance between big business and state bureaucracy. The struggle against this alliance is of course one of the basic postulates of Marxism. It is not difficult to agree with the Marxists in the accuracy of this observation. However, it is much more difficult to agree on the solution to the problem, i.e. the elimination of the private ownership of the means of production. Also in the *bourgeois* literature this topic was often discussed. For example Adam Doboszyński pointed to the fact that it is easier for the state to come to an agreement with a few corporations than with many small and medium-sized businesses,

especially when waging war becomes necessary. It is worth quoting these words of this classic thinker of Polish nationalist thought:

Concentrated industry makes it extremely easy to shift from peace-production to the production of armaments, for this is done by the decision of a small group of ruling men, whereas in a community, where millions of men run their own businesses, the bulk of them must be convinced of the necessity of war-production. In a diffused economy, a chance-dictator has to contend with the profound aversion of the average man for armaments and war; compulsion is not so easily enforced on the individual producer as on the worker or a big factory. History teaches us that a peace-loving spirit has been shown by democracies rather than by single rulers and oligarchic systems with centralized control of property; such systems, as a rule, have sought war (...) The only guarantee of a lasting peace lies in depositing the tools of production directly into the hands of peace-loving small men²⁹.

It should also be mentioned that the cause of many wars lay in the fact that individual countries functioned as a system of unrestrained expansion, which sought to expand and enlarge its territory at the expense of other countries. In line with the distinction which Kossecki used to update his doctrine after the publication of *Naukowe podstawy nacjokratyzmu*, such systems are not free autonomous systems³⁰. They function under compulsion

²⁹ A. Doboszyński, *The Economics of Charity*, London 1945, p. 89.

³⁰ J. Kossecki, *Nacjokratyzm a zjednoczenie Europy*, [in:] Ł. Świącicki, A. Wielomski (ed.), *Od Christianitas do Unii Europejskiej. Historia idei zjednoczenia Europy*, Warszawa 2015, p. 102.

of the *energy-material/information* necessity and therefore have less freedom to act. Systems of forgone expansion can further accumulate their free energy in the form of capital or assets, because they do not have it to spend on the expansion processes. Hence, the modified demand of natiocratism is defined by Kossecki as striving to ensure that all nations and states become free autonomous systems³¹. One can thus observe that if the leaders of states really cared about maximizing free energy of their peoples, they would not strive to expand, but focus on the development of what they already possess. It turns out that natiocratism can be an effective weapon against the *specter of nationalism* and that there is no need for the extremely costly EU in order to achieve this.

The European Union thus legitimizes its existence by way of propaganda which appeals to European fears of war. However, this propaganda refers to images of war that belong to a bygone epoch, when the fundamental role was played by energy wars, i.e. having as their aim physical extermination of the enemy and the destruction or the looting of his property by means of weapons and other forms of violence.

In the current era, however, information warfare is playing an ever greater role, the aim of which is to take control over the economy of other countries without firing even a single shot³². A question can even be posed: are the ideologues of the EU speaking the truth about no wars taking place in Europe, or do they occur in a manner imperceptible to the average European? How does the EU promote or can promote the conduct of such wars between Member States? Kossecki addresses this when he states that within the EU highly developed countries, which have accumulated wealth earlier, execute neo-colonial policies

³¹ Ibidem, p. 102.

³² R. Brzeski, *Wojna informacyjna – wojna nowej generacji*, Warszawa 2014.

towards the poorer members of the EU. These countries limit the possibilities of self-control of the poorer countries, i.e. they seek to actually deprive them of their autonomy in Mazur's understanding. As a result, among the Member States, we have countries that can be designated as "controlled" and those that "control"³³. Kossecki shows how after Poland's accession into the EU, our economy has been strangled or even extinguished³⁴. He also mentions the southern countries, for which the EU has nothing to offer in terms of improving their economic situation. Kossecki states ultimately that the richer countries have nationalist policies, hypocritically hiding this fact under various globalist-cosmopolitan slogans³⁵. In his view, the sustainable development of Europe can only be ensured by a transition to natiocratism, taking into account the real interests of all countries and peoples.

In conclusion, it must be said that even if the Eurocrats succeed with the help of European funds to create a European nation, and thus transform the EU into a European nation-state, therefore we cannot escape from nationalism. The nation will remain the primary state-forming subject. We can pose the question: what is the point, therefore, in replacing many nations with one nation at a time when the idle power needed to achieve this objective in no way offsets the disadvantages of the existence of a system based on the coexistence of many European nation-states? It seems that the Eurosceptics, if they wanted to become a serious political force, should begin to develop rules of coexistence between autonomous nation-states, which would provide Europe to the furthest degree possible with peace and allow individual nations to maximize their free energy.

³³ J. Kossecki, *Nacjokratyzm a zjednoczenie Europy*, p. 105.

³⁴ Ibidem, p. 105–111.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 115.

5. Selected Eurosceptic currents as forces of progress?

After presenting the doctrine created by Kossecki it is worth posing the question whether natiocratism can realistically become an ideological proposition for the forces of Euroscepticism. Is the time ripe to promote such an idea?

Analyzing the interviews, which were conducted with members of the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom, and published in this volume, it can be concluded that there are many similarities between Kossecki's natiocratism and the beliefs expressed in these interviews.

As has already been more than once mentioned, according to Kossecki, the essence of external independence is the possession of a sovereign state. The essence of internal independence is the real potentiality to effectively oppose the control via foreign channels of influence³⁶. Kossecki believes – along with nationalist doctrine – that it is the right of every nation to self-determination regarding its borders (postulate of nation-state), as well as in reference to itself (postulate of sovereignty of the people)³⁷. It is a position very characteristic of nineteenth-century democratic nationalism, which developed in opposition to prerevolutionary states that ignored the location of nations, as well as in opposition to non-democratic and monarchical forms of government³⁸. This

³⁶ J. Kossecki, *Naukowe podstawy*, op.cit., p. 8.

³⁷ H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States. An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, op.cit., p. 6; E. Gellner, *Narody i nacjonalizm*, op.cit., pp. 9–10; C. Calhoun, *Nationalism and Ethnicity*, op.cit., p. 212; Ch. Tilly, *National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us*, op.cit., p. 29.

³⁸ J. Plumyène, *Les nations romantiques. Histoire du nationalisme. Le XIXe siècle*, Paris 1979, p. 52; H. Kohn, *Die Idee des Nationalismus*.

observation seems to be confirmed by the reluctant approach of Kossecki to the world which grew out of the Congress of Vienna, ignorant of the principle of the internal and external sovereignty of the people³⁹. He includes, among others, in the camp of national and international regression (*vulgo* reaction) the Anti-French Coalition, and after the defeat of Napoleon, “the so-called Holy Alliance, with tsarist Russia as the main gendarme of Europe and the English bankers as the main providers of the money”⁴⁰. This position seems to be particularly close to that held by Austrian Eurosceptics from the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). This party appeals directly to the slogans of the revolution of 1848 and so to the idea for which the Spring of Nations was fought for. In the case of the British MEP Janice Atkinson, we see a direct appeal to the belief that the nation is best at governing itself and does not need mentors in Brussels. The only thing necessary is the courage to decide about one’s own issues. The National Front emphasizes the element of the nation’s sovereignty, which cannot be subjected to decisions emanating from abroad, whether in a formal way (the European Commission and the European Parliament) or in an informal way (pressure from Berlin and Washington)⁴¹.

Interestingly, the members of the MENF do not use the traditional vocabulary of nationalist doctrines. They are happy

Ursprung und Geschichte bis zur Französischen Revolution, Frankfurt am Main 1962, pp. 9–10; P. Alter, *Nationalism*, op.cit., pp. 28–31. For an exemplification of the problem refer to: A. Wielomski, *Nacjonalizm francuski 1886–1940. Geneza, przemiany i istota filozofii politycznej*, Warszawa 2007, pp. 27–130.

³⁹ J. Kossecki, *Naukowe podstawy*, op.cit., p. 37.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 37.

⁴¹ For a comprehensive discussion of the problem refer to: A. Wielomski, *Francuska prawica narodowa a Unia Europejska*, [in:] A. Wielomski, *Prawica w XX wieku*, Radzymin 2013, pp. 245–252.

to use the term patriotism (patriotic forces), homeland. The concept of a nation is used usually in the context of the right to self-determination. There is no absolutization of the nation as the supreme value. Instead, there is emphasis on civil liberties and the defense of democracy against transnational, uncontrolled centers of decision-making. Due to the way in which the EU has been legitimizing itself in the last decades, these Eurosceptics emphasize the need for international cooperation, they are well aware that in Europe, the inhabitants of which have enjoyed the benefits of freedom of movement of people, capital and goods, ideas that absolutize national egoisms will not get a hearing. Hence Georg Meyer is correct when he says that the idea of creating a *Nationalist International* should be taken quite seriously. Eurosceptics affiliated in the MENF seem to understand well the need for cooperation in order to establish such a movement.

It seems that natiocratism is *ahead of the times* and therefore can become an idea worthy of propagating among Eurosceptic formations. Natiocratism also provides a framework for the conceptualization of the idea of a *Nationalist International*. As a completely novel doctrine it is not burdened with any negative stereotypes, which is also an important argument in its favor. In the context of Polish nationalist thought, it should be stated that natiocratism constitutes an interesting intellectual attempt to revitalize Polish nationalist doctrine and the traditional nation-state. Its great advantage is the change of the narrative. For many decades, even after 1989, the epigones of Dmowski were not able to break through to public opinion, because the media equated them – usually quite wrongly and unfairly – with the demons of Fascism, xenophobia, and sometimes the Holocaust. The nationalists themselves were deeply compartmentalized intellectually, because they did not provide answers to current

problems in the language and in accordance with the aspirations of contemporary people. In these groups, answers were always sought in the writings of Dmowski. When a problem appeared, there immediately appeared the question: *What if Mr. Roman Dmowski was alive today, what position would he take?*, as if even detailed answers to detailed contemporary questions could be found in texts dating back 100 years. Kossecki's natiocratism departs from this antiquarian thinking about politics, attempting to address the needs of the Polish nationalist movement using the tools of the Polish school of cybernetics in order to propose a new outlook, new thinking, new justification, and even a new label: natiocratism.

6. Instead of an ending: a few tips on the effectiveness of political activity

At the end of these considerations it is worth mentioning that in his work Kossecki places much emphasis on the methods used by forces of regression in the fight against progress. This is not the proper place for a detailed discussion of the subject. But one should note that these methods are still used and therefore an effective political struggle assumes their knowledge, as well as the need to develop effective strategies of conduct. The scientific basis for natiocratism can provide the Eurosceptic movement not only with an ideology (as understood by socio-cybernetics), but also valuable tips with regard to the activities at the strategic, operational and tactical level⁴². Kossecki states that the struggle of national and international forces of regression against nationalist and social movements took place and continues to take place on four levels. On the ideological level this diversion was based primarily on

⁴² J. Kossecki, *Naukowe podstawy*, op.cit., pp. 12–24.

inspiring national chauvinism, which leads to wars between various nations⁴³. On the strategic level it meant inspiring fighting between nationalist and socialist movements, as well as between different variants of these movements. Operational diversion consisted of causing and fueling unproductive conflicts on an organizational and personnel level in these movements. While tactical diversion was based primarily on misinformation, arranging provocations and police repression against activists of these movements⁴⁴.

Standard methods used by the Eurocratic forces include propaganda and educational efforts in order to discredit the Eurosceptic movement, as well as analytical activities and research, aiming at developing an effective method of ideological sabotage against progressive movements. They would also block the social circulation of accurate information and the disseminate misinformation concerning nationalist movements⁴⁵.

One such method is pinning the stereotype of poor and uneducated voters onto the Eurosceptic parties. The most effective way to discredit these groups is, however, the stereotypical association with Fascism and Holocaust, which is bizarre considering that the very concept of the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the EU, was created in Nazi Germany⁴⁶.

⁴³ Ibidem, p. 38.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 39.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 38.

⁴⁶ In the beginning of 1942 a series of talks was given in Berlin, dealing with the creation of a European Economic Community. The talks were published in the first edition in the same year, and in a second edition in the following year of the book „Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft”, ed. H. Hunke. For discussion of the main assumptions of this work see M. Ziętek-Wielomska, *Idea Neuordnung jako źródło niemieckich koncepcji zjednoczenia Europy*, [in:] Ł. Święcicki, A. Wielomski (ed.), *Od Christianitas do Unii Europejskiej. Historia idei zjednoczenia Europy*, Warszawa 2015, pp. 281–286.

Eurosceptic groups, if they want to achieve political effectiveness, must master these tools to fight the information war to the same extent as the Eurocratic forces. Otherwise they are doomed to further political marginalization. As is clearly shown by Kossecki in his work on natiocratism, in the hierarchy of social effectiveness, the choice of a proper ideology is the most important. Followed by the right strategy, then the operational arrangements and at the end the tactical arrangements⁴⁷. Erroneous ideological decisions cannot be made up for by even the best strategy, operational art and tactics. However, the choice of even the best ideology is not enough for an effective victory in the political struggle.

⁴⁷ J. Kossecki, *Naukowe podstawy*, op.cit., p. 17.

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PART II

INTERVIEW WITH MARINE LE PEN

The President of France is only Germany's vice-chancellor

Adam Wielomski

Wielomski: I would like to thank you Madame for finding the time to answer my questions. I would like to take this opportunity to pose to you some questions on French and international politics. The first issue is the following: the National Front opposes the anti-Russian policies of NATO, as well French policy in this regard. Could you please explain this issue to our readers?

Le Pen: Yes, we criticize this anti-Russian policy. I can cite the following example: as a result of this policy we have allowed Islamic fundamentalists to seize power in Libya, and for some time now we have been doing much to repeat this scenario in Syria. This policy seems crazy to us. For this reason the National Front opposes to attempts at abolishing Bashar al-Assad. Assad is the one, who is fighting Islamists in his country and acting against the establishment of an Islamic State. To combat this danger we, the National Front, propose the creation of a grand coalition

composed of Syria, Russia, Iran, the United States, United Arab Emirates and even Egypt, i.e. with all those, who would be able to put a stop to the totalitarian threat in the form of an established and strengthened Islamic State.

Wielomski: What do you think of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin? How do you assess him?

Le Pen: I see him as a politician who rebuilt Russia, who recovered her from a very difficult situation. He is a politician with a particular diplomatic talent in the realm of foreign relations. Thanks to him, Russia has once again become an important country, whose voice counts in the world. This satisfies our demands. After all, the National Front always defended the concept of a multi-polar world, one which would not be subject to the rule of just one power. We postulate the creation of a world in which many centers of power would balance each other, maintain mutual equilibrium and bilateral relations as independent powers. We see that Vladimir Putin's vision of international relations is heading in exactly the same direction as ours is, that is, towards the organization of a multi-polar world.

Wielomski: So you, Madame, are an opponent of uni-polar world? You come out against American global hegemony?

Le Pen: Yes, I am strongly opposed to such hegemony. We see that the United States have committed many mistakes, especially in international relations. What's even worse, is that those European states, that have followed the lead of the Americans, have committed the same mistakes. Therefore I believe that we should retain the right to our independent judgment (*libre arbitre*)

and thus our actual independence. We believe that we lost such political independence many years ago. Thanks to that we have not become more secure. On the contrary, this has contributed to the deterioration of our position. I respect the United States, just as I respect Russia. Despite this, I believe that neither of these two states should wield any sort of hegemony over the world and possess the right to impose its own concepts on other countries.

Wielomski: Is it legitimate to perceive Vladimir Putin as the „natural ally of the European Right”? Does the National Front consider him such an ally?

Le Pen: I look at this from the standpoint of the National Front, but also from that of other patriotic movements in other countries. We observe today that we are met with great hostility from the representatives of the political elites, who wield control over the European Union and the United States. These people look with hostility on all European patriots, thus we must seek other allies. The concurrence between the European Right and Russia is also seen in the field of economics. The economic model, which we defend, can be described as „patriotic” as opposed to what could be called „total free trade”, based on the literal free competition of all against all. Our views also in this regard are similar to those concepts which Vladimir Putin is successfully implementing in Russia. You can especially observe this policy in recent times, that is from the time the economic sanctions were imposed on Russia, some of which – especially the European ones – have turned out to be severe. This has forced Putin to create something than can be referred to as „economic patriotism”. And this is more or less the same concept that we have been developing for some time now, in opposition to the concept which originated in the United

States about the need to enact „total free trade”, indicating a type of „savage globalization”, the real and sole beneficiary being of course the United States.

Wielomski: What is your position, as well as that of the National Front, on, first, the political revolution, and secondly on the civil war in Ukraine?

Le Pen: I think that it is the policies of the EU that are at the root of the civil war in Ukraine. As we all know, Ukraine was always somewhat stuck between Russia and the West. Its Eastern part gravitated towards Russia, while its Western part towards the West. This was a fragile balance, but it was a balance nonetheless. Meanwhile, the EU has destroyed this balance by giving meaningless promises, practically blackmailing its government, which initially caused sharp internal tensions, and eventually led to the outbreak of open civil war. Unfortunately, I believe it is the EU that is responsible for the current situation.

Wielomski: In your opinion, does Crimea today belong to Ukraine or Russia?

Le Pen: Crimea, of course, is Russian territory. Besides, it always was Russian. If anybody has doubts in this regard he should look at the results of the referendum, which are clear and unassailable. They expressed the will of the inhabitants of Crimea to return to Russia.

Wielomski: If you were to indicate, which right is more important, the rights of the state to maintain its territorial integrity or the right of nations to self-determination would you choose the latter?

Le Pen: No, it's not even about this. In Ukraine there was a coup. As a result, the constitution was abolished. From the moment the constitution became void, Crimea had the right to organize such an independence referendum. If there was a legitimate government and a legitimate constitution was in force, then, of course, the local authorities in Crimea would not have the right to organize such a referendum to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. The fact that this situation occurred is the responsibility of those, who organized and carried out the coup.

Wielomski: I would like to return to the Syria question. Should the European states support the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad?

Le Pen: No, these actions are devoid of any sense. I understand the criticism directed against the rule of al-Assad. I don't mind that, because everyone has the right to formulate such criticism. I have no reason to praise President al-Assad. I simply wanted to emphasize that he is the exponent of the Syrian State. If we destroy the existing Syrian State, its place will be taken by the Islamic State. And no matter how many doubts we may have in relation to the existing Syrian State, when compared with the Islamic State, I choose the existing Syrian State without hesitation. I don't have the slightest doubt in this regard and I hope that this matter has been clearly explained by me.

Wielomski: Could you say the same about the war in Libya? Would you respond in the same manner?

Le Pen: Yes, it is almost the same question and therefore the answer would be the same. We had a secular state, where religious minorities were protected. Of course, it was not a democracy in the

proper sense of the term. But the state, which replaced Gaddafi's Libya, is full of chaos, marked by sectarian violence and mass murders. The Libyan State was overrun by murderous militias. Diplomacy usually involves the selection of the so-called lesser evil. And in the case of Islamic countries, the secular countries are the lesser evil, because the greater evil is the Islamic State, with which we are dealing today or other similar states ruled by fundamentalists.

Wielomski: I would like to turn now to the subject of Europe. The post-war unification of Europe was based on the alliance of two states equal in status, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. Does this alliance still exist and does it guide Europe?

Le Pen: Yes, this alliance still exists, but it is no longer an alliance of „two equals”. In order to illustrate this problem I once stated, that in reality the president of France is only Germany's vice-chancellor. Currently it is Angela Merkel who is imposing her position on all the European countries. She herself presents a position on their behalf, she negotiates on behalf of everybody, not having any authority to do so, at the same time lecturing and controlling countries with a different opinion. We absolutely reject this, because we are a free nation, we know how to strive for our independent existence. We are a sovereign nation and we will not take orders from anyone, especially Angela Merkel, who has so greatly shaken the security of the entire European Union, with her decision to open the borders of the EU to millions of immigrants. It is said that next year there may be as many as three million and this is a number much too high when it comes to the capabilities of our native populations.

Wielomski: How do you view the recent results of the local elections in France?

Le Pen: Of course, I am very satisfied with the spectacular rise in support for the National Front. We obtained a truly historical result, receiving a total of 6 800 000 votes. Thanks to this, we tripled the number of our councilors. Unfortunately, we were met with opposition from the system, whose individual components entered into a coalition to stop us from achieving total victory. We judge such a maneuver to be contrary to the spirit of democracy. This is unacceptable. Those, who create such coalitions, ally themselves against the very principle of democracy. If they believe that thanks to this the situation in France will develop in the right direction, they are wrong. With such a policy on the part of the establishment parties, the National Front will march on and step by step it will grow in strength on its own and against all.

Wielomski: How do you assess the prospects of the National Front before the presidential elections of 2017?

Le Pen: Today it is difficult to speculate, because don't know what will happen in the meantime. I think that there is much evidence, that the candidate of the National Front will take part in the second round of the presidential elections. I hope, that by this time, the French people will understand, that they should not behave like a flock of sheep being led to a slaughter and don't vote against their own views. In this regard, we still have much work to do. We still have to work hard to convince people. Anyway, today we are the premier political party in France and we have achieved success, which no one can deny us.

Wielomski: One final question. Is it true that you did not want to be in the same Euro-faction as the Polish MEP, Janusz Korwin-Mikke?

Le Pen: Yes, that's true.

Wielomski: Why not?

Le Pen: Because that would be dangerous. He is a particularly harmful person. As a person, he is untrustworthy. Some of his statements are crazy, and some of his words are worthy of condemnation.

Marine Le Pen is the president of the National Front, a Member of the European Parliament and member of the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF).

AN INTERVIEW WITH MICHAŁ MARUSIK

Sovereignty is the basic attribute of statehood

Adam Wielomski

Wielomski: How does a conservative liberal, and you Sir come from such a political group, feel in the Eurosceptic faction led by Marine Le Pen and dominated by the activists of the National Front? Are you comfortable in the company of nationalists? Are they not collectivists?

Marusik: By definition, nationalists are those people, who derive inspiration for social and political activity from the sense of service to their own nation. They can properly identify what is objectively good for the nation and then they constitute the so-called national Right, but it may be the case that they are wrong in identifying the national interest and they become national socialists; out of love for the people they try to endow the people with the nightmare of collectivism. The Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom is not Eurosceptic – it is „Unionsceptic”. I, as a „Unionsceptic”, feel very comfortable among similar „Unionsceptics”. The socialist leanings of some members of this

group certainly worry me, but politically this does not encumber me in any way. Each member of this group votes according to their conscience (we agree on how to vote with Stanisław Żółtek). In France, the division between Left and Right is not considered important. More important is the attitude towards the United States, Russia and the problem of thousands of aggressive, expansive Islamist enclaves, literally beyond French jurisdiction. In France, there are entire cities, where Islamists have their own laws, their own courts, their own police and their own political and religious leader. And French socialism? Well, if France wants to have a swamp of collectivism, go right ahead. This is not Poland's business. As long as it is not a threat to Poland (in the last century German Nazism was indeed very harmful to Poland).

Wielomski: If not a federal Europe, projected by the Left in the European Commission and in the European Parliament, than what kind of Europe? If not a super-state, than what? A loose confederation or a return to an absolutely independent state, as in the XVIII or XIX century?

Marusik: A return to sovereign states. A „partially round” circle is simply not a circle. A partly sovereign state is on principle not a state. Sovereignty is an essential attribute of statehood. States may be conditioned in their behavior by external constraints, sometimes even by open blackmail, but they consider (or ignore) these conditions in a sovereign way. Otherwise they are only „state-like” entities. The currently proclaimed „federalism” of the Left is only a method for the dissemination of standards of occupation.

Wielomski: Do you support the common European market, the abolition of tariffs, the free movement of peoples and

goods? Does such an eventuality demand the integration of the union's tax, trade and consumer laws?

Marusik: I do not support so much a European common market, but rather a worldwide free market. This does not mean, however, the liquidation of borders. Sovereignty means the ability of each country to shape its own policy in the wide range of international relations, and in the control of cross-border flows: of people, goods, capital, knowledge, etc. If one country does not want the importing of very good Polish vodka, that's its own business. Others protect themselves against the influx of poisons, weapons, drugs or radioactive materials. Others control and restrict the flow of waste. Restrictions on import and export may bring good or bad results. For example, the abolition of custom fees is an obvious postulate, because it is the most advantageous step for a country not to impose any tariffs. Custom fees have only one goal: the appropriation of the benefits of international trade by the state from its own citizens. It is a simplified income tax. The imposition of tariffs indicates the occupational character of the state.

Wielomski: Is economic integration possible without political integration?

Marusik: Of course!

Wielomski: How do you view the idea of creating a European army?

Marusik: An army is an instrument for the defense of the sovereignty of the state. The establishment of a European army

would signify the unmasking of propaganda and confirm the fact, that ultimately the purpose of proclaiming the EU was and is the liquidation of sovereign European states and the creation of a United States of Europe. With all the very risky consequences.

Wielomski: The Congress of the New Right opposes the acceptance of massive waves of Muslim immigrants. From what values does this opposition stem from? Is it ordered towards the defense of Christian identity, secular principles against fundamentalism, the national idea?

Marusik: It's about the defense of Christian identity. The state, i.e. the content of the laws and the system of institutions, must be founded on some kind of understanding of good and evil. We cannot accept that the criteria of good and evil are the private matters of each citizen. One cannot set up for himself the content of applicable laws. The law must be equal for all, and so must come from a single ethical code, and an ethical code may not in turn be derived from the preferences and tastes of some „current parliamentary majority”. An ethical code is part of a specific theology. Whoever does not want to submit to our law must remain outside of Poland, and if he happens to find himself within our borders and will break our laws – he will land in jail. Muslims are guided by their own laws and openly declare that they will remain faithful to them, and so they themselves close our doors to them.

Wielomski: A united Europe must have its own idea, on which unity can be based? Should it be religion, philosophy or maybe some sort of ideology?

Marusik: Europe can function on the basis of the principles of respect for national sovereignty. Every European state can be founded on different religions and philosophies.

Wielomski: What is your position on the current anti-Russian policies of NATO, the United States, the EU, as well as Poland? Are Poland and Russia bound to be enemies?

Marusik: The EU can be omitted here, because – so far – it has not created an army. NATO is certainly a tool of harnessing other countries to implement American hegemony in the world. Anyone who is able to resist the hegemony is the natural and even mortal enemy. So far, America has had one such enemy – Russia. In recent years, the number of countries able and willing to resist America has grown: China, India, Brazil, Iran... Of course, America will use vassal states to break the power of these defiant countries. Poland is easily used to cause trouble for Russia. Hence, the involvement of the Polish army in Iraq and Afghanistan, hence Polish involvement in Georgia and Ukraine. I do not see any „Polish foreign policy”. The world becomes more comprehensible when we accept the thesis that Poland is an American pawn on the global chessboard. The Polish media... Excuse me, the media operating in Poland try to induce Poles with hostility towards Russia and Putin. But politics and propaganda are two different things.

Wielomski: Putin's Russia seems to sympathize with European rightist and nationalist movements in Western Europe, which was made manifest in the loans to the National Front, which was refused money by French banks, that willingly finance establishment parties. Can Putin be a natural ally of the European Right against the demo-liberal oligarchy ruling Europe?

Marusik: Even if Putin would support in any way right-wing parties in Europe, it would certainly not be because they are right-wing. „Rightism” can benefit from this, but only accidentally. I think that Putin does not want the European states to be used as tools of American aggression against Russia. The aforementioned National Front enjoys a degree of sympathy from Putin, despite the fact that he cannot be considered rightist.

Wielomski: In your view, Vladimir Putin is a post-Communist, who must be hated, because of his past or a statesman, who is rebuilding Russia?

Marusik: Most certainly Putin is at the same time the strongest pillar of the old communist generals and a statesman, who is trying to rebuild Russia and the Russian empire. This does not mean, however, that we should hate him for these reasons. You have to understand him and you have to be able to arrange the relations of the other European countries with Russia.

Wielomski: What is your opinion on the coup in Ukraine? Was it a „democratic coup” or nothing more than an overthrow of the government financed and planned by Washington and Berlin?

Marusik: We are living in a period of such a „political style”, according to which wars are played out as „internal rebellions”. Anyone interested is well aware that these „internal rebellions” are inspired and supported from the outside, sometimes with an ostentatious involvement of foreign armies. The coup in Kiev – inspired and supported from the outside – triggered the reaction of Russia in the form of the seizure of Crimea and a „counter-rebellion” in the eastern regions of Ukraine. I think for clarity one

should talk of a US-Russian conflict on the territory of Ukraine over Ukraine. It is about whether the Ukrainian authorities will be pro-or anti-Russian. America is trying to destroy the imperial power of Russia. Other countries are simply „screwed into” the conflict (on one side or the other).

Wielomski: And what about the conflict in the Donbass? Are the Ukrainians correct, and along with them TVN, Gazeta Polska and Gazeta Wyborcza?

Marusik: Each side has their reasons. As in any war. Everyone has their own reasons, except that each of them is different. One can fight for his reasons using the force of arguments or the argument of force. And in Ukraine we see the use of the argument of force. The propaganda outlets, which you mention, do not indicate any „arguments” in politics. They serve only the falsification of the image of reality in order to obtain the consent of Poles to certain moves on the part of the Polish authorities. In my childhood the main enemy was the „kulak”, now it is a „terrorist” or „Putin”. „Osama bin Laden” will be the main enemy for another ten years despite his death in 2011.

Wielomski: Marine Le Pen claims that after the coup Ukraine fell apart as a state the people of Crimea had the right to secede. Would you agree?

Marusik: In politics, law submits to force. One can only tell oneself that „Crimea had the right...” The question is whether she had enough strength to decide about its fate independently. States have only as much „rights”, as the strength for their effective enforcement. The simple truth is that Ukraine simply did not

have enough strength to defeat Russia in an open military conflict on the Crimean Peninsula. The law (based on the principle of subordination) is in force in an area dominated by a power monopoly. In contrast, international law (treaty) is based on the principle of conciliation, and not on the principle of subordination, which is founded on the parity of forces of the states which are parties to a treaty. Ukraine was recognized as an independent state through an agreement between the world powers (like Poland at Yalta) and the world powers are now trying to place Ukraine in a specific area of influence. Thus, the argument of force employed in this „dialogue”.

Wielomski: What is more important: the principle of self-determination or the principle of the integrity of the state?

Marusik: Something like „the right of peoples to self-determination” simply does not exist. „Self-determination of nations” is a bizarre neologism. It’s a propaganda slogan. What does in fact exist is a national identity, which is used as a binder of statehood. In order to squander force as carefully as possible, states try to get consent for their elites to rule. Such consent is obtained on the basis of a sense of community (especially between the rulers and the ruled), language, religion, culture and lived historical events and via propaganda methods. If this „right of people to self-determination” is taken seriously, what about the Roma people? Should they get-like Israel – an area where they could accomplish their „self-determination”?

Wielomski: Is Europe and the U.S. justified in fighting Assad in Syria? Or maybe the Russians are right in bombing the Islamist opposition?

Marusik: As I mentioned earlier, all of them have their reasons. It's just that these reasons are contradictory. America wants Syria in its area of imperial influence, Russia wants the same thing. Many strategic interests of world powers are intertwined there. Fighting against the government of someone is a conspicuous interference in the internal affairs of the state. Theoretically, it is not America's business who governs in Syria. Practically, if Russia mobilizes enough strength, then the regime in Syria will continue to be pro-Russian. Of course, with everything which that entails.

Wielomski: Was it right to support the rebellion in Libya in order to abolish Gaddafi? Looking at the waves of immigrants coming to Europe, was it not a mistake?

Marusik: It was aggression perpetrated against a sovereign state. As you can see, sovereign states can only exist if there is a parity of forces between the world's superpowers. Gaddafi violated the strategic interests of one superpower without a guaranteed defense from another superpower. There was no „rebellion in Libya”, so you can not consider the validity of „supporting the rebellion in Libya”. It was Western aggression against Libya. The Libyan state was annihilated by America and its allies. Europe suffered much as a result and it will suffer still.

Wielomski: What is better for Poland: American dominance or a „concert of powers”, i.e. a multi-polar world?

Marusik: American domination of the world is waning before our eyes. Only a powerful army is left. The issuing of the dollar as an instrument of imperial exploitation around the world now

has met effective resistance. The regimes of Iraq and Libya – after their resignation from the dollar – were annihilated. But Iran and India cannot be. Trading Iranian oil in exchange for gold has been used for some time now. India is also conducting transactions in gold. China is using its own currency as a reserve and is buying huge quantities of gold...The world is becoming „multi-polar”. Whether this is good for Poland or not – it does not matter. This is a return to the state of nature and we have to learn to function in the natural world. In the world of absolute American dominance there was one simple principle: the one who surrenders without a fight will not be fought. This principle could be considered good only by those who had no chance of breaking out of it. In the next few decades, the boundaries of the American empire will become more clearly outlined and will include increasingly smaller parts of the world. In the long term, you will see a new threat: the vassalization of all states by supranational structures. Apart from purely physical force (army), the main tool of oppression, exploitation and brutishness will be the total control of every person and all human activity. Countries, including America, will only be areas and institutions for the implementation of this total control, surveillance and manipulation. The state system will become a zone of occupation introduced under the rule of supranational structures. Such a process is already taking place and its happening pretty fast, and it is disturbing that no one opposes it. The removal from office of Benedict XVI as a result of brutal pressure on the Vatican Bank, i.e. the removal of the Vatican Bank from the SWIFT system until the abdication of Benedict XVI.

Wielomski: Is the EU dominated by Germany? Who rules the EU? Is it the Parliament, Commission or Angela Merkel?

Marusik: Europe is governed by a „triumvirate of katehons”: the UK, France and Germany. In essence it is power exercised above the EU. The EU, however, is governed by lobbyists and bankers.

Wielomski: Will France and the UK attempt to stop German aspirations for domination on the continent?

Marusik: Such actions are already taking place. Neither Britain nor France will agree to a further process of „integration” and increasing the influence of Germany on the continent. Both countries possess nuclear weapons and have serious aspirations to shape global policy. Germany wanted to obtain dominance in Central Europe – and they got just that. The EU is already a tool that has served its purpose. It functions only as a gigantic, bureaucratic parasite for its own self-interest, i.e. the thousands of bureaucrats and – above all – in the interest of a number of transnational corporations, that „buy” a monopolistic position in the domestic economy. Europe is changing into a dragon, which is devouring itself. „Poland exists only in theory”, while Britain and France only theoretically subordinate themselves to the dictates of the EU.

Wielomski: What is the real significance of Poland in the EU?

Marusik: Unfortunately, Poland has no significance. But to make myself clear: I do not see any meaning for Poland inside the EU. Within the EU Poland is a territory of brutal exploitation of both human and natural resources. The strength of its powers is built by the slave labor coming from sometimes distant countries. Poland is one of such countries. Living and working under Polish jurisdiction, we are not working for our own welfare, nor

contributing to the strength of our state. We do not even labor for our own existence, because the debt imposed on us is probably growing faster than our current consumption rate. We are a colony drained to the very bottom, and even much deeper. I do not even know whose colony we are. Indeed, „Poland exists only in theory”. Poland does not need an „increase of EU influence”, or any „reform”. Poland needs a resurrection. The Polish state should be brought back to life.

Michał Marusik is chairman of the Congress of the New Right, a Member of the European Parliament and member of the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF).

AN INTERVIEW WITH JANICE ATKINSON

Donald Tusk is not my European leader

Magdalena Ziętek-Wielomska

Ziętek-Wielomska: I know you support the Brexit, Madame. Why? For what reason?

Atkinson: Why? Because I want to regain my country. I do not want officials, who are not subject to our control, as is the case in the European Commission, to decide the fate of my country. 75% of the regulations that apply to us are not enacted by us. There are really many reasons: I want to recover our agriculture, because food prices in the European Union continue to grow, and the EU agricultural policy also causes poverty in Africa. We Britons still have our Commonwealth, with which we cannot have free trade, which keeps some of these countries at a low economic level. For this reason we need to support them by means of charity. The legal aspect includes the European Court of Justice, which protects human rights that are sufficiently protected in my country. In this regard, we have quite a long history. But after leaving the EU our Bill of Rights will still apply. We need to recover our territory, our

fisheries. We want to control our waters so that we can care for fish habitats. In fact, we are also able to rebuild our fishing fleet. These are just a few examples.

Ziętek-Wielomska: But the world has changed greatly in the last decades. As a result of globalization and technological progress, the member states of the EU are economically dependent on one another. What is your vision of Europe without union institutions?

Atkinson: Well... that depends on Europe. I'm worried above all about Britain. If other countries, in total 27 countries, want to voluntarily limit their sovereignty and are satisfied with the EU, it is not up to me to make decisions about what will happen in Poland or elsewhere. We can survive on our own. We can return to the XIX century, when the British Commonwealth of Nations was founded. We are proud to be a nation of traders. We have dealt with this for centuries, and we do it pretty well. Regardless of what one thinks about history, the French began with colonization, so did the Dutch. We are capable of doing it again. All it takes is courage to move from words to deeds.

Ziętek-Wielomska: What do you think of opinions according to which such aspects of common policy, as protection of the environment, competition, establishment of uniform technical standards, care for consumer health, will suffer? Should the market or individual themselves find solutions, without any central organization?

Atkinson: We don't need the EU for this. If we want to lay down workplace safety and health rules, it's a question that should be

left for us to decide. We are good at this. If you want emission standards, it is our business, we have our own auto industry. If others want to reduce or tighten standards – that is their business, we can have our own standards. The basis for exiting the EU is the regaining of the state by the British nation. It is we, and not the other 27 states of Europe, who decide what is best for enterprises in our country. One size, unfortunately, does not fit all. On these issues the Right often speaks in one voice with the Communists: we want self-determination. It doesn't matter then whether we are talking about technical standards or unfair competition. We'll do it on our own. I am a free-market liberal, but it is up to my parliament and nation to decide on the choice of people, who want to establish appropriate regulations or not. That's the whole point.

Ziętek-Wielomska: One of the main arguments for staying in the UE is that we need common technical standards.

Atkinson: Let them use this argument all they want. I don't accept it. We're leaving. Most of them argue this way, from the party of Angela Merkel to the Left. They do not understand that we can establish our own standards. Besides, most of the solutions originate in Germany. In practice, no one has influence over the setting of such standards.

Ziętek-Wielomska: In your estimation, Madame, do European states have common aims and interests? Or does each country have their own set of particular interests, making the pursuance of common interests impossible?

Atkinson: We have a common interest. Indeed, Europe is not the same as the EU. We have a similar cultural identity. Most

countries have a democratic system. I know that your country arrived at democracy somewhat later. But if we look at Poland, the membership in the EU is basically a form of return to Communism. More and more people are turning against what is happening here. As to the second part of the question: we have a common religion. I personally am an unbeliever, but faith connects us – our Judeo-Christian roots, which are now under threat.

Ziętek-Wielomska: According to the old idea of continental blocs, Europe must become one great nation in order to compete with Russia and America. This is a very German point of view. Maybe the proponents of unity are right?

Atkinson: We have the second strongest economy in Europe. We have the pound, we always had it and will never give it up. How many countries have adopted the euro? Well, all the ones that did not accept it are doing fairly well. Look at Greece: a straw Euro-zone economy. If it does not liberate itself from the euro, it will be ruled by Angela Merkel. If this is what they want, all right, they can be ruled by the Troika. Just look: people voted and did not receive what they wanted. Standing in their way is Angela Merkel, who has nothing in common with democracy. Greeks can improve their situation, all it takes is a return to the drachma.

Ziętek-Wielomska: What about the argument about the prevention of war by the EU?

Atkinson: I love this argument. The truth is that NATO stopped war. We are still members of the UN Security Council. In fact, it is quite interesting: Brussels wants to take our place at the UN, as

well as France. We will never allow this to happen. Brussels seeks to create a European army and a kind of CIA. I know that Helga Schmidt [Secretary General of the European External Action Service] said, that she did not want this to be done now, but Brussels is determined to create a spy agency. Dieter Borchardt said that we have to sacrifice sovereignty for security. I've never heard of similar nonsense. No, this will not happen.

Ziętek-Wielomska: And what about the danger of war?

Atkinson: We do not need the EU; we can regain our place at the World Trade Organization. We have the UN, NATO – all this is enough to ensure peace in Europe. I do not see any connection with the EU. This is a completely unfounded statement, another big lie, which is eagerly replicated in the European Parliament.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Maybe we are dealing with a new kind of war in Europe, i.e. an economic war?

Atkinson: I don't see the reason for using such grim words... I would rather talk of trade and competition. I believe in competition and free trade.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Our next question pertains to the Prussian model, that the EU is functioning in. Is it correct to say that this type of model, with its central bureaucracy, has been imposed on the European states?

Atkinson: As I said earlier, I think this place is evil. It is an office full of cronies, with Schulz as its head. These people are destroying freedom in order to create a new Soviet Union. And

it will not work. People will rebel, as a matter of fact, they are already rebelling. 30% of Europeans support our position.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Eurosceptics have one problem – they are being linked with nationalist and fascist stereotypes.

Atkinson: Indeed. Fascism is a dirty word. Perhaps no one knows more about fascism than you and people in my country. My father fought in the Second World War, participating in convoys to Russia. But we are able to utilize this manipulation for our goals. Swearing or using similar terms to the ones we are discussing, demonstrates a lack of arguments. They most hate it when we laugh. Whenever they talk like this, we sit and we smile – we are united and therefore strong. It's a bit like than Gandhi saying: „First they ignore you. Then they laugh at you. Then they fight you. And in the end you win”.

Ziętek-Wielomska: We see no opposition to this type of thinking from the European intellectuals and media elites. In fact, they share this stereotypical thinking.

Atkinson: You are right, we see it also in our country. You can see, that in the great universities (I do not mean by this the education level of the college), virtually no debates takes place. An authentic exchange of views has been extinguished. Have you heard about the feminist Germaine Greer? She is a great feminist, I agree with everything she says. She is Australian, but lives in the UK. Well, she cannot voice her feminist views at Oxford or Cambridge, because she was considered a Femi-Nazi. This type of language is utilized. Another example: an outstanding historian, David Starkey (diploma defended at Cambridge) is not allowed to participate in

university debates, because people are demanding „safe spaces”. So the debate was stifled. I noticed an interesting thing about the recent elections in France. Commentators in the British press and in the U.S. drew attention to the fact that Marine Le Pen and her party hired scholars, which was perceived as an attempted intrusion by a political power into a sphere it should be not be intruding into. This is certainly true in my country. When I am able to speak, for example at the University of Kent, where I address young people, I often meet students from other European countries, studying at the expense of the British taxpayer, but also taxpayers from other EU countries. After my speeches, many of them secretly agree with me. They are Spaniards, Greeks, and representatives of other nations. A student from Spain points out what is happening in his country and complains that he cannot find work at home; another, from Greece, says the same: he must stay, because in his country he will not find a job. And that’s basically it when it comes to debates. Whenever I’m in Canterbury, I address the professors: „You are apologists for the European Union, therefore let’s talk about it”. Of course, none of them take up the challenge.

Ziętek-Wielomska: But why? Where does this attitude stem from?

Atkinson: I think they are too arrogant, and too frightened. Furthermore, they believe that their funding comes from Brussels, but this is not the case. This is the money of British and European taxpayers, because there is no such thing as „European money”. Without the EU we can have much more money. Currently we spend 55 million pounds a day for the maintenance of this institution, which we could make better use of it, for example, education, science, etc.

Ziętek-Wielomska: I believe this is a major problem in contemporary Europe: the elites stand on one side, but the ordinary people – on the other.

Atkinson: Yes, you are right. For my part I can talk primarily about the UK. We could all observe what took place during the last election in France. UKIP, my former party, won the elections to the European Parliament and gained 24 seats, but in the national elections we could get more seats. However, it is still 4 million votes. The victory could have been greater had it not been for the win of David Cameron, which resulted mainly from the concerns of citizens about the possible takeover of the economy by the Socialists together with the Scottish nationalists. For this reason, a large share of our voters voted for Cameron. Of course, it is good that we have this government, not a socialist one, but this does show voter distribution. Unfortunately, no one represents the voters of the middle and working classes. What is interesting is that when I was elected the first time, and this was two years ago, people came and showed support. Then, before the national elections, they lined up in front of my office to sign a petition and further supported me, loudly and clearly.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Marxist organizations, especially the Communists, were always active on an international level. On the other hand, the problem with conservative and nationalist groups was always the lack of some international structure. They remain oriented towards their own political scene.

Atkinson: Not necessarily. Please note that, for example, British Conservatives are in alliance with American Republicans, the Australian Liberal Party, and the Canadians (unfortunately

Stephen Harper lost the last election). So such alliances do exist, albeit not necessarily among European countries, but we have gathered these parties together and it works. We do this in the UK, just as the Socialists, therefore we have a network, which you mentioned. Besides, we still have the British Commonwealth of Nations: India and other major democracies.

Ziętek-Wielomska: What about Europe and activity on a continental scale?

Atkinson: I think that perhaps we are dealing with the beginning of something really big.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Maybe the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom will contribute to popularizing the idea of join action?

Atkinson: Yes, there is the group, which we constitute. There is the Conservative Party. Unfortunately, Victor Orban is still in the same group as Angela Merkel – this place was simply assigned to him – even though he would be more comfortable next to us. Some coalitions already exist. But we know that many people want join us. They see our efforts and appreciate them. Let us hope that soon we will expand our group.

Ziętek-Wielomska: That would be splendid. Please tell us, who opposes Brexit in the UK?

Atkinson: Those who do not have enough faith in getting started on your own. Those who do not perceive the UK as a dynamic force. But they must remember that we are the second economic power

in Europe, we have links all over the world, we have a monarchy, and there is the British Commonwealth of Nations. These people simply have lost confidence in their own strength. They have let themselves become dominated by a haunting fear. But this fear is slowly disappearing. Polls indicate that the number of opponents of the EU is constantly growing; now it is over 50%. There are two reasons: one of them is terrorism, and the second is immigration. People are realizing they no longer have control of their own borders. This is not about nationalism or other similar sentiments. What bothers people is the fact that their borders are not safe. The media is increasingly helping us, and what have seen recently is that it also is beginning to reflect social concerns. This is wonderful, as there has not been such synergy in a long time. Let's look at what is happening in Calais. Even the BBC shows pictures from a bird's eye view, which is evidence that the problem is growing. Let's look at Finland. I do not remember exactly how many immigrants have landed on the coast of this country. Every now and then they check their cell phones, which store images of Jihadist atrocities, scenes of beheadings and other horrors. Nobody vetted these people. We Brits know that they want to come to our country. British truck drivers are at risk every day, some even were aimed at with weapons, and they rub against riots and are angry at the agitation of British activists. All these immigrants from Africa, Pakistan and Syria, the young and able-bodied men – women constitute only about 15% of the camp in Calais – everything is coordinated. And it happens to be right next to our coast. The French don't do anything; they probably do not understand the problem. Sarkozy is – as a parliamentarian – responsible for Calais, Holland today governs France, and Marine Le Pen is snapping at their heels. If the National Front wins, the situation in Calais may change. Brits currently are being told of some nuances in the Dublin Convention. And these people [in Calais] are

criminals. They break into the back of the truck, they threaten the lives of the drivers, and they threaten the goods being transported. You have to arrest them, imprison them and deport them. It's pretty simple. Meanwhile, Angela Merkel said that 1.2 million immigrants is not a problem. Matters of history and so on. But her own party (she spoke at the convention last Monday) says: no, this is wrong. Her people, here in the European Parliament, are listening to her with arms crossed and are angry at her. The British people see this and come to the conclusion that she has no control over anything. It's her fault. Cameron said recently that we can accept 25 thousand. It seems to be more reasonable – but then again, look what Hollande says, what Merkel is saying. This entire political row shows that we are losing control. And the British people see this.

Ziętek-Wielomska: How does London City view Brexit?

Atkinson: It just happens that we recently held a small conference on this topic in London. What's more, a survey was conducted in a variety of companies and institutions in City, which shows that 50% of these enterprises do believe Brexit could in any way jeopardize their interests. The big banks, those working globally are slowly changing their language, saying that they will not feel any change. They realize that we are at the center of global banking. We're talking about hundreds of billions of dollars a year. Besides, the bankers represent only 1% of the people employed in City. These people employ secretaries, cleaners. I do not remember the exact figures, but this represents a huge contribution to the structure of employment. And you know what? If the Commission will continue to interfere, and the Left will continue to impose draconian laws in our City, the result will be simple: the banks will flee to Switzerland or Hong Kong.

Ziętek-Wielomska: But, on the other hand, European financial institutions are located in Frankfurt. Is this not competition?

Atkinson: As you stated Madame, these are European institutions. London City will decide on its own which course to take. So far they have coped well.

Ziętek-Wielomska: So this is rather weak competition?

Atkinson: Well... The Germans and the French would gladly strangle our banks.

Ziętek-Wielomska: How can Brexit potentially influence US-UK relations?

Atkinson: It should not affect our relations. Republicans, especially those running for president, i.e. Donald Trump and Jeb Bush, do not fear any changes. They perceive NATO as a world power and the special relationship between NATO and U.S. has a long tradition. Apart from this, just who do they think they are that they can interfere in our politics?

Ziętek-Wielomska: What do you think of Donald Tusk as a European leader?

Atkinson: (laughter) He is not my leader. I sent him a letter containing my earlier speech – I think that the letter of Prime Minister Cameron did not reflect what the British people want – that is why I wrote my own. Well... Donald Tusk always makes me smile... He's just a politician.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Let's turn now to the Euro. Is a fully sovereign country only that which possesses its own currency?

Atkinson: Do I correctly understand your suggestion that countries within the Euro-zone are not fully sovereign?

Ziętek-Wielomska: That is what I would like to ask.

Atkinson: Of course. Please take a look at what happened with Greece. It is in fact guided by the Troika. In turn, these Euro-zone countries, which sought to hold a referendum on staying or leaving, were met with responses, such as: „No, it's the wrong decision, vote again”. This indicates that they have lost their sovereignty. Moreover, in Spain or Portugal there were elections held recently, in which a hard-headed Socialists won. It seems that Mr. Weber, the leader of Angela Merkel's group in the European Parliament, stated at the time that it was a bad choice that this cannot be allowed to happen. How is this possible? What right does the leader of one group have to say to the people of Spain: „Sorry, but you have chosen a bad government? Change it”? It's intimidation. Personally, I do not enjoy seeing Spain being put into the hands of a socialist government, but that was the will of people. Or, for example, today we had a discussion about borders. Many countries do not want Frontex. But they will have it, they were left with no choice. It is quite frightening language, moreover, again it has as its source Germany.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Is the Euro therefore „German currency”? Is Europe dominated by Germany?

Atkinson: That's how it definitely appears from our perspective. Of course, Germany is the leading economic power, which can

be seen, among other things, in the way it supported foreign economies.

Ziętek-Wielomska: How do you assess the European policy of Prime Minister Cameron?

Atkinson: I've always had a different perspective on the issue of Europe than he has. Even when I was in the party and spoke on the subject, I was told to shut up. But he does not listen to the voices of his constituents, who do not want to be in the Union. David always said that Britain is stronger in Europe. He will arrive here on Tuesday and will come up with arguments, which then he will take home. The next day the newspapers will report that is now ready to put Brexit up for a vote. But he is not. A few months later he will come back here and say why the UK needs to remain in the EU.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Let's move on now to politics on a larger scale. Is there a conflict between the dollar and forces trying to reduce its position in the world economy?

Atkinson: That is possible. For a long time it was the strongest economy in the world. Currently we also have China, there is Russia. Yes, it is possible. The Euro is not yet weakened, nothing threatens it.

Ziętek-Wielomska: How do you view the conflicts in the Middle East?

Atkinson: Today in Parliament we had an interesting discussion. The Greens states that Brussels wants to admit Turkey. A member of the British Conservative Party, who happens to be Muslim,

responded that there is no chance of this happening. For different reasons, because of religion and numerical data: 97% of the territory of Turkey lies in the Middle East, not in Europe, 18 million people live in poverty, the Turks would make up the largest group in Parliament. But – claimed the Greens – at the same time we are supporting a leader who jails journalists, does not respect human rights and blackmails us with the amount of three billion dollars per year. And what was the case with Putin? When the problem of trade sanctions against Russia appeared, someone stands up and says that we must absolutely implement them. So we vote – we voted against. Then a representative of Latvian farmers arose and stated explicitly that all this has a negative effect on his compatriots in Latvia – due to the supply of oil and the inability to conduct normal trade with Russia. This vacuum is being filled by China. That's what I call the politics of unintended consequences.

Ziętek-Wielomska: What is the state of Russian-British relations? What do you think of President Putin?

Atkinson: This is essentially a bipolar issue. I will not apologize for him. But he was the first one to bomb the Syrian rebel positions. He was the first to express support for France, when they experienced all the horrors of the last few weeks. He seems to be a good citizen. I do not know what drives him, but he shows that a different point of view is possible. Therefore, I believe that this is a multifaceted issue. His relations with the U.S. are quite specific, but I think that above all we must join forces in the fight against jihadists.

Ziętek-Wielomska: What is your view on the situation in Ukraine? Can one speak of Western intervention, especially by the United States and Germany?

Atkinson: The thing that worries me is the fact that – even before I was elected – this chamber fomented those brave students to revolt against their own government. And they died. They were killed. And they were persuaded here to oppose the authorities selected through direct elections. This is meddling in the affairs of a foreign state in a most shameful way. Those who are guilty of this are responsible for the death of those people.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Did Crimea have the right to secede from Ukraine and join Russia?

Atkinson: Of course, it is the right of people to self-determination.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Should European countries follow the example of Putin, whose policy is concentrated on the realization of the Russian national interest?

Atkinson: Yes. As long as the people have a voice. This is democracy: if people elect Putin, they get Putin. It is not our business to be meddling in the affairs of others. We – I have in mind my country – can offer election observers, I myself was proposed such a function. We can also monitor the situation from here, if that is what Russia wants. But it is up to the people.

Ziętek-Wielomska: What is your position on Scottish independence?

Atkinson: A referendum was conducted and the people have decided to remain a part of the United Kingdom. And this is a good solution: together we are stronger.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Despite this, propaganda efforts have not ceased. Maybe in ten years a more stable sense of Scottish national community will arise?

Atkinson: That might be the case. On the other hand, the Scottish National Party has 56 MP's in the British parliament. Only three Scottish MP's do not come from this party. Their own parliamentary elections in May 2016 will be a good test, because the SNP has not had full control over the legislature. They have the Greens, Socialists and Conservatives there. But again, it all depends on the society. On the other hand, David Cameron gave up so many times that even the British felt their interests are not adequately taken into account. This time, we should also take into account the growing resentment of the English. This is important for our economy and we do not want our money to remain abroad. Nationalists do speak of Scotland's oil resources, but a lot depends on how you mark the border line. Besides, these deposits will be exhausted soon. So what will drive their economy? The Bank of Scotland? I do not think so. So if they want price increases, fine, but then do not ask us for support.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Does the British national movement support the monarchy?

Atkinson: This I do not understand. There is no such thing as the British national movement. The Queen is very popular. She is 90 years old and is the longest reigning monarch. The question is what will become of Prince Charles – he is not so popular. At present, the institution of monarchy functions well. True, there are federalists and anti-monarchists, but they are a minority.

Ziętek-Wielomska: According to them, the maintaining of the Royal Court is too costly and the Queen has no real power...

Atkinson: Currently, the Queen supports the Minister of the Treasury and let's not forget about the tourism industry. And the British Commonwealth of Nations. Most of its member countries recognize the Queen. The maintenance of the monarchy is actually quite cheap. It seems to me that it now has its own plane, but David Cameron intends to share it. The monarch no longer has her own train and yacht. 15 years ago financing was significantly cut for the royal family. Although it is not quite a monarchy traveling on bicycles, as in the Netherlands, but the Queen is certainly economizing. And we'll see what Prince Charles will do.

Ziętek-Wielomska: A new question: according to the report issued by Baroness Butler-Sloss, the UK is no longer a Christian country and should not be considered as such. What is your opinion?

Atkinson: It's an interesting question. As I said earlier, I'm not a believer. But basically the country is still Judeo-Christian. When people are asked about faith, and they say they do not believe, and then the question is, which religion you most identify with, they will indicate Christianity. They still celebrate Christmas, still get married in churches and marriage oath is deeply rooted in the culture. So I think the Baroness is wrong, though perhaps she also refers to new religions. However, we are an open nation, very tolerant towards other religions. I have Hindu and Sikh friends, I was in their temples, participated in the festivities and watched their traditions in places of worship. It is a wonderful thing that we have such an opportunity. Unfortunately, the threat of from jihadists, but this goes beyond your question. We try to

reassure those people and say that they are welcome and that we appreciate their religion as a great value, which it undoubtedly is. But, unfortunately, it is fundamentally anti-Christian.

Ziętek-Wielomska: When we speak of European universalism, we have to have more in common than just paragraphs from treaties and declarations on human rights. What is the axiological foundation of European integration?

Atkinson: We have Christianity, a common culture, especially in art, all of these things. But once again, we are talking about Europe, not the European Union. Unfortunately, identity and culture are alien concepts to the European Commission, the Socialists and Schulz himself. I took part in the work of the Committee on Civil Liberties, during which they discussed among other things the issue of gay marriage. One of the Polish Ministers – unfortunately I do not remember his name or the group he represents – quite reasonably said something like this: my country just got rid of communism, we are a deeply Catholic nation, you cannot force us to do this, we cannot change our culture overnight and the way we experience Catholicism. Maybe someday we'll come to that, maybe not, but we are not able to take part in your march towards gay marriage. I remember that the Swedish MEP, Cecilia Wiklstrom, from the group of liberals replies: „I'm sick when I hear this”, „I cannot believe that we breathe the same air. You're disgusting. You make me sick”. Yesterday she said something similar. I was only here a month and it was difficult to comprehend that she could actually say such a thing. Especially that this Polish MEP was a very reasonable man. The French have a similar attitude. I do not care too much about gay marriages. If anyone wants to get married, go ahead. But I defend the rights of those who want to say that this is evil, because they have

behind them 2000 years of doctrine and the Pope, who says that it is wrong. Besides, the bishops of the Anglican Church in Africa say the same thing. It is their deep-rooted faith. Many Jews say it's wrong. All Muslims believe that it is bad – homosexuals in their countries are probably dropped from tall buildings or beheaded. I do not like that attitude, but I will defend the right to express it. There is nothing wrong with that. On the other hand, what is happening here is the closing of possibilities for debate, people are being bereft of their culture and identity. The only thing that matters is global warming. Everyone must share a liberal-leftist attitude. However, people rebel, they do not like what is happening.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Here we come to the question of tolerance. If they are truly tolerant...

Atkinson: There is no tolerance there. But there is much frustration. All those Greens, liberals – they quickly become angry. I recently had the opportunity to speak about violence against women. Well, I have had the opportunity to see many of its symptoms in this place. Sometimes it came close to being physical violence – as in the case of a certain journalist, but that's another matter. My friend Vicky Maeijer, a Dutch woman, gave a speech one day and someone from the Greens called her „trash”. Another example: when at a meeting with representatives visiting our organization, bringing together small businesses, I asked whether EU legislation does not hit this sector in the UK, I was shouted down by the Left, and one of the Socialists threw at me – please forgive the quote – „shut up you bloody, stupid woman”. I did not hear it, but one of my colleagues and assistants did. So I sent him an email. I wrote that I was shocked. In response I read that he did not use this type of vocabulary. So I wrote again: yes, there are witnesses, there

is a recording. Anyway, a week later in my speech I said that we are talking here about women's rights, gender equality, and what about me? Who will support me? The same Left that called my friend „trash”? The one which called me a „stupid hag”? Don't you think – I went on – that his language is totally unacceptable? Can you imagine a man of the center-right, who says something similar about a female member of your group? We would immediately be sanctioned, forbidden to take part in the meetings; everyone in the media would be talking about us. Meanwhile, they are allowed to get away with it. The others looked at me as if I was insane. The Christians turned their heads, lowered their eyes, they looked embarrassed. But in the end there was no reaction. Not even the slightest. That is an example of “tolerance”.

Ziętek-Wielomska: They seem to harbor much hatred.

Atkinson: Oh yes, the Left likes to hate. We discuss this quite often in our group. We try to approach different problems rationally, but it's not about arguments, it's pure hatred. They don't have a sense of humor. But we laugh. For example, Marine Le Pen and I, we also try not to take ourselves too seriously. But we take our politics seriously. We show the human face and they hate it.

Ziętek-Wielomska: So they talk about peace and love, but with hatred in their hearts?

Atkinson: Love and peace last as long as you agree with what they agree with and support them. They have no tolerance for that what is national, referring to identity, having to do with borders, jihad. We did not come up with these problems – UN reports discuss them, as well as Interpol reports, one needs to know the facts properly – 30% of the

refugees are not refugees, they are immigrants. It is also a question of the language they use. These would-be refugees come here in search of a better life. It would be much better to send them back so that they may fight at home. When I said this one day during a radio discussion with a liberal, I heard from him that I was disgusting. Why? – I asked. We fought during the Second World War, restored order, fascism was defeated. The same thing is happening today.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Now a controversial question: how do you view Polish immigration to the UK?

Atkinson: It is not controversial at all. You are most welcome in my country, moreover, we have much in common. And you are very hard working. I have no problem with Polish immigrants as such, but what I do not like is benefits, which they collect and then send to your country. The situation of Poles in Great Britain is improving very much indeed; it seems to me that the bigger problem is the Romanians and Bulgarians. Unfortunately, the massive influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe causes wage decreases. It is unfortunately a fact. Many young people cannot find work, although I realize that often the cause is rather their laziness. We do not train them sufficiently, which also causes migration to become problematic. You currently probably fill a certain gap. We are not able to prepare a proper amount of people to work. We do not have enough bricklayers, but we encourage young people to graduate university. We lack plasterers. We need to import labor. I have no problem with that, as we have a qualification gap, something the government did not foresee. But we have already accepted more than 1 million of your countrymen. And it's hard to deal with. I happened to visit schools where thirty languages were spoken. Can you imagine a school in Poland, in which Poles, Ukrainians, Romanians,

Albanians, Chinese and Indians were taught? Thirty languages in one class. We see this every day, and British taxpayers have to pay for it. At the same time, our children are marginalized. It's great that they can learn Polish, besides many Poles marry British women and the children of such relationships grow up in an environment of that is bi-or trilingual. It is, however, a strain on our infrastructure.

Ziętek-Wielomska: But is also a problem for Poland, we have lost many skilled people.

Atkinson: Of course, this is drainage of the labor force.

Ziętek-Wielomska: And a demographic problem. It is primarily an outflow of young people, often with their families, which leads us to a demographic crisis.

Atkinson: First of all, you educated these people. Maybe as far as university level, maybe not, but you paid for their education. Then they emigrate, leaving a huge hole in the system, in which they have thus far functioned. You are wonderful people, you respect our culture, and we respect yours, but the problem lies in the numbers. Then there are Polish-English marriages. We are lowering wages; in fact, many people earn less because of the cuts implemented by the government. It is impossible to recover benefits sent to Poland. Many people in the UK have less money because it goes to help immigrants. That is not good.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Many Poles, those living in the UK and those who have returned to Poland, complain that young Brits also abuse the social benefit system, they don't want to work, but have children and live off state subsidies.

Atkinson: We all agree with that. There many regions where Poles have settled for good, e.g. Kent, from which I come. Certainly not all young people look forward to becoming pregnant and having a free home. But we have a state-funded system, which says that such action is in order, that you do not have to worry, because the state will take care of you; pay for your child and for a roof over your head. Worse yet, it deprives the young men of what shapes masculinity. They become mere sperm banks. In turn, the girls feel more confident in this situation, they are later seen with strollers, another boyfriend behind them with a new phone. And we pay for it. I was once in a kindergarten, where I met fourteen, fifteen and sixteen-year olds with children, so I began to inquire a bit: Do you intend to find work? Why should I work? – came the answer. You are supported by your boyfriend, husband, partner? No. Whereupon it turned out that one of the children is from a relationship with one man, the second from another, and the third from yet another. Do these fathers support their children? No. Who pays for the maintenance, for diapers, for milt, etc.? For the kindergarten, social workers, who work here? I do – said I. I went to school, I have only two children, because that's all I can support. Well, I noticed they looked at me with surprise... So, yes, those Poles are right. And not only the first, but the second, third and fourth generation of a given family. We have caused people to rely on the state for help. The welfare state was to be the cradle from which people did not fall, but it began to be abused. Here I'm thinking also of the immigrants.

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INTERVIEW WITH GEORG MAYER

The creation of a Nationalist International is not a laughing matter

Magdalena Ziętek-Wielomska

Ziętek-Wielomska: The Freedom Party of Austria, whose member you are, is considered to be Eurosceptic. Do you reject any form of European integration? What exactly do you criticize about the EU?

Mayer: Yes, we are Eurosceptics and in recent times our position on this matter has only become stronger. Especially the refugee-crisis and, earlier, the problems in Greece, have shown very clearly that Europe has not the solution to every problem. The European Union as such is the true source of the problem, since the decision-making is being done by people who are true Euro-fanatics, arguing that the European Union would be the one-fits-all solution to all problems. As a member of the Freedom Party of Austria I can say that we are not against any sort of European integration, but we do not want – and this is the position we have held for decades – for Brussels to have more and more competences, taking over more and more power from national governments.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Is there a common European system of values, and if so, where can we find its roots?

Mayer: Indeed, we believe that we share a common European system of values based on our Christian, Jewish and Enlightened tradition. Freedom of religion and freedom of expression are parts of our common European tradition. But every nation has its *raison d'être*. We support a Europe of the nations where nations can decide for themselves about their inner state politics and, first and foremost, the decision-making process.

Ziętek-Wielomska: What is your position as regards the so-called European values, which the European Union claims to guarantee?

Mayer: These so-called European values are being sold out by the Euro-fanatics. To name one example, the European Union has led in 1.5 million people on its territory, most of them have not even been properly registered. However, the role of the state is to protect its own borders. Today, we have illegal guests on our territory. Nobody knows what to do with these people, nobody knows who should pay for them. One fifth of these people are illiterate, and there are many radical Islamists among them. The Euro-fanatics are indeed selling out the values of which they speak.

Ziętek-Wielomska: But they also speak of such values as hospitality, the right of every person to a decent life, to prosperity, etc.

Mayer: For us, the more important issue is the right of our countrymen, in this instance of Austrians, than the rights of

immigrants. Those who come to us are in no way war refugees, but economic refugees. We are in a larger degree responsible for Austrians, than, for example, Germans, who are the responsibility of politicians in Germany. And Austrians have a right to decide, who has the right to settle in their country and who does not. And initially we ask Austrians, if they want this many immigrants. These are the values in which we believe.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Do the European elites not see what the people feel and want? Or maybe they believe that they are the true Europeans, that the typical European has little awareness, that he is stupid and too egoistic?

Mayer: Of course! I have the impression that those who consider themselves the elite of Europe, do not want to see that many people in Europe have a problem with immigrants. Therefore, they ignore the problem that arises in connection with the illegal migration. We see this often here, in the European Parliament. Some months ago we had a discussion, which was taking place at the same time that Austria was experiencing the crisis resulting from the refugee wave. The issue discussed was that of introducing a register, so that the registered could a right of residence, and would thus be subject to control. But in a situation, where borders have been forced open, who needs such a discussion?!

Ziętek-Wielomska: Do the European elites not see this reality? Are they not interested or do they not have a vested interest in seeing reality the way it really is?

Mayer: Here in the European Parliament, the policy is very left-wing. Except that we too are humanitarian [menschenfreundlich]

and anyone who is a refugee and meets the criteria of asylum law, should receive it. But this does not mean that we cannot control the migrants, and this is the opinion that dominates in the Parliament, where it is claimed that all of the migrants are refugees of war. We see a huge difference between those who are actually refugees of war and those who come because they believe that they will be able to lead a better life.

Ziętek-Wielomska: There are many war refugees in the world. Does this mean that we should take in people from all over the world?

Mayer: That's exactly my point. We believe that, as Europeans, we are not able to help all people. On the road to Europe there are many other countries, through which these alleged refugees pass and which could also provide a better life and asylum, if they meet the relevant criteria. There are a number of Arab states, often very rich Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia. Why don't they travel to those countries? Well, an important role here was played by the Americans, who took care to create this chaos in the South.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Someone, who lived in a Communist state, can detect certain similarities with the current situation in the EU. The Communist elites were also fairly blind to reality and were surprised, when it suddenly became apparent that their system is collapsing.

Mayer: Yes, in a way this does resemble that situation. Indeed, if we look at the states of Eastern Europe, especially Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and now also Poland, we see that those countries have a more realistic approach.

Ziętek-Wielomska: These people, however, are decried as nationalists or populists.

Mayer: Or insane people. But above all, as enemies of humanity. Meanwhile, for us, our compatriots, who live in our country, are important. We are in politics for them.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Europe on the one hand, USA and Russia on the other. These states also have their interests. How do you assess European policy with regard to these states?

Mayer: The EU, which is ruled by Euro-fanatics, stands at attention in front of the Americans, who pursue their interests in Ukraine, and who violated to some extent Russia's zone of interests. I am not a defender of Vladimir Putin, but I can well understand why Putin reacted the way he did. Why is Europe moving towards a confrontation with Russia? It is incomprehensible. We are against sanctions imposed on Russia. Their effect is that in the meantime the Americans are exporting more to Russia than the Europeans. In the last half-year, the Americans have significantly improved their trade balance with Russia.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Is Europe even able to speak in one voice to Russia and the U.S.? Does a common European interest even exist? Or are the differences in national interests simply too great?

Mayer: The EU already tried to speak in one voice, when it established a foreign minister of sorts, the function of which is now performed by Federica Mogherini. But this, of course, does not work, because we are dealing with 28 states, who have different

interests, some are more aligned with the United States, others less. No, this is simply impossible. 28 states equal 28 different political interests. Such a uniform foreign policy simply cannot function.

Ziętek-Wielomska: The question of divergent national interests or in general of different positions seems to be taboo. Already the simple observation of a possibility of clashing interests leads to charges of Euroscepticism.

Mayer: Yes, we are Eurosceptics, so this does not hurt us, when the charge is made. But seriously, it saddens me, because we are dealing with a violation of basic democratic principles, which assume that about a given subject there might be different opinions, and they are all equal. The basic problem of the European Union lies in the fact that people, who have a different opinion, who present problems in a different light, are accused of being Eurosceptics, of being enemies of humanity.

Ziętek-Wielomska: This is clearly seen, when the observation is made, that states have different interests, such as in the sphere of energy production. For example, Germans are pushing for transition to renewable energy sources, whereas in the Polish energy sector coal plays a huge role...

Mayer: This is political correctness. We cannot deny some issues. Whether it is the question of foreigners or issues having to do with the climate, we don't all have to say the same thing. For example, in case of the climate issue, that we are those who have caused global warming. If someone says that throughout history there have always been periods marked by a warming of the climate, even though people had no modern industry, that person

is immediately ridiculed. Thus again we return to the question of democracy. It makes me sad that some views are banished from discussion.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Why are European elites so confident about themselves? Does the reason lay in the weakness of European journalists, scholars, artists, who benefit themselves from European funds? Do they really believe in what they preach?

Mayer: Good question! I sometimes pose it to myself. The media in Europe have been completely leveled. Russians are the bad guys and Americans are the good guys. No one talks about American interests in Ukraine. And they fight for them real hard. It awakens my mistrust when no one has the courage to say: stop. We need to adopt a different perspective, to be able to look at issues from a different position. Instead, the media have become standardized. The same is true in the case of the European elites, who are too cowardly to say something other than has been dictated to them.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Is it just a case of fear? Or maybe some sort of subjection, personal benefits?

Mayer: Fear, subjection, political correctness.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Does this not resemble the situation in Communist systems?

Mayer: Yes, of course the journalists are afraid of repressions, which threaten them if they talk in a different manner than is expected. And here I agree. This does resemble the situation in that system.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Does the greatest weakness of Eurosceptic groups result from their being associated with the stereotypical poor and uneducated voter? Or maybe this is in fact the case?

Mayer: Of course this is how we are treated by our political opponents, who aspire to develop in voters the belief that these parties have only the support of poor and less educated people. But this is only political propaganda. Of course, this is how they conduct policy. But with us, in Austria, it is quite different. The vast majority of our voters are young people, who do not walk the path of political correctness and who want to retain the right to hold a different opinion.

Ziętek-Wielomska: How can one fight this propaganda?

Mayer: Every voter fights it. Currently in the polls we are the strongest party in Austria. It is the voter himself who shows how much this propaganda is worth.

Ziętek-Wielomska: But the stereotype still exists.

Mayer: This is what the political game, which we play, is all about. Our opponents try to distract voters from us, by telling them not to vote for us, because we are supported by uneducated and poor people, i.e. the lower social classes.

Ziętek-Wielomska: In Poland this stereotype also exists. How can one deal with it in a constructive way?

Mayer: We, European patriotic forces, should work together on the European level. Thanks to this we can better identify how

others deal with problems which everywhere are the same, how to deal with political opponents, who always act according to the same patterns. They accuse us of inciting hatred, of being enemies of humanity, call us stupid. Always the same pattern.

Ziętek-Wielomska: To these accusations the charge of being nationalist is added, which suggests, that there can be no international cooperation between Europeans, because what exactly is it that can unite a Polish and Austrian nationalist?

Mayer: Such cooperation functions very well! In 2010, as general secretary of the FPÖ, I was here, in the European Parliament, and already at that time we took notice of the role of international cooperation. We realized that we needed to build a counter-bastion on the European level, the opposite pole against these Euro-fanatics, who only tell people that all is well and that everything will be all right, when one can clearly see, that all is not well. We realized that we need to exchange information about what is happening in other countries, how problems are solved there, how our opponents behave. This international, European cooperation is of great help to us in Austria. We have intensive contacts with the National Front, we share our political experience.

Ziętek-Wielomska: So nationalists don't have to shoot at each other?

Mayer: Thank God those times are over. Some socialist might claim that the creation of a Nationalist International is a laughing matter. But there is nothing funny in patriotic forces cooperating with each other in order to gain what is best for their nations.

Ziętek-Wielomska: So you believe, Sir, that the creation of a „Euroseptic International” is possible?

Mayer: It is not only possible, but crucial, and even necessary. Both for us, as politicians, as well as for ordinary people it is essential that we work together to preserve the independence, autonomy and the right of peoples to self-determination.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Is a new ideology needed, which could guide such cooperation? Nationalism seems to be a worn-out doctrine, both because of its real history and because of the stereotypes assigned to it by political opponents.

Mayer: That's right. For this reason in Austria we refer to ourselves as the Patriotic Party [Heimatpartei]. We are interested in the homeland; we do not use the term nationalism.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Is this also the position adopted in the European Parliament by the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom?

Mayer: Yes. We have created our own parliamentary group and work within it together. We have set a framework which applies to all of us. We are concerned first and foremost with stopping the process of undermining the right of nations to self-determination.

Ziętek-Wielomska: But a danger exists, that conflicts, relating to divergent national interests, will arise. Is it enough to learn to talk to each other about what separates and what unites us?

Mayer: Everyone knows that such differences exist. It is obvious to us, that, for example, the French have a different position on many issues than the Austrians or Poles. But this is not a problem. This does not, however, mean that we have to quarrel. Ultimately, it's about something much bigger.

Ziętek-Wielomska: **Do we need a new culture, which would assume the ability to discuss differences in interests, building compromises and their observance?**

Mayer: This is precisely what is happening in our Euro-group. We know that we have different points of view. But we also know that we have to cooperate. This is manifests itself in our group, Europe of Nations and Freedom.

Ziętek-Wielomska: **Do you teach such an approach to the youth?**

Mayer: Yes, all our parties have youth movements, which learn how to cooperate on the European level. A year ago we organized a large congress in Paris, which was attended by our youth organizations and during which we discussed issues that are discussed here in the European Parliament. Patriotic forces need such international cooperation and for some time now we have been working together.

Ziętek-Wielomska: **Do Austrians desire something along the lines of a federation with Germany?**

Mayer: No, absolutely not. That is a distant past, nobody desires it. Of course, there are many forms of cooperation between

Austrians and Germans, if only for reasons of a common language. But we have to look to the future and nobody brings this subject up anymore.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Is the Habsburg monarchy still a point of reference for your political circle?

Mayer: In a sense it is. Vienna is marked by the Habsburgs; the city is shaped by their reign. Just look at all those buildings there, they are too big for a small country. Certain ties with Hungary still exist. At the moment, of course, it has to do with a certain affinity to Orban, who executes policies, which we would like to see in Austria. In particular, when it comes to the closure of country borders, so that no one could illegally enter the territory of Hungary – this of course is an initiative which arouses our sympathy. Also, there are links with Slovakia, if only because of the proximity – both of the capitals are no more than 50 km apart. It seems to me that these are the two capitals in the EU located closest to each other.

Ziętek-Wielomska: What is the role of the Catholic religion in FPÖ?

Mayer: Our roots stem from the revolution of 1848 „for light and truth”. One of the aims of the revolution was the separation of Church and state, which is one of the fundamental propositions of our party. We say that the state and the Church have to be separated; we have religious liberty in Austria, which is a liberty enshrined in the constitution, but religion should remain outside of politics. Of course, we do not reject our Judeo-Christian roots on which we base ourselves and which have to be taken under consideration. But religion plays no role in our policies.

Ziętek-Wielomska: What is the ethos of freedom that guides the FPÖ?

Mayer: It is the ethos of 1848. That is the basic ideal of our party. We want to fight for freedom, for „light and truth”, for freedom of expression, for freedom of religion, for a free citizen.

Ziętek-Wielomska: And how do you approach the question of economic freedom? How much statism and how much free market does the FPÖ envisage?

Mayer: Our ideal is a social market economy, which was co-shaped in Austria. We call ourselves the social patriotic party. We want to be social, but not socialist. We don't want anyone living in poverty in Austria, but, on the other hand, there are many people who abuse our social system and this we also do not want. One cannot be blind to abuse. Economic issues are very important to us, also in the context of international cooperation. But when it comes to, for example, TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), a trade agreement with the USA, we do not want the Americans to dictate to us what product standards or what food we shall introduce in Austria. This is only our business.

Ziętek-Wielomska: What about European agricultural policy?

Mayer: This is a difficult subject. Of course, in Austria we have many small farmers, who do not benefit from European funds in such a degree as the owners of large farms. We believe that the money should be utilized in other ways. In general, small and medium-sized enterprises are an important topic in Austria, because we have a lot of these companies, while our government is

doing everything possible to destroy their livelihoods with various means. The regulations are constantly tightened, businesses have to pay more and more new taxes. In Austria we care about this very much.

Ziętek-Wielomska: Can one not get the impression that the EU has a huge stake in making sure the European economy undergoes further concentration?

Mayer: I have the impression that the EU supports large companies, while the smaller ones, which constitute the basis of the economy, are repressed. Large companies lobby on behalf of their interests. However, hardly anyone stands up for the smaller ones. This is a serious problem, which is why we are making sure that the Lux Leaks affair, with Juncker at the center is properly investigated. This has to be explained, just exactly how a large company, with the help of Juncker, influenced politics to ensure lower taxes for itself.

Georg Mayer is a member of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and a member of the European Parliament, member of the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF).

INTERVIEW WITH JEAN-LUC SCHAFFHAUSER

Vladimir Putin is a person that possesses a religious dimension

Adam Wielomski

Wielomski: To begin with, I would like you to introduce yourself, Sir, to our readers. Who is Jean-Luc Schaffhauser?

Schaffhauser: I began my career as a Member of the European Parliament quite late. Previously, I toured the world and I did many different things, although I became involved in political life at a very young age. I studied philosophy. I am a Thomist. In my youth I was a professor of philosophy, and then I worked in local government, and later in the energy sector and environmental protection – both at the local and international level. Later I worked for large private groups, notably for Dassault Aviation, among other things striving for the sale our fighter aircraft the Mirage 2000 in place of the American F-16. In this, at the same time, I was defending the interests of Dassault Aviation and of France. I also worked for large energy companies. So I was always close to what could be called the „strategic interests” of France.

Wielomski: You are one of the founders of the Rhine-Volga Association, as well as an advocate of rapprochement between Western states and Russia and also between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. All this at a time when the relations are bad or very bad. What are your motivations and ideas in this respect?

Schaffhauser: I will answer in the following manner: there was a time when Rocco Buttiglione was closely associated with John Paul II, at the same time he was also my friend. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, he asked me about the state of the opposition on the other side of the Wall. That's why I went to Hungary, even in an era when communism prevailed there, to meet people from the Hungarian Democratic Forum. I established contacts with the Slovak Civic Forum, the Czech opposition, as well as with Solidarity activists such as Najder and Mateusz Morawski. At that time we wanted together to discover the Christian roots of Europe. The Holy Father was also very interested in uniting Europe, but with the inclusion of Russia. Jean-Marie Mayer, who was also a friend of the Holy Father, and mine also (he too was a professor of philosophy), kept telling me that the Pope talks about Russia over and over. So I travelled to Russia for the first time, and this was probably in the year 1995, I looked at what was happening there. Then I returned to Russia in 2007, which was after Vladimir Putin came to power. During the second visit I sensed that Russia is already in a different era. The purpose of my trips was to build European unity around the papal formula of „two lungs of Europe” and the creation of a united Europe with Russia on the foundation of a joint dialogue between the Orthodox and Catholic churches. At the same time I maintained contacts Mateusz and Kazimierz Morawski. The latter helped

me very much, especially in understanding the principle of this pan-Christian cooperation. Catholic-Orthodox dialogue is not possible without a simultaneous Polish-Russian dialogue, and this is because Poland is a real bridge. Poland is a deeply Catholic country and in Poland alone there were some – whom I met in person after all – who wanted to build this unity. This cooperation is necessary for the development of Christianity as a whole in the future, so that we can repel Islam, which is truly a fundamental threat, because it is a militant religion and does not retreat from violence. This is not my assessment of Islam, but rather an observation of facts. On the other hand, we need to ensure the unity of the Christian world against the Chinese threat. China is a country in an era of great transformation, searching its form and her new doctrine. Today it is ruled by pragmatists, who under the guise of communism build a system that has nothing to do with Marxism. However, it is still a materialistic system. Because of these two simultaneous threats, Christians must unite, as was so often taught by John Paul II, seeing Poland at the center of the process. Maybe my answer is already too long, but there is one thing I would like to highlight. I'm Alsatian, so I know well what Franco-German reconciliation meant for the process of European unification. Therefore, I would like to see Poland rise above its history – which I am familiar with and understand your motivations – and reconcile with Russia, just as we reconciled with Germany, despite numerous assaults on their part. However, without Polish-Russian reconciliation there will be no unification of Christianity. Only thanks to such a union, through the creation of an alliance of both Christian lungs, we will be able to stand and fight Islam on the one hand and China on the other. This entire plan is dependent on the Poland's position, being as she is at the very center.

Wielomski: Do you agree with my thesis that contemporary Russia is no longer a communist or post-communist country, but the last conservative and Christian country on our continent?

Schaffhauser: Yes, that is what I believe, exactly in this way. I know that perhaps I will shock many of my Polish friends – I'm not referring, of course, to those who have known me well for thirty years – but I believe that Russia today is crucial. It is the only country stabilizing the situation in Syria. If it wasn't for the current Syrian government, we would have been literally flooded by a wave of Muslim immigrants. The plan for such an invasion was invented and developed in order to destroy Christianity, and therefore also Europe as such. The forces of evil, we can speak of such a thing, want to destroy everything associated with Christianity. France is the „eldest daughter of the Church” (even of that's sometimes forgotten), and together with Poland is at the center of the fight against these destructive forces battling against our spirituality. Even against something more. Spirituality is not a proper word for me, because I am a man of religious faith and for me Christianity constitutes true civilization. That is how I, a man of Christian faith, understand its role.

Wielomski: But let's return once again to Vladimir Putin and his role in all this. How do you assess his policies?

Schaffhauser: I think Vladimir Putin is a man that possesses a religious dimension of a fundamental nature. That, at least, is how I see it, as much as I know him. His administration has no dictatorial or totalitarian strains in them. At some point, Putin experienced a religious conversion. Besides, he was already baptized in extraordinary circumstances. Also, the way in which

he came to power was remarkable, you can even say that it was providential. After all it was difficult to predict such a turn of events. This is a man whose fate is extraordinary. This is something one could not have predicted. I think this spiritual dimension is fundamental for his entire power structure. He does not wield power for himself, but for something beyond himself. The first duty of a politician is to serve. For a Christian, this means that he must be obedient to his conscience.

Wielomski: What is your assessment of the recent coup in Ukraine? Was this the work of the Ukrainians themselves or was it inspired by the U.S. and Germany?

Schaffhauser: In such cases one can rarely have 100% certainty. But in this instance we can say for sure that this whole thing was organized by the Americans and that without a doubt Germans were accomplices. Unfortunately, Poland also played a role to some degree. No one should be instrumentalized, though sometimes this is not easy. One should not allow oneself to be drawn into a trap, a result of which can be instrumentalization. It is important to always preserve your own judgement of the situation, one's independence and be able to look beyond what we see as artificially created images. The Maidan and the great democratic movement was an example of such an artificial image. You have to analyze events in order to detect their real actors. Who organized it all? The United States. Who is paying for all this? The United States. Who organized the coup, i.e. the removal of a legitimate president under the threat of death? It was all organized. One needs to be able to assess the consequences of these events afterwards. Is Ukraine in better shape? Do they have an improved democracy? Is the country developing faster? Is there less corruption? The answers to all these questions are clearly negative.

Ukraine is not better off, but worse off. There is less democracy now than before. This democracy is now completely artificial. I cannot say whether corruption is as it was or has it increased. Even according to various reports nothing there seems to be heading in the right direction. Therefore, I believe that all of this took place in order to destabilize Europe. Allow me to explain in greater detail. I think that the Americans went mad, while China is growing faster in strength. On account of the growing strength of China, the United States should strive to create an alliance with other Western countries, and not divide Europe into two warring parts, i.e. Eastern and Western.

Wielomski: How do you view the referendum and then the annexation of Crimea? Was it legal (in accordance with the legal order) or only morally legitimate?

Schaffhauser: These events can be interpreted from the point of view of the legal order. There was a coup in Ukraine, a normal situation was interrupted, because there was a change of power through a coup instead of elections. But there was a conscious intention to break the legitimate government. From that moment on legalism was renounced and the principle of self-determination of the people automatically became applicable – let us add that this is a principle in accordance with international law – and Crimea acquired the right to appeal to that principle. Most of the inhabitants of Crimea demanded the right to exercise their power to decide their own fate. Therefore, in the case of a breakdown of a legitimate state, in accordance with the principles of international law, the residents of Crimea could do what they eventually did. The various details can be debated and everyone has their own opinion on the matter. That includes me. If the law had not been abolished, when it was not clear if normal elections would take place, then the „annexation” (please

put in quotations) of Crimea would be absolutely illegal. But from the moment of the interruption of the normal political processes, it must be said that the „annexation” occurred in accordance with international law. I will repeat to you what I said at the International Commission: everything was in accordance with international law.

Wielomski: I am also curious of your opinion of Alexander Lukashenko?

Schaffhauser: I believe that Belarus has taken a big step forward on issues such as democracy and human rights. It is a continuous process and without downtime. I think it's a big mistake to demand of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia a clear choice of a path between the West, i.e. the United States, and Russia. We are Europeans and we do not have to make such choices between two cultures and civilizations that make up Europe. It is inconceivable how one can make such a choice and also take part in this confrontation, which will be so destructive to our identity, culture and Christianity, rather than working together against the forces of China and Islam.

Wielomski: Do you see Vladimir Putin as a natural ally of the nationalist Right in France, and, more broadly, the European Right?

Schaffhauser: I think Vladimir Putin is an ally, but it's not about „Left” and „Right”, but rather about the forces of preservation and development.

Wielomski: So he is an ally of the forces defending European Civilization?

Schaffhauser: Yes, that is exactly the way it is. He is an ally of the forces of preservation and development, and in some instances also of those who fight to preserve natural law, without which there is no culture, no society, and no politics.

Wielomski: One last issue I would like to ask you about. How do you assess Polish foreign policy, especially in the East?

Schaffhauser: Poland should do today what we Alsations already did once. Here I am referring to the Franco-German reconciliation. We Alsations suffered very much during the Franco-German conflict, because we ourselves are a people of two cultures. Poland is at the core of the European problem. The division of Europe and its dividing into East and West is dependent, to a large extent, on Poland's position. Historical resentments devour a nation and that is why nations must be able to rise above them. Poland should become a bridge between cultures, a bridge between civilizations, so that the cultures and civilizations of Catholicism and Orthodoxy can stand together in the struggle against Islam and China. If Poland does not grasp its fundamental role from the point of view of civilization and history, if it does not become such a bridge, then we will lose and we will be destroyed. The whole of Europe will be destroyed. Poland has a unique role, much depends on her. I hope that Poland will undertake the thought and words of its pope, who at all costs wanted to save her Christian identity and pave the way for cooperation with Russia.

Jean-Luc Schaffhauser is a Member of the European Parliament elected as a candidate of the National Front and a member of the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF).